Moderate nominalism and moderate realism

The subject matter of this thesis is analytic ontology. Chapters II and III deal with two versions of trope theory, or moderate nominalism; these are defined as ontologies which recognise properties and relations but no (real) universals. The key notion of both theories, trope, is characterised as an abstract particular. What the abstractness amounts to differs between the two. Yet another difference is that simplicity is an essential trait of a trope according to one theory, but not according to the other. Though exact similarity is said to play an important role in both theories, as it turns out, this does not seem to be the case. The ontology dealt with in chapter IV is a mixture of moderate nominalism concerning qualities and realism concerning relations. In it, quality instances (moments) and universal relations are the ultimate constituents of the universe. While relations and moments are considered to be constituents of states of affairs, which are characterised as objects of higher orders, complexes that are objects of the first order are made up of moments on their own. Among these complexes one finds the ordinary objects. Paradoxically, although relations are necessary for the existence of complex first order objects, relations are not thought to be among the contents of these objects. The main subject of chapter V is a particular version of moderate realism; it is an ontology which is realistic in its recognition of universals and moderate in its recognition of instances of these universals. Instances combine to form complex networks. A theoretically motivated claim is that although each instance has a predicational aspect as well as a universal one, it is simple in the sense of lacking internal predicative structure; though, this claim can be called into question. Keywords: analytic ontology, moderate nominalism, moderate realism, particular, universal, abstract, concrete, abstract particular, abstract universal, concrete particular, concrete universal, trope, moment, complex unity, collection, instance, unit attribute, intensional aspect, predicational aspect, continuous composite, articulated composit

From being unaccountable to suffering from severe mental disorder and (possibly) back once again to being unaccountable

From 1965, the Swedish penal law does not require accountability as a condition for criminal responsibility. Instead, severely mentally disordered offenders are sentenced to forensic psychiatric care. The process that led to the present legislation had its origins in a critique of the concept of accountability that was first launched 50 years earlier by the founding father of Swedish forensic psychiatry, Olof Kinberg. The concept severe mental disorder is part of the Criminal Code as well as the Compulsory Mental Act. The medical conditions for being sentenced to forensic psychiatric care are supposed to be the same as those for being admitted to involuntary psychiatric care. What these conditions are is not regulated in any law. For the guidance of the courts and others, there is a collection of examples in the government bill drafting the legislation in question. On the basis of these examples the content of the concept of severe mental disorder is chiselled out. However, the purposes of imposing penal law sanction and admitting someone to psychiatric care are not the same, and therefore the content of the concept severe mental disorder is bound to differ accordingly. Severe mental disorder is a legal concept that masks as a psychiatric one. In its applications in penal law, the court determines its content. But for the forensic psychiatrist it is more natural to interpret the term as a medical one. This creates a tension that has led to several controversies in recent criminal cases in Sweden. The best way to alleviate the situation is to discard the concept of severe mental disorder from criminal law. This will allow for a better separation of the roles of the psychiatrist and the court

Knowledge and forms of knowledge

Uppsatsens primära syfte är att analysera begreppet kunskapsform samt de fyra kunskaps-formerna fakta-, förståelse-, färdighets- och förtrogenhetskunskap, som dessa beskrivs av Ingrid Carlgren. Ett andra syfte är att ge förslag till förändringar/förbättringar av bestämningarna av de fyra kunskapsformerna. Uppsatsens frågeställningar ansluter syftena: Vad är kunskapsform tänkt att vara, i Carlgrens beskrivning? Vad utmärker respektive kunskapsform? Hur skiljer sig de fyra kunskapsformerna från varandra? Hur är de relaterade till varandra? Hur utforma förbättringar av kunskaps-formerna? Den använda analysmetoden är en variant av conceptual engineering. Metoden har två delar. I den ena analyseras analysobjekten – i detta fallet kunskapsform och de fyra kunskapsformerna. I den andra föreslås förändrade/förbättrade bestämningar av analysobjekten. Analysen av kunskapsformen faktakunskap utmynnar i att den bäst förstås i termer av två slags fakta, råa respektive institutionella fakta, beträffande vilka försanthållanden görs. Analysen av kunskapsformen förståelsekunskap utmynnar i ett förslag till förändrad avgränsning och be-stämning i termer av att explanatoriskt använda identifierade mönster. Analysen av färdighets- och förtrogenhetskunskap utmynnar i ett förslag om en annan typ av kategorisering där dessa två kunskapsformer ersätts av den singulära kunskapsformen know-how. Know-how är för-mågan att kunna utföra en viss handling, och termen ”know-how” innefattar såväl förmågan till handling, vars utförande kan uttryckas i ord, som handlingen, vars utförande inte kan uttryckas i ord av utövaren

Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday

Inthe last decades, Ingvar Johansson has made a formidable contribution to the development of philosophy in general and perhaps especially to the development of metaphysics. This volume consists of original papers written by 50 philosophers from all over the world in honour of Ingvar Johansson to celebrate his 70th birthday. The papers cover traditional issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, applied ethics and applied metaphysics, the nature of human rights, the philosophy of economics and sports. Some of the papers study the philosophy of Ingvar Johansson. All of them studies subjects which he has shown an interest in. The variety of subjects covered, testifies to the extraordinary wide range of issues his thought has had a bearing on

New Swedish forensic psychiatric facilities: visions and outcomes.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to map significant features of the physical design of nine recently planned facilities for forensic psychiatric care in Sweden. The present paper is focused on differences in the physical design, static security adaptations, visions and goals for the projects, economy and steering processes. Design/methodology/approach – In June 2008, records concerning major forensic psychiatric construction projects, planned or carried out between 1970 and 2008, were requested from all 21 regions in Sweden. The documents were collected, organized, critically examined, and analyzed in their contexts. Extensive data have also been retrieved from the internet. Findings – In spite of the common national legislation governing forensic psychiatric care, the projects show great diversity in the physical design and, after 2006, increasing emphasis on static security. The collected material indicates different visions and goals and little coordination between them. It also suggests that the decisions rarely have been preceded by scientific studies or, as it appears, systematic needs assessments. There were also considerable variations in the interpretation of the legislation stipulating public access to official documentation and the time-frame allowed for such requests. Research limitations/implications – Limitations of the project especially relate to the incompleteness of the documents received. Originality/value – This mainly descriptive paper provides an overview of contemporary Swedish forensic psychiatric construction projects, planned for or realized after 2000. This paper points out structural and physical differences between these projects. The systematised documents are made available for research purposes within different disciplines

Mental disorder is a cause of crime: The cornerstone of forensic psychiatry

The assumption that mental disorder is a cause of crime is the foundation of forensic psychiatry, but conceptual. epistemological. and empirical analyses show that neither mental nor crime, or the causation implied, are clear-cut concepts. "Mental" denotes heterogeneous aspects of a per-son such as inner experiences. cognitive abilities, and behaviour patterns described in a non-physical vocabulary. In psychology and psychiatry, mental describes law-bound, caused aspects of human functioning that are predictable and generalizable. Problems defined as mental disorders are end-points of dimensional inter-individual differences rather than natural categories. Deficits in cognitive faculties, such as attention, verbal understanding, impulse control, and reality assessment, may be susceptibility factors that relate to behaviours (Such as crimes) by increasing the probability (risk) for a negative behaviour or constitute causes in the sense of INUS conditions (insufficient but Non-redundant parts of Unnecessary but Sufficient conditions). Attributing causes to complex behaviours such as crimes is not an unbiased process, and mental disorders will attract disproportionate attention when it comes to explanations of behaviours that we wish to distance ourselves from. Only by rigorous interpretation of what psychiatry actually can inform us about, using empirical analyses of quantified aggressive antisocial behaviours and their possible explanatory factors, can we gain a clearer notion of the relationship between mental disorder and crime. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved