Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration

Crafting appropriate dispute settlement processes is challenging for any conflict-management system, particularly for politically sensitive international economic law disputes. As the United States negotiates investment treaties with Asian and European countries, the terms of dispute settlement have become contentious. There is a vigorous debate about whether investment treaty arbitration (ITA) is an appropriate dispute settlement mechanism. While some sing the praises of ITA, others offer a spirited critique. Some critics claim that ITA is biased against states, while others suggest ITA is predictable but unfair due to factors like arbitrator identity or venue. Using data from 159 final cases derived from 272 publicly available ITA awards, this Article examines outcomes of ITA cases to explore those concerns. Key descriptive findings demonstrate that states reliably won a greater proportion of cases than investors; and for the subset of cases investors won, the mean award was US$45.6 million with mean investor success rate of 35%. State success rates were roughly similar to respondent-favorable or state-favorable results in whistleblowing, qui tam, and medical-malpractice litigation in U.S. courts. The Article then explores whether ITA outcomes varied depending upon investor identity, state identity, the presence of repeat-player counsel, arbitrator-related, or venue variables. Models using case-based variables always predicted outcomes whereas arbitrator-venue models did not. The results provide initial evidence that the most critical variables for predicting outcomes involved some form of investor identity and the experience of parties’ lawyers. For investor identity, the most robust predictor was whether investors were human beings, with cases brought by people exhibiting greater success than corporations; and when at least one named investor or corporate parent was ranked in the Financial Times 500, investors sometimes secured more favorable outcomes. Following Marc Galanter’s scholarship demonstrating that repeat-player lawyers are critical to litigation outcomes, attorney experience also affected ITA outcomes. Investors with experienced counsel were more likely to obtain a damage award against a state, whereas states retaining experienced counsel were only reliably associated with decreased levels of relative investor success. Although there was variation in outcomes, ultimately, the data did not support a conclusion that ITA was completely unpredictable; rather, the results called into question some critiques of ITA and did not prove that ITA is a wholly unacceptable form of dispute settlement. Instead, the results suggest the vital debate about ITA’s future would be well served by focusing on evidence-based insights and reliance on data rather than nonreplicable intuition

International Investment Arbitration: Winning, Losing and Why

This perspective reviews recent empirical research about investment treaty arbitration in order to help create a more accurate framework for policy choices and dispute-resolution strategies

国际投资仲裁：胜诉、败诉及其原因

本文回顾了最近有关投资条约仲裁的实证研究，目的是为了帮助创建一个更准确的政策选择和争端解决的战略框架

The Role Of International Arbitrators

With the advent of the global economy, arbitration has become the preferred mechanism for resolving international disputes. Today international arbitrators resolve billions of dollars worth of disputes

Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration

International investment and related disputes are on the rise. With national courts generally unavailable and difficulties resolving disputes through diplomacy, investment treaties give investors a right to seek redress and arbitrate directly with states. The costs of these investment treaty arbitrations - including the costs of lawyers for both sides, as well as administrative and tribunal expenses - are arguably substantial. This Article offers empirical research indicating that even partial costs could represent more than 10% of an average award. The data suggested a lack of certainty about total costs, which parties had ultimate liability for costs, and the justification for those cost decisions. Although there were signs of balance and a preference for parties to be responsible for their own costs, there was neither a universal approach to cost allocation nor a reliable relationship between cost shifts and losing. Awards typically lacked citation to legal authority and provided minimal rationale, and the justifications for cost decisions exhibited broad variation. Small pockets of coherence existed. Tribunals typically decided costs only in the final award; and as the amount investors claimed increased, tribunal costs also increased. Such a combination of variability and convergence can disrupt the value of arbitration for investors and states. In light of the data, but recognizing the need for additional research to replicate and expand upon the initial findings, this Article recommends states consider implementing measures that encourage arbitrators to consider specific factors when making cost decisions, obligate investors to particularize their claimed damages at an early stage, and facilitate the use of other Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) strategies. Establishing such procedural safeguards can aid the legitimacy of a dispute resolution mechanism with critical implications for the international political economy

The Future of Law and Development: Investment Treaty Abritration and Law & Development

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The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards

The legitimacy of the World Bank\u27s dispute resolution body - The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) - is a matter of heated debate. Some states have alleged that ICSID is biased, withdrawn from the ICSID Convention, and advocated creating alternative arbitration systems. Using pre-2007 archival data of the population of then- known arbitration awards, this Article quantitatively assesses whether ICSID arbitration awards were substantially different from arbitration awards rendered in other forums. The Article examines variation in the amounts claimed and outcomes reached to evaluate indicators of bias. The results indicated that there was no reliable statistical relationship between ICSID arbitrations and either amounts claimed or ultimate outcomes. The results generally did not show a statistical difference when controlling for (1) the presence of an Energy dispute, (2) the presence of a Latin American respondent, or (3) the respondent\u27s Development Status. Nevertheless, although outcomes were not statistically different for Latin American and non-Latin American respondents, amounts claimed against Latin American states were higher - but only for non-ICSID arbitration. While the arguably higher initial arbitration risk may contribute to concerns related to perception of bias, the results provide initial evidence that those criticisms may have been misattributed to ICSID. Results suggested, on the whole, that ICSID arbitration awards were not statistically different from other arbitral processes, which is preliminary evidence that ICSID arbitration was not necessarily biased or that investment arbitration operated in reasonably equivalent ways across forums. Caution about this finding is appropriate given the size of the pre-2007 population and as one analysis suggested that for the subset comprised only of ICSID Convention awards as compared to all other awards (including ICSID Additional Facility awards), awards against Low Income respondents were statistically higher than awards against High Income respondents. Qualitative commonalities in that small subset of awards revealed the presence of certain types of law firms (or the lack thereof) or recent civil war in African states. In light of the initial quantitative findings for a pre-2007 population of arbitration awards, but recognizing the need for replication and methods to facilitate qualitative and normative assessments of ICSID, this Article concludes by suggesting that there may be value in implementing tailored reforms and structural safeguards to address arguable concerns of bias, improve the management of international economic conflict, and minimize a potential backlash to the international investment system

