Electoral Competition with Entry

By extending the established theoretical models of electoral competition with entry (eg. Palfrey (1984)) to incorporate simultaneous competition for multiple districts I produce a unique two party equilibrium under plurality rule with non-centrist party platforms. This equilibrium also precludes entry of additional parties. This result is used to provide a domain for which Duverger's Law could be expected to apply. I also present new results under the run-o_ rule for both the single district and multiple district frameworks. In the single district case I find that for the run-off rule the model is more consistent with empirical observation than it is for the plurality rule, but that this performance is reversed when we consider multiple districts. The paper also sheds some light on how the different levels of elections in the U.S. and other systems relate to each other

Principles of network development and evolution: An experimental study

This paper reports on an experimental investigation of the evolution of networks and the individual decision making processes that guide it. Since there is no history of experimental work on network formation, part of the paper is devoted to the formulation of problems that can be examined experimentally. The results are that networks, composed of decentralized decision makers, are capable of overcoming complex coordination and learning problems and converge to stationary configurations. While stationarity is frequently observed, such an achievement is not guaranteed and when it doesn’t occur significant and persistent inefficiencies can result. The models of equilibration based on the principle of Nash equilibrium are more reliable than models based on the alternative principles of efficiency seeking or focalness of the network configuration. However, individual decision making within networks is not in accordance with the simple decision rule of Nash best response. Instead we observe complicated strategies that appear to trade short term profits in order to signal to, and teach, other agents the strategies required for long term profit maximization

Principles of network development and evolution: an experimental study

This paper reports on an experimental investigation of the evolution of networks and the individual decision-making processes that guide it. Inasmuch as there is no history of experimental work on network formation, part of the paper is devoted to the formulation of problems that can be examined experimentally. The results are that networks, composed of decentralized decision makers, are capable of overcoming complex coordination and learning problems and converge to stationary when it does not occur, significant and persistent inefficiencies can result. The models of equilibration based on the principle of Nash equilibrium are more reliable than models based on the alternative principles of efficiency seeking or focalness of the network configuration. However, individual decision making within networks is not in accordance with the simple decision rules of Nash best response. Instead, we observed complicated strategies that appear to trade short-term profits in order to signal to and teach other agents the strategies required for long-term profit maximization

Principles of network development and evolution: An experimental study

This paper reports on an experimental investigation of the evolution of networks and the individual decision making processes that guide it. Since there is no history of experimental work on network formation, part of the paper is devoted to the formulation of problems that can be examined experimentally. The results are that networks, composed of decentralized decision makers, are capable of overcoming complex coordination and learning problems and converge to stationary configurations. While stationarity is frequently observed, such an achievement is not guaranteed and when it doesn’t occur significant and persistent inefficiencies can result. The models of equilibration based on the principle of Nash equilibrium are more reliable than models based on the alternative principles of efficiency seeking or focalness of the network configuration. However, individual decision making within networks is not in accordance with the simple decision rule of Nash best response. Instead we observe complicated strategies that appear to trade short term profits in order to signal to, and teach, other agents the strategies required for long term profit maximization

Lenalidomide after Stem-Cell Transplantation for Multiple Myeloma

Data are lacking on whether lenalidomide maintenance therapy prolongs the time to disease progression after autologous hematopoietic stem-cell transplantation in patients with multiple myeloma