Climate change: Why the conspiracy theories are dangerous

Uncertainty surrounds the public understanding of climate change and provides fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Typically, such conspiracy theories assert that climate scientists and politicians are distorting or hijacking the science to suit their own purposes. Climate change conspiracy theories resemble other conspiracy theories in some respects, but in others they appear to be quite different. For example, climate change conspiracy theories appear to be motivated by the desire to deny or minimize an unwelcome and threatening conclusion. They also appear to be more contentious than other types of conspiracy theories. Perhaps to an unparalleled extent, people on both sides of the issue champion climate change conspiracy theories. Finally, more than other conspiracy theories, those concerning climate change appear to be more politically loaded, dividing opinion across the left-right continuum. Some empirical evidence suggests that climate change conspiracy theories may be harmful, steering people away from environmentally friendly initiatives. They therefore present a significant challenge for governments and environmental organizations that are attempting to convince people to take action against global warming

When is it wrong to eat animals? The relevance of different animal traits and behaviours

Research suggests that animals’ capacity for agency, experience, and benevolence predict beliefs about their moral treatment. Four studies built on this work by examining how fine‐grained information about animals’ traits and behaviours (e.g., can store food for later vs. can use tools) shifted moral beliefs about eating and harming animals. The information that most strongly affected moral beliefs was related to secondary emotions (e.g., can feel nostalgia), morality (e.g., will share food with others), empathy (e.g., can feel others pain), social connections (e.g., will look for deceased family members), and moral patiency (e.g., can feel pain). In addition, information affected moral judgements in line with how it affected superordinate representations about animals’ capacity for experience/feeling but not agency/thinking. The results provide a fine‐grained outline of how, and why, information about animals’ traits and behaviours informs moral judgements

Why conspiracy theories matter: A social psychological analysis

Although conspiracy theories have arguably always been an important feature of social life, they have only attracted the attention of social psychologists in recent years. The last decade, however, has seen an increase in social psychological research on this topic that has yielded many insights into the causes and consequences of conspiracy thinking. In this article, we draw on examples from our own programme of research to highlight how the methods and concepts of social psychology can be brought to bear on the study of conspiracy theories. Specifically, we highlight how basic social cognitive processes such as pattern perception, projection, and agency detection predict the extent to which people believe in conspiracy theories. We then highlight the role of motivations such as the need for uniqueness, and the motivation to justify the system, in predicting the extent to which people adopt conspiracy explanations. We next discuss how conspiracy theories have important consequences for social life, such as decreasing engagement with politics and influencing people’s health and environmental decisions. Finally, we reflect on some of the limitations of research in this domain and consider some important avenues for future research

Conspiracy theories and the conspiracy mindset: Implications for political ideology

We consider the significance of belief in conspiracy theories for political ideologies. Although there is no marked ideological asymmetry in conspiracy belief, research indicates that conspiracy theories may play a powerful role in ideological processes. In particular, they are associated with ideological extremism, distrust of rival ideological camps, populist distrust of mainstream politics, and ideological grievances. The “conspiracy mindset” characterizes the ideological significance of conspiracy belief, and is associated with measuring conspiracy belief by means of abstract propositions associated with aversion and distrust of powerful groups. We suggest that this approach does not pay sufficient attention to the nonrational character of specific conspiracy beliefs and thus runs the risk of mischaracterizing them, and mischaracterizing their ideological implications

Rabbit Hole Syndrome: Inadvertent, accelerating, and entrenched commitment to conspiracy beliefs

There is mounting anecdotal evidence that some individuals fall into conspiracy ‘rabbit holes’ causing harms ranging from social isolation to violence. We propose a hypothetical Rabbit Hole Syndrome in which some individuals’ subscription to conspiracy beliefs is initially inadvertent, accelerates recursively, then becomes difficult to escape. This proposal is distinguished by a person-centred and dynamic perspective on conspiracy beliefs. It aims to provide a theoretical foundation for research that (a) illuminates the rabbit hole phenomenon, (b) is pluralistic, spanning diverse subdisciplines (e.g., social and clinical psychology) and methods (e.g., qualitative, longitudinal, and case studies), and (c) informs theory and practice by uncovering discontinuities between committed believers and other populations in the causes, consequences, and ‘remedies’ of conspiracy beliefs

