1,429 research outputs found

    Of (UN) Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying The Imbalance Between Neutrality and Separationism

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    The Supreme Court\u27s recent Establishment Clause decisions have framed neutrality and separationistn as competing principles. A plurality of the Court views evenhanded neutrality as the superior principle over separationism and the controlling model for Religion Clause adjudication generally. A bare majority insists that the two principles are of equal jurisprudential pedigree. So framed, neutrality and separationism have been placed on an apparent collision course, forcing Supreme Court justices as well as church-state scholars to choose between one principle or the other. This Article proposes an alternative view of the relationship between separationism and neutrality. When viewed within its proper role and function, neutrality serves as an adjunct to separationist\u27\u27, and can only contribute a value consistent with the history and purpose of the religion clauses by existing as a subordinate principle

    No Aid, No Agency

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    Over the past three decades, members of the Supreme Court have demonstrated increasing hostility to the Establishment Clause’s rule against funding religion, first enunciated in 1947. Over the years, the Court has not only narrowed the rule to allow for government aid to flow to religious schools and faith-based charities, it has more recently declared that to enforce that rule may amount to discrimination against religion. This Article argues that a key reason for the decline in the no-aid principle rests on the weakness of the rationale underlying that rule: that funding of religion coerces the conscience of taxpayers. The taxpayer conscience rationale, though valid historically as basis for the clause’s prohibition on government funding of religion, no longer makes sense. And because the taxpayer conscience rationale is wanting, so too is the Flast v. Cohen rule permitting taxpayer standing to challenge government disbursements to religious entities. This Article then proposes an alternative basis for the no-aid principle, that being the concept that government has “no agency” over religious matters, a theory originally enunciated by James Madison. As explained, the no-agency theory is a structural or jurisdictional limitation on the power of government to finance inherently religious activity. If adopted, the no-agency rationale would restore needed credibility to the no-aid principle

    The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment

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    Ambiguity of Neutrality

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    Mechanism of Neuroprotective Mitochondrial Remodeling by PKA/AKAP1

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    The mitochondrial signaling complex PKA/AKAP1 protects neurons against mitochondrial fragmentation and cell death by phosphorylating and inactivating the mitochondrial fission enzyme Drp1
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