Recent Legal Literature

Clementson: A Manual Reletaing to Special Verdicts and Special Findings; Wharton: A Treatise on the conflict of Laws, or Private International Law; Lile, Redfield, Wambaugh and Wheeler: Brief Making and the Use of Law Books; Pomroy: Pomroy: Pomeroy\u27s Equitable Remedies (supplementary to Pomeroy\u27s Equity Jurisprudence); McLaughlin: The Confederation and the Constitution, 1783-178

Disqualification of Judges by Prejudice

Under the provisions of Section 21 of the Federal Judicial Code, Victor Berger and others, who had been indicted under the Espionage Act in the Northern District of Illinois, filed an affidavit charging Judge Landis with personal bias and prejudice against them as German-Americans, and moved for the assignment of another judge to preside at their trial. The motion was overruled by Judge Landis, and he himself presided at the trial, and the defendants were convicted and sentenced. The Supreme Court of the United States, to which the matter came on certificate, held, three justices dissenting, that Judge Landis could not, under the statute, pass upon the truth of the facts alleged in the affidavit showing prejudice, but that, upon the filing of an affidavit sufficient on its face, he was incapacitated from further proceeding with the case. Berger v. United States, No. 460, decided January 31, 1921

Preserving a Special Appearance

No personal judgment against a defendant is valid unless the court which renders it has first obtained jurisdiction over the person of such defendant. This is elementary and fundamental, and goes to the essence of the judgment. And such jurisdiction must be secured through the actual service of process upon the defendant against whom the judgment is sought or through his voluntary appearance in the action

THE NEW MICHIGAN COURT RULES

There are two features of general interest connected with the revised system of practice which went into operation in Michigan on January 1, 1931. The first is the manner of employing the rule-making power, and the second is the content of the new rules

The Practice Court

The law department of the University of Michigan has always proceeded upon the theory that the chief function of a law school is to fit men for the practice of the law. An aim to make professional instruction as thoroughly practical as possible is by no means a narrow one, nor is it out of accord with the liberalizing tendencies of university culture. The age is insisting with more and more emphasis that nothing is valuable which is not useful, a doctrine which does not put culture upon a money basis but does insist that all knowledge is but a means to an end. What the end is makes, perhaps, little difference, so long as it is legitimate. But clearly, in order to determine the value of any institution one must first ascertain what use it is designed to serve and how fully it lends itself to that use

Bringing Third Parties into Actions at Law—Set-Off Against the Assignor

It frequently happens, in an action by an assignee, that the defendant wishes to use as a cross-action a claim against the assignor. This results in no diffiulty unless the amount of the set-off against the assignor is greater than the claim of the plaintiff, or unless the cross-action calls for a specific remedy against the assigner in addition to its defensive effect upon the plaintiff\u27s demand. In each of these cases we have a three-sided controversy. In the first, the set-off operates against the plaintiff to the extent of his claim and against the assignor for the balance. In the second, the cross-action operates against the plaintiff and his assignor in ways which may be quite variously different. If the assignor can be brought into the controversy, it can be wholly determined in a single action; otherwise two or more actiops are necessary

An Inroad Upon Fiduciary Integrity

It is a principle universally recognized throughout our system of law, that no person shall be permitted to occupy a position of trust and confidence who at the same time is clearly subject to influences hostile to a faithful performance of his trust. There is a rule as old as Christianity, and it has been incorporated into our law from the earliest times, that no man shall serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will hold to the one and despise the other. Fiduciary relations can rest upon no foundation but absolute integrity. Once destroy the inviolate sanctity of the trust relation and the moral basis for social institutions will begin to crumble away. The law has, in this particular, been ever vigilant to ward off the least encroachment upon the high standards of conduct exacted from those who hold positions of trust and confidence