How multisensory neurons solve causal inference.

Sitting in a static railway carriage can produce illusory self-motion if the train on an adjoining track moves off. While our visual system registers motion, vestibular signals indicate that we are stationary. The brain is faced with a difficult challenge: is there a single cause of sensations (I am moving) or two causes (I am static, another train is moving)? If a single cause, integrating signals produces a more precise estimate of self-motion, but if not, one cue should be ignored. In many cases, this process of causal inference works without error, but how does the brain achieve it? Electrophysiological recordings show that the macaque medial superior temporal area contains many neurons that encode combinations of vestibular and visual motion cues. Some respond best to vestibular and visual motion in the same direction ("congruent" neurons), while others prefer opposing directions ("opposite" neurons). Congruent neurons could underlie cue integration, but the function of opposite neurons remains a puzzle. Here, we seek to explain this computational arrangement by training a neural network model to solve causal inference for motion estimation. Like biological systems, the model develops congruent and opposite units and recapitulates known behavioral and neurophysiological observations. We show that all units (both congruent and opposite) contribute to motion estimation. Importantly, however, it is the balance between their activity that distinguishes whether visual and vestibular cues should be integrated or separated. This explains the computational purpose of puzzling neural representations and shows how a relatively simple feedforward network can solve causal inference

Deep Convolutional Neural Networks Outperform Feature-Based But Not Categorical Models in Explaining Object Similarity Judgments.

Recent advances in Deep convolutional Neural Networks (DNNs) have enabled unprecedentedly accurate computational models of brain representations, and present an exciting opportunity to model diverse cognitive functions. State-of-the-art DNNs achieve human-level performance on object categorisation, but it is unclear how well they capture human behavior on complex cognitive tasks. Recent reports suggest that DNNs can explain significant variance in one such task, judging object similarity. Here, we extend these findings by replicating them for a rich set of object images, comparing performance across layers within two DNNs of different depths, and examining how the DNNs' performance compares to that of non-computational "conceptual" models. Human observers performed similarity judgments for a set of 92 images of real-world objects. Representations of the same images were obtained in each of the layers of two DNNs of different depths (8-layer AlexNet and 16-layer VGG-16). To create conceptual models, other human observers generated visual-feature labels (e.g., "eye") and category labels (e.g., "animal") for the same image set. Feature labels were divided into parts, colors, textures and contours, while category labels were divided into subordinate, basic, and superordinate categories. We fitted models derived from the features, categories, and from each layer of each DNN to the similarity judgments, using representational similarity analysis to evaluate model performance. In both DNNs, similarity within the last layer explains most of the explainable variance in human similarity judgments. The last layer outperforms almost all feature-based models. Late and mid-level layers outperform some but not all feature-based models. Importantly, categorical models predict similarity judgments significantly better than any DNN layer. Our results provide further evidence for commonalities between DNNs and brain representations. Models derived from visual features other than object parts perform relatively poorly, perhaps because DNNs more comprehensively capture the colors, textures and contours which matter to human object perception. However, categorical models outperform DNNs, suggesting that further work may be needed to bring high-level semantic representations in DNNs closer to those extracted by humans. Modern DNNs explain similarity judgments remarkably well considering they were not trained on this task, and are promising models for many aspects of human cognition

Material perception for philosophers

Philosophy Compass, EarlyView

Facial age aftereffects provide some evidence for local repulsion (but none for re-normalisation)

Face aftereffects can help adjudicate between theories of how facial attributes are encoded. O’Neil and colleagues (2014) compared age estimates for faces before and after adapting to young, middle-aged or old faces. They concluded that age aftereffects are best described as a simple re-normalisation— e.g. after adapting to old faces, all faces look younger than they did initially. Here I argue that this conclusion is not substantiated by the reported data. The authors fit only a linear regression model, which captures the predictions of re-normalisation, but not alternative hypotheses such as local repulsion away from the adapted age. A second concern is that the authors analysed absolute age estimates after adaptation, as a function of baseline estimates, so goodness-of-fit measures primarily reflect the physical ages of test faces, rather than the impact of adaptation. When data are re-expressed as aftereffects and fit with a nonlinear “locally repulsive” model, this model performs equal to or better than a linear model in all adaptation conditions. Data in O’Neil et al. do not provide strong evidence for either re-normalisation or local repulsion in facial age aftereffects, but are more consistent with local repulsion (and exemplar-based encoding of facial age), contrary to the original report