894 research outputs found
On Selective Indirect Tax Reform in Developing Countries
The current consensus on indirect tax reform in developing countries favors a reduction in trade taxes with an increase in VAT to raise revenue. The theoretical results on selective reform that underlie this consensus are, however, derived from partial models that ignore the existence of an informal economy. Once the incomplete coverage of VAT due to an informal economy in acknowledged, we show that, contrary to the current consensus, the standard revenue-neutral selective reform of trade taxes and VAT reduces welfare under plausible conditions. Moreover, a VAT base broadening with a revenue-neutral reduction in trade taxes may also reduce welfare. The results raise serious doubts about the wisdom of the widely implemented indirect tax reform in developing countries.Tax Reform, VAT, Trade Tax, Informal Economy, Welfare, Government Revenue
Price-neutral Tax Reform With an Informal Economy
A strand of recent literature shows that a reform of import tariff (export tax) and consumption tax (production tax) that keeps the consumer (producer) price unchanged enhances welfare and increases revenue under plausible conditions. It has been argued that the results provide an ex-post justification for the widely implemented reform policies in developing countries that reduce trade taxes and increase consumption tax like VAT for revenue. We demonstrate that the results derived so far critically depend on the assumption that there is no informal sector in the economy. Our results show that, when the feasibility restrictions on the tax instruments imposed by the presence of a large informal and shadow economy is taken into account, such consumer or producer price-neutral reform reduces both welfare and revenue under plausible conditions.Trade tax, VAT, Price-neutral reform, Welfare, Government Revenue
Privatization, Information and Incentives
In this paper, the choice between public and private provision of goods and services is considered. In practice, both modes of operation involve significant delegation of authority, and thus appear quite similar in some respects. The argument here is that the main difference between the two mod- concerns the transactions cats faced by the government when attempting to intervene in the delegated production activities. Such intervention is generally less costly under public ownership than under private ownership. The greater ease of intervention under public ownership can have its advantages; but the fact that a promise not to intervene is more credible under private production can also have beneficial incentive effects, The Fundamental Privatization Theorem (analogous to The Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics) is presented, providing conditions under which government production cannot improve upon private production. The restrictiveness of these conditions is evaluated.
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Output, Employment, and Wages in the Short Run
I. Introduction, 537.--II. Building blocks, 539.--III. The working of the model, 545.--IV. Displacement of short-run equilibrium, 554.--V. Effective demand and the distribution of income, 557.--VI. Next steps, 559
Information and Multi-Period Optimal Income Taxation with Government Commitment
The optimal income taxation problem has been extensively studied in one- period models. When consumers work for many periods, this paper analyzes what information, if any, that the government learns about abilities in one period can be used in later periods to attain more redistribution than in a one- period world. liken the government must commit itself to future tax schedules, the gains cane from relaxing self-selection constraints by intertemporal nonstationarity. The effect of nonstationarity is analogous to that of randomization in one-period models. In a model with two ability classes it is shown that the key use of information is that only a single lifetime self-selection constraint for each type of consumer must be imposed. Sane necessary and sufficient conditions for randomization or nonstationarity are given. The planner can make additional use of the information when individual and social rates of time discounting differ. In this case, the limiting tax schedule is a nondistorting one if the government has a lower discount rate than individuals.
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Wage Rigidity, Implicit Contracts, Unemployment, and Economic Efficiency
This article examines the theory of involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts. Furthermore, the article is concerned with identifying the circumstances under which implicit contracts will give rise to unemployment even though involuntary unemployment has been often attributed to wage rigidities generated by implicit contracts by themselves. Moreover, a simple, general equilibrium model and the three sources of restrictions on the set of feasible contracts: (1) information; (2) enforcement; and (3) complexity. Finally, it is concluded that implicit contracts can then provide an explanation of unemployment
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Risk Aversion, Supply Response, and the Optimality of Random Prices: A Diagrammatic Analysis
This paper analyzes the effect of commodity price stabilization on producers and consumers, both in the short run, and in the long run, when producers have adjusted their production decisions to take account of the change in the price distribution. We derive conditions under which (a) both producers and consumers may be better off; and (b) both producers and consumers may be worse off. Moreover, we show that the long-run effects may differ not only quantitatively but also qualitatively from the short-run effects. The anomalous results may occur even with reasonable assumptions concerning production functions and utility functions of producers and consumers
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The Choice of Techniques and the Optimality of Market Equilibrium with Rational Expectations
This paper shows that, in the absence of a complete set of risk markets, prices provide incorrect signals for guiding production decisions. Even if all individuals have rational expectations concerning the distribution of prices which will prevail on the market next period, the market allocation is, in general, not a constrained Pareto optimum. Essentially the only conditions under which, for all technologies, the market equilibrium is a constrained Pareto optimum are those in which risk markets are redundant. We derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for redundancy of risk markets, which turn out to be extremely restrictive
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The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization Rules: Welfare Impacts and Supply Responses
It is the aim of this paper to suggest an alternative framework for the analysis of commodity stabilisation schemes, based on more secure micro-economic foundations. We begin with what might be termed the general theory of partial (or incomplete) price stabilisation. This meets objection (vi) above, and shows how the shape of the demand schedule and the source and specification of risk influence the size and distribution of welfare gains. It therefore allows the reader to appreciate the importance of the more detailed model specification which is required to investigate the remaining questions. This new model allows one to distinguish between the short run and long run impact of stabilisation, and to examine the importance of risk aversion and individual supply elasticity on the distribution of gains and losses from partial stabilisation. In particular, we do not discuss the dynamics of price stabilisation in the paper (price expectations, learning, the stochastic nature of buffer stocks, etc.), nor do we model demand uncertainty, the macro-economic impact of risk and stabilisation, market imperfections, interactions with future markets, private speculators, with other commodities, and a host of other important issues. For these, and for a more detailed exposition of some of the key concepts presented here, the interested reader is referred to our forthcoming book (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1980). Finally, we should point out that the buffer stock rules analysed here are not optimal rules, which can only be derived from complete dynamic analysis, as derived and discussed in the book 1 Turnovsky (1978a) examines a simple parameterisation of a partial stabilisation scheme, but restricts the analysis to the linear Waugh-Oi-Massell case
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Optimal Commodity Stockpiling Rules
Stiglitz and Newbery discuss optimal commodity stockpiling rules
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