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(Re-)Emergent Orders: Understanding the Negotiation(s) of Rebel Governance

James Worrall

School of Politics & International Studies
University of Leeds

The concept of order is often neglected in the study of conflict – seemingly such a ‘disordering’ process. With the recent increase in the examination of rebel governance however, bringing order back into our understanding of rebel and insurgent groups has much to offer in exploring the everyday politics which connect authorities, rebel movements and the population itself, in a complex mass of intersubjective and power-based interactions and negotiations. Rebels both shape and are shaped by existing forms of order in complex and ongoing ways. This article explores how varying elements interact in the negotiation, framing and enforcement of order and develops an original analytical framework to examine the perpetual negotiations of rebel movements in their attempts to cement their control.

Keywords: *Rebel governance; social order; negotiation; Hezbollah; ordering practices; limits of violence; legitimacy; insurgency*

ORCID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5229-5152>

Order is a frequently under-utilised and under-theorised analytical concept in the study of conflict and post-conflict situations. When the term is deployed it is frequently conflated with the connected, but separate, notion of security, it is often used without explanation or exploration, comes loaded with normative assumptions about ideal types and is deployed as a descriptive rather than an analytical tool. Yet, order as an analytical concept has much to offer the study of societies of all kinds, and especially those experiencing conflict, because it offers opportunities to explore the everyday politics which connect authorities, rebel movements, criminal gangs and the population itself, in a complex mass of intersubjective and power-based interactions and negotiations. Until relatively recently studies of order drew on Hobbes' notion of a strong unitary actor which imposed its rules through coercion and outright violence. The study of order from a political perspective has always been focused on the state and its formation and consolidation processes, leaving the challengers to states understudied in terms of their own governance processes or simply dismissed as the forces of disorder.

Rebel Governance as a field of enquiry¹ has recently received increased attention and together with studies of the micro-dynamics of Civil Wars more broadly² has seen the development of more innovative approaches which have begun to paint a more nuanced picture of both the tools and aims of rebel governance, as well as the constraints which shape the extent and style of rebel governance across space and time.³ However despite this encouraging uptick in focus, much of the attention tends to still fall on two aspects: specific rebel uses of violence and their recruitment or financing processes.⁴ Alongside this there has also been increased interest in rebel transition to political parties within post-conflict settlements.⁵ This has left a fairly substantial gap in the literature which has received far less focus, that of how rebel groups actually govern areas within their control, not just in terms of their own processes and power but in terms of how existing localised forms of order interact with those forms of order which rebels wish to promote. Clearly what is important to explore are not only rebel uses of violence and the extraction of resources which have been the focus of so much study but also the rebels' use of other mechanisms, key among them their legitimacy. Few are the rebel groups which do not attempt to create and deploy their legitimacy to assist their rule, but too often studies of the uses of violence and/or the legitimacy of rebel groups neglect to fully recognise the trade-off required by the long and short term goals of rebel governance, and how, despite greater coercive power, insurgents who wish to govern must engage with other forms of power and other powerbrokers. In other words, rebels shape and are shaped by existing forms of order in complex and ongoing ways, it is these negotiations over the written and unwritten rules which order everyday life that is the true crucible in which rebel governance is forged.

In order to explore these processes in more detail this article begins by examining the various threads which combine to shape and sustain order. It then goes on to identify how these elements interact in the negotiation, framing and enforcement of order. This provides a platform upon which to begin to construct an analytical framework which centres on the interactions of power, legitimacy, authority and culture. This framework helps explore the processes by which rebel movements continually adapt in their attempts to cement their control - specifically the ways in which they shape, try to shape and are shaped by existing social structures. It is through the examination of the processes of the (re-)emergence of order(s) and the

multiple and ongoing negotiations, both formal and informal, in which rebel groups must engage in order to govern that form the focus of this analysis.