Toeing the party line: Politically driven responses to the coronavirus pandemic in the USA

Polling data indicate that in the USA, Republicans, compared to Democrats, have been less inclined to take preventive measures against coronavirus. In three studies (Ns = 380, 430, and 393), we sought to find evidence for partisan motivations and to illuminate how they translate into attitudes, behavioral intentions and actual behaviors. Results revealed a consensus that the Democratic party wants people take coronavirus seriously. Thus, while Democrats thought it was aligned with their political interests, Republicans thought it was in their opponents’ interests. Further analyses suggest that perceived party interests mediated the effect of party allegiance on attitudes about the seriousness of coronavirus, and both attitudes and intentions to preventive behaviors (Studies 1 and 2) and specifically attitudes and intentions to wear masks (Study 3). This relationship also held for mask-wearing behavior. Results suggest that people’s responses to coronavirus may reflect a conformity to the perceived wishes and interests of their political party

Conspiracy Mentality Versus Belief in Conspiracy Theories: Response to Nera and Some Recommendations for Researchers

In this research spotlight, we respond to Nera’s (2024, this issue) critique of the conspiracy mentality. We agree that the concept of the conspiracy mentality – and its relation to belief in conspiracy theories –requires further clarification. We also agree that the causal relationship between conspiracy mentality and belief in conspiracy theories may be bidirectional. We elaborate on these arguments by adding additional critical points and providing recommendations for researchers. We see the chief value of the construct as making it possible to tease apart (e.g., in covariance analyses) belief in conspiracy theories from the political attitudes that underlie them

Semantic and causal relations between the conspiracy mentality and belief in conspiracy theories

Four pre-registered studies examined the semantic and causal relation between conspiracy mentality and belief in conspiracy theories. Study 1 (N = 251) confirmed important differences between these two constructs. Participants perceived conspiracy mentality propositions as general rules and conspiracy theories as specific examples. This perception that conspiracy mentality statements are more general was associated with the perception that they are more plausible and, if shared, less likely to cause dispute and to stigmatize the communicator. Conceptualizing them as different constructs, Studies 2–4 together indicate that they might have a bidirectional causal relationship with each other. Affirming conspiracy theories set in real-world and fictional societies increased participants’ conspiracy mentality scores, relative to negations of conspiracy theories (Studies 2, 3) and a baseline condition (Study 4). Conversely, affirming conspiracy mentality statements increased participants’ endorsement of conspiracy theories (Study 4). The semantic relation between the two constructs means each may reinforce the other through inductive and deductive reasoning. Nonetheless, important social-psychological differences may emerge between them due to the greater specificity and epistemic riskiness of conspiracy theories compared to the conspiracy mentality

Belief in conspiracy theories: Looking beyond gullibility

In this chapter, we consider the factors that attract people toward conspiracy theories and also consider whether or not belief in conspiracy theories is a sign of gullibility. We first review the framework of Douglas, Sutton, and Cichocka (2017), which explains that belief in conspiracy theories is driven by epistemic, existential, and social motives. In reviewing the literature on the psychology of conspiracy belief, we conclude that people who believe in conspiracy theories will not simply believe anything they hear. Instead, people appear to believe conspiracy theories that appeal to these three important psychological motives. Conspiracy believers can therefore not be dismissed as gullible and researchers should not characterize them as such. In the remainder of the chapter, we highlight some of the social consequences of conspiracy theories. To date, research reveals that while conspiracy theories may seem attractive to people when they are seeking to satisfy their psychological motives, unfortunately they may sometimes do more harm than good