The Syrian Conflict: Proxy War, Pyrrhic Victory, and Power Sharing Agreements

The Syrian conflict presents as a case that has been well-studied in the power-sharing literature. It is typically coded as an ethno-sectarian civil war moving towards a decisive military victory by an authoritarian regime and thus unlikely to end in a power-sharing agreement. Yet Syria’s experience offers important insights into the effects of new conflict environments on prospects for power-sharing in ‘hard’ cases. Syria’s conflict exhibits attributes and is unfolding in an environment that requires rethinking simplistic correlations between the military and political outcomes of civil wars. Moreover, the form of political settlement that emerges in Syria may also complicate assumptions about the ability of victors to shape the terms of post war settlements unilaterally. Whether a power-sharing agreement is reached in Syria – however remote the prospects for that might be – will be determined by factors that underscore the impact changing conflict contexts can have on how civil wars end

Rethinking Stabilization in Eastern Syria: Toward a Human Security Framework

As the United States faces important decisions regarding its future role in Syria’s conflict, a new Atlantic Council report by Dr. Steven Heydemann, “Rethinking Stabilization in Eastern Syria: Toward a Human Security Framework,” provides important context, analysis, and strategic policy recommendations

After the Earthquake : Economic Governance and Mass Politics in the Arab World

The revolutionary wave that washed over the Arab world in 2011 swept away the rulers of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen. This article compares the economic policies adopted by the various governments in response to popular dissatisfaction, finding significant similarities between post-authoritarian transition regimes and authoritarian survivors . Both have relied on a similar mix of economic strategies : a temporary increase in redistribution, direct monetary transfers to what are deemed politically useful sections of the population and an ongoing commitment to preuprising policies of reduced social spending and economic liberalization. This convergence runs counter to expectations that elected transitional governments would be more responsive than their authoritarian predecessors to mass demands for social and economic justice. It also undermines the notion that these authoritarian regimes are inflexible and so unable to adapt their policies to changing circumstances

Sovereignty versus Sectarianism: Contested Norms and the Logic of Regional Conflict in the Greater Levant

The Middle East is experiencing an extended period of turmoil and violent conflict. Two main explanations exist to account for heightened levels of conflict and competition. The first attributes current conditions to the intensification of sectarian polarization in the Arab east; regional dynamics are best explained by identity politics, which serve as instruments of sectarian regimes. The second attributes current conditions to state weakness; states in the Arab east are fragile, lacking effective institutions and suffering from a deficit of legitimacy, allowing state elites to govern in ways that exacerbate social cleavages. We view both these arguments as insufficient to explain patterns and trends in regional conflict across the greater Levant and the Arab east. Instead, we argue that current regional dynamics are best explained in terms of competition to determine whether a regional security order will be governed by the norm of sovereignty or the norm of sectarianism. This struggle plays out in an environment of normative fragmentation, where neither norm is hegemonic. It is unfolding most directly through violent confrontations within states that contain multi-confessional societies and exhibit high levels of cross-border intervention. Orta Doğu, uzun süredir bir karmaşa ve şiddetli çatışma dönemiyle karşılaşma devam etmektedir. Artan çatışma ve rekabet seviyesini anlamada için iki temel yaklaşıma başvurulmaktadır: İlk yaklaşım açıklamasını, mevcut sorunları doğuda kalan Arap coğrafyasında şiddetlenen mezhepçi kutuplaşmaya dayandırmaktadır. Bu yaklaşıma göre bölgesel dinamikler en iyi şekilde, mezhepçi rejimlerin de aracı olarak kullandıkları kimlik politikalarıyla açıklanabilir. İkinci yaklaşım ise sorunların kaynağını devletin zayıflığına dayandırmaktadır. Bu yaklaşıma bu coğrafyadaki devletlerin kırılgan yapısı, etkili kurumların bulunmaması ve meşruiyet açığı sorunu elitlerinin devleti sosyal bölünmeyi artıran yöntemlerle yönetmelerine imkân tanımaktadır. Bu makale, her iki argümanın da Geniş Levant bölgesi ve doğudaki Arap coğrafyasında yaşanan bölgesel çatışmaların şeklini ve eğilimleri açıklamada yetersiz kaldığını savunmaktadır. Mevcut bölgesel dinamiklerin, bölgesel güvenlik düzeninin egemenlik normuyla mı yoksa mezhepçilik normuyla mı idare edileceği bağlamında ortaya çıkan rekabet ile en iyi şekilde açıklanacağı değerlendirilmektedir. Bu mücadele hiçbir normun egemen olmadığı normatif bir bölünme ortamında devam etmektedir. Bu durum, çoğunlukla farklı dini inanışlara sahip toplumları içinde barındıran ve yüksek seviyede sınırötesi müdahalelere sebep olan devletlerde ortaya çıkan şiddetli çatışmalarla gözler önüne serilmektedir

Neuronal Nitric Oxide Synthase-Rescue of Dystrophin/Utrophin Double Knockout Mice does not Require nNOS Localization to the Cell Membrane

