Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games

We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected from games with the neighbors. The players, located on the sites of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation or defection and use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule drives the system towards a state where only one evolutionary rule remains alive even in the coexistence of cooperative and defective behaviors. The final rule is related to the optimum providing the highest level of cooperation and affected by the topology of the connectivity structure.Comment: 5 two-column pages, 3 figure

Impact of critical mass on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

We study the evolution of cooperation under the assumption that the collective benefits of group membership can only be harvested if the fraction of cooperators within the group, i.e. their critical mass, exceeds a threshold value. Considering structured populations, we show that a moderate fraction of cooperators can prevail even at very low multiplication factors if the critical mass is minimal. For larger multiplication factors, however, the level of cooperation is highest at an intermediate value of the critical mass. The latter is robust to variations of the group size and the interaction network topology. Applying the optimal critical mass threshold, we show that the fraction of cooperators in public goods games is significantly larger than in the traditional linear model, where the produced public good is proportional to the fraction of cooperators within the group.Comment: 4 two-column pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Defense mechanisms of empathetic players in the spatial ultimatum game

Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the evolution of fairness, thus far considered continuous strategies have precluded the observation of solutions that would be driven by pattern formation. Here we introduce a spatial ultimatum game with discrete strategies, and we show that this simple alteration opens the gate to fascinatingly rich dynamical behavior. Besides mixed stationary states, we report the occurrence of traveling waves and cyclic dominance, where one strategy in the cycle can be an alliance of two strategies. The highly webbed phase diagram, entailing continuous and discontinuous phase transitions, reveals hidden complexity in the pursuit of human fair play.Comment: 4 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review Letter

Generalized mean-field study of a driven lattice gas

Generalized mean-field analysis has been performed to study the ordering process in a half-filled square lattice-gas model with repulsive nearest neighbor interaction under the influence of a uniform electric field. We have determined the configuration probabilities on 2-, 4-, 5-, and 6-point clusters excluding the possibility of sublattice ordering. The agreement between the results of 6-point approximations and Monte Carlo simulations confirms the absence of phase transition for sufficiently strong fields.Comment: 4 pages (REVTEX) with 4 PS figures (uuencoded

Phase transitions for rock-scissors-paper game on different networks

Monte Carlo simulations and dynamical mean-field approximations are performed to study the phase transitions in rock-scissors-paper game on different host networks. These graphs are originated from lattices by introducing quenched and annealed randomness simultaneously. In the resulting phase diagrams three different stationary states are identified for all structures. The comparison of results on different networks suggests that the value of clustering coefficient plays an irrelevant role in the emergence of a global oscillating phase. The critical behavior of phase transitions seems to be universal and can be described by the same exponents.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, to be published in PR

Segregation process and phase transition in cyclic predator-prey models with even number of species

We study a spatial cyclic predator-prey model with an even number of species (for n=4, 6, and 8) that allows the formation of two defective alliances consisting of the even and odd label species. The species are distributed on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of spatial distribution is governed by iteration of two elementary processes on neighboring sites chosen randomly: if the sites are occupied by a predator-prey pair then the predator invades the prey's site; otherwise the species exchange their site with a probability $X$. For low $X$ values a self-organizing pattern is maintained by cyclic invasions. If $X$ exceeds a threshold value then two types of domains grow up that formed by the odd and even label species, respectively. Monte Carlo simulations indicate the blocking of this segregation process within a range of X for n=8.Comment: 5 pages, 5 figures, to be appear in Phys. Rev.

Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games

Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbe

Influence of extended dynamics on phase transitions in a driven lattice gas

Monte Carlo simulations and dynamical mean-field approximations are performed to study the phase transition in a driven lattice gas with nearest-neighbor exclusion on a square lattice. A slight extension of the microscopic dynamics with allowing the next-nearest-neighbor hops results in dramatic changes. Instead of the phase separation into high- and low-density regions in the stationary state the system exhibits a continuous transition belonging to the Ising universality class for any driving. The relevant features of phase diagram are reproduced by an improved mean-field analysis.Comment: 3 pages, 3 figure

Cluster mean-field study of the parity conserving phase transition

The phase transition of the even offspringed branching and annihilating random walk is studied by N-cluster mean-field approximations on one-dimensional lattices. By allowing to reach zero branching rate a phase transition can be seen for any N <= 12.The coherent anomaly extrapolations applied for the series of approximations results in $\nu_{\perp}=1.85(3)$ and $\beta=0.96(2)$.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figures, 1 table included, Minor changes, scheduled for pubication in PR

Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas

Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual fitness as well as on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group interactions, we show that plugging into the "wisdom of groups" strongly promotes cooperative behavior. The more the wider knowledge is taken into account the more the evolution of defectors is impaired. We explain this by revealing a dynamically decelerated invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different domains remain smooth and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently invade cooperators. This in turn invigorates spatial reciprocity and establishes decentralized decision making as very beneficial for resolving social dilemmas.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report