Inflation Uncertainty and Contract Duration.

This study examines the determinants of the duration of U.S. union contracts using a longitudinal contract data base. Support is found for the hypotheses that (1) inflation uncertainty reduces contract length and that (2) greater contracting costs, as proxied by a strike variable and by previous duration, increase contract length. In addition, contract duration is found to be greater for indexed contracts, to be procyclical, and to have increased over the sample period. Copyright 1989 by MIT Press.

Dual Labor Markets, Efficiency Wages, and Search

Published in connection with a visit at the IIES

Unemployment Compensation Finance and Efficiency Wages.

This article examines the effects of unemployment compensation finance in a labor market in which firms pay efficiency wages. Two self-financing unemployment compensation systems are compared: one in which benefits are financed by a proportional payroll tax and another in which experience rating is introduced by taxing firms in proportion to their separations. The authors find that experience rating leads to less unemployment, less shirking, and higher output. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.

Dual Labor Markets, Efficiency Wages, and Search.

This article presents an equilibrium model of a dual labor market. Firms are assumed to be identical ex ante and dualism arises endogenously. The dual labor market outcome is supported by efficiency wage and search considerations. Firms choose wage/effort requirement packages optimally given optimal search and effort choice by workers, and vice versa. The authors prove existence and investigate the occurence and nature of dual labor market equilibria. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.

An Equilibrium Search Model of Synchronized Sales

We demonstrate the existence of periodic nonstationary equilibria with self-generating cycles in a simple model of random search. Our results provide a theory of synchronized sales based on product market search by heterogeneous consumers. That is, our model explains how it can be optimal for all sellers to follow a repeated pattern of posting a high price for several periods and then posting a low price for one period

Matching with Multiple Applications

We analyze the implications of multiple applications by job seekers for the microfoundations of the matching function. We emphasize a coordination failure caused by multiple applications, namely, that firms can waste resources processing applicants who are ultimately hired elsewhere. This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Economics Letters' , 2003, 78(1), 67-70.search; matching