Survival of dystrophin/utrophin double-knockout (dko) mice was increased by muscle-specific expression of a neuronal nitric oxide synthase (nNOS) transgene. Dko mice expressing the transgene (nNOS TG+/dko) experienced delayed onset of mortality and increased life-span. The nNOS TG+/dko mice demonstrated a significant decrease in the concentration of CD163+, M2c macrophages that can express arginase and promote fibrosis. The decrease in M2c macrophages was associated with a significant reduction in fibrosis of heart, diaphragm and hindlimb muscles of nNOS TG+/dko mice. The nNOS transgene had no effect on the concentration of cytolytic, CD68+, M1 macrophages. Accordingly, we did not observe any change in the extent of muscle fiber lysis in the nNOS TG+/dko mice. These findings show that nNOS/NO (nitric oxide)-mediated decreases in M2c macrophages lead to a reduction in the muscle fibrosis that is associated with increased mortality in mice lacking dystrophin and utrophin. Interestingly, the dramatic and beneficial effects of the nNOS transgene were not attributable to localization of nNOS protein at the cell membrane. We did not detect any nNOS protein at the sarcolemma in nNOS TG+/dko muscles. This important observation shows that sarcolemmal localization is not necessary for nNOS to have beneficial effects in dystrophic tissue and the presence of nNOS in the cytosol of dystrophic muscle fibers can ameliorate the pathology and most importantly, significantly increase life-span

(Re-)Emergent Orders: Understanding the Negotiation(s) of Rebel Governance

The concept of order is often neglected in the study of conflict – seemingly such a ‘disordering’ process. With the recent increase in the examination of rebel governance however, bringing order back into our understanding of rebel and insurgent groups has much to offer in exploring the everyday politics which connect authorities, rebel movements and the population itself, in a complex mass of intersubjective and power-based interactions and negotiations. Rebels both shape and are shaped by existing forms of order in complex and ongoing ways. This article explores how varying elements interact in the negotiation, framing and enforcement of order and develops an original analytical framework to examine the perpetual negotiations of rebel movements in their attempts to cement their control

Beyond Fragility: Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States

Beginning as early as 2012, the Bashar Assad regime in Syria has worked to put in place the legal and regulatory authorities to implement an ambitious vision of reconstruction as a process of authoritarian stabilization. With its military victory close at hand, the regime’s intent is to use reconstruction to reimpose its authority, tighten its control over Syria’s society and economy, and fundamentally alter Syria’s demography to achieve what Assad himself has characterized as a “healthier and more homogenous society.” The odds that it will achieve these aims are high. Contrary to views of the Assad regimeas too severely weakened by eight years of conflict to reassert its authority, it facesrelatively few obstacles in its drive to reimpose its control. The reasons for this are rootedin the nature of the Assad regime and in how Syria’s conflict unfolded, defying widely- held assumptions about the effects of civil war on pre-war institutions and governance practices, and creating a post-conflict landscape that the regime will find relativelyeasy to navigate. Today, for all intents and purposes, the structure, governance, andorganization of post-conflict reconstruction in Syria are settled issues. The Assad regimehas consolidated its dominance over the levers of reconstruction, rendering it virtually impervious to external pressure. This assessment of Syria’s post-conflict landscape poses challenges for bothpolicymakers and development practitioners. To date, however, neither have addressed its implications for policy or how Syria’s experience challenges the core assumptions that dominate current approaches to reconstruction. This paper argues that both policy and practice rest on problematic assumptions and calls for a fundamental rethinking ofwhat the options are for those hoping to shape Syria’s post-conflict trajectory. The disconnect between policy and practice, on the one hand, and conditions on the ground, on the other hand, is due in no small measure to the blinkered effects of interpreting Syria through the lens of “fragility.” Syria is regularly held out as an exampleof a fragile state driven into conflict by the cumulative effects of poor governance and dysfunctional institutions. It is more accurate, however, to describe Syria as a “fierce”state: one in which ruling elites elevate survival above all else and design institutionsto support this aim. In fierce states, the consolidation of such institutions and theireffectiveness is often tied to attributes that directly contradict those seen as necessary to overcome fragility, including accountability, voice, equity, transparency, and inclusion.Instead, governance in fierce states is managed as an expression of a zero-sum existential struggle in which conflict reinforces the determination of a ruling elite to defend existing institutional arrangements by force. Not all fierce states survive challenges on the scaleof those confronted by the Assad regime. Those that do, however, credit their survival to the very institutions, norms, and practices that reconstruction orthodoxy targets for reform. This diagnosis has obvious implications for both policy and practice. Fierce states are poor candidates for the standard reconstruction treatment. They call into question thevalue of fragility-based models of state failure as a guide for policy. Absent recognition of the limits of fragility-based frameworks, and without acknowledging the extent to whichthe Assad regime has consolidated its hold over the instruments of reconstruction, the United States and EU may well fall into the trap of viewing Syria through the lens ofcurrent, fragility-based reconstruction orthodoxy. Such an approach, this paper argues,would be a mistake. It vastly underestimates the resilience of the institutions, norms, andpractices that define economic governance in Assad’s Syria. It does not take adequateaccount of the near impossibility of pursuing any form of reconstruction support thatwill not contribute to the regime’s project of authoritarian stabilization and demographicchange, or avoid channeling funds into the pockets of regime cronies and warlords. The hope, however modest, that political conditions might someday permit external actors to engage in effective, accountable reconstruction programming in Syria, or throughtheir interventions influence the course of reconstruction, is deeply misguided. What both policymakers and practitioners should recognize is that the Assad regime’s efforts to shape an architecture that ensures its unchallenged control over every aspect of the reconstruction process are too far advanced for external actors to unravel oreasily circumvent. If the United States and EU wish to influence Syria’s post-conflict trajectory, they will need to rely on alternatives to reconstruction as potential sources of influence or pressure on the Assad regime