International Investments Arbitration: Winning, Losing and Why

In late 2008, as financial markets were crashing, the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment launched the Columbia FDI Perspectives. The first Perspective, entitled “The FDI recession has begun,” correctly forecast an FDI recession in the following year. From that first Perspective in late 2008 to the end of 2010, the series published thirty-three concise notes on topical FDI-related issues by diverse experts in the field. The purpose of these Perspectives is to inform readers about some of the important issues and trends in the contemporary debate on FDI, and to promote a wide-ranging discussion about the policy implications of these trends and events. The topics of these Perspectives, while not an exhaustive list of the issues raised by the global investment regime, capture a dynamic period in the global debate on international investment and reflect many hot topics and issues of continuing relevance in 2009-2010. Topics ranged from the implications of the financial crisis and recession for major economies, to the changing geography of the international investment regime and policy questions faced by emerging markets; from the implications of sovereign investment for national security and measures taken to restrict such investment, to policy options for countries seeking to increase inward investment flows and trying to stay competitive in a downward market; from investment in land and agriculture, to investment in extractive industries – raising important questions both for national policy and for the international investment regime. The range of topics reflects the multifaceted, interdisciplinary and rapidly evolving nature of key issues in international investment. This compilation of the Perspectives offers snapshots of some of the most topical issues of 2009-2010 and an opportunity to connect the dots, drawing out the interconnections among the various themes addressed in the stand-alone Perspectives. It is the collection of these issues and policy considerations that, woven together, forms the changing fabric of the international investment regime. By putting these pieces together in one volume, this e-book allows a clearer picture to emerge.https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_bk_contributions/1231/thumbnail.jp

The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the Invisible College of International Arbitration

As diversity can affect the perceived legitimacy of a state’s dispute resolution system and the quality of judicial decisions, diversity levels in the national bench and bar have been an area of transnational concern. By contrast, little is known about diversity of adjudicators and counsel in international arbitration. With a lack of accurate, complete, and publicly available data about international arbitrators and practitioners, speculation about membership in the “invisible college” of international arbitration abounds. Using data from a survey of attendees at the prestigious and elite biennial Congress of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration permitted one glimpse into the membership of the international arbitration community. Although defining the international arbitration community is challenging, rather than leave the “invisible college” unexamined, this Article offers one systematic glimpse into the global elites of international arbitration using data from 413 subjects who served as counsel and 262 who acted as arbitrators (including 67 investment treaty arbitrators). The median international arbitrator was a fifty-three year old man who was a national of a developed state reporting ten arbitral appointments; and the median counsel was a forty-six year old man who was a national of a developed state and had served as counsel in fifteen arbitrations. In addition: (1) 17.6% of the arbitrators were women, and there was a significant age difference such that male arbitrators were approximately ten years older than women; (2) for those acting as international arbitrators, we could not identify a significant difference in the number of appointments women and men obtained; (3) depending upon how development status was defined, developing world arbitrators accounted for fifteen to twenty percent of arbitrators; and (4) for all measures used to analyze development status, arbitrators from the developing world received a statistically lower number of appointments than their developed world counterparts. Recognizing the data revealed diversity in international arbitration is a complex phenomenon, the data nevertheless supported, rather than disproved, claims that international arbitration is a relatively homogenous group. Acknowledging that international arbitration may improve over time and diversity issues challenge other forms of dispute resolution, diversity levels in international arbitration were somewhat lower than in several national court systems but were generally reflective of diversity levels in other international courts and tribunals. The international arbitration community seems aware of the distortions. For all subjects, 57.5% either somewhat or strongly agreed that international arbitration experiences challenges related to gender, nationality, or age. Younger subjects and women were statistically more likely to identify such challenges as compared to older or male subjects; but subjects from states outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) were less likely to identify challenges when compared to their OECD counterparts. Replication is necessary as the results may reflect a limited historical baseline of international arbitration global elites. Given the self-identified concerns and the symbolic legitimacy of broader representation, the international arbitration community may wish to explore factors inhibiting full utilization of untapped talent and facilitate aims of procedural, and potentially distributive, justice. Structural and incremental strategies could then promote a sustainable international arbitration system for the future