Using Hezbollah to illustrate the development of this framework, the article highlights themes within the framework by examining the realities faced by the Party of God in its negotiation of political, social and cultural order with different interest groups and authorities within Lebanon. Hezbollah has been able to successfully negotiate its rise not only to dominance over its associated identity group - the Shi'a of Lebanon, but has also been able to negotiate with other groups in society to secure itself a role in the governance of the entire country. In doing this it has been able to shape expectations and structures of order at both a localised and national level within Lebanon but has in turn been shaped by other forces of order within its own community and within the wider Lebanese socio-political environment. It is the perfect example with which to illustrate the fact that rebel orders are built both upon and alongside existing social and cultural orders which (re-)emerge both during and in the aftermath of conflict, demonstrating how rebel order endures only if it remains responsive to other forms of order.

Order as an Analytical Concept in Rebel Governance

Order conditions almost every aspect of our social, political and economic lives, it acts as a flexible and evolving structure which helps to shape our interactions with the world and is in turn also shaped by patterns of human agency. It can best be defined as a set of predictable behaviours, structured by widely known and accepted rules which govern regular human interactions and behaviours.⁶ In large part it is rooted in the functional and psychological human need for stability and predictability, meaning that ordering devices permeate every form of human social organisation. This, of course, makes it an ideal tool with which to explore the functioning of forms of rebel governance, which are in their base *an attempt to create forms of order which enable the rebels to govern and meet their own objectives in a manner which is relatively stable, and which ensures the continuing authority of the rebel group.*⁷ This general definition is important because it allows for a wide range of rebel end goals, from secession to state capture and/or the imposition of revolutionary ideology, while also recognising that achieving these meta-goals may not be possible and that simple endurance and survival may become the main motivation.

While rebel end goals will of course have an impact upon the way in which they govern, this is merely a variable within the wider need to maintain authority and order. The definition offered here is important because it also opens up the possibility of examining how rebel governance depends upon order, how it must take into account other components of order and how order is negotiated and/or evolves. In this sense the metaphor of an arena in which order is framed and negotiated is especially useful,⁸ order emerges from interactions in this arena which may be based on coercion and violence, deal-making and bargaining, co-optation and co-operation, or through iterative practices and sociocultural innovation and evolution.

In much literature dealing with conflict and post-conflict situations a binary distinction between order and disorder is utilised, with rebel groups, and their often violent ways, representing the very forces of disorder themselves. This obscures the reality that some form of order - however fluid and violent - is always present, and that it is constantly being negotiated and renegotiated, evolving and re-evolving. Order is never pure or static in either its social or political guises. Equally, both social and political forms of order are deeply intertwined. Thus while it can be helpful in managing complexity to study these forms of order as separate categories, the next step must always be to examine how they interact and reinforce each other. As Mary Kaldor famously identified in her provocative 'New Wars' thesis in 1998, and later defended, '[n]ew wars are fought in the name of identity (ethnic, religious or tribal)... Perhaps most importantly, identity politics is constructed through war. Thus political mobilisation around identity is the aim of war rather than an instrument of war, as was the case in "old wars"'.⁹ Identity, of course, is an important form of social order, and is an outcome of various ordering processes - in this sense it becomes both an agent and a structure of order. Indeed, it is perfectly normal for rebel groups to cloak themselves in some form of identity politics as this is an important ordering and legitimating tool which facilitates their governance of a population. What this quote from Kaldor neglects however, is that these forms of identity, and the social and political orders with which they are connected, pre-date these modern conflicts, thus while war may further construct identity politics, those identities and their connected orders also shape the ways in which war is fought, legitimacy is framed and social and political orders function. Just as identity is rarely ever a cloak which can be worn

and discarded at will, likewise existing orders will always have an impact upon newly constructed orders brought about by conflict.¹⁰

Order thus has much to offer us in terms of the study of processes of rebel governance, reflecting as it does on the ways in which meaning is created out of interactions, discourse, symbols and power based relationships. It gathers in the diversity of human society and forces us to understand rebel groups as being very much part of that society. This is vital if we are to capture wider processes and avoid focusing too intently on the 'rebel' in rebel governance. In sum, the reification of rebel groups as being unusual, or as a cause or symptom of disorder, is always going to be unhelpful. Rebels clearly are a part of an ordering process, often an important part, but they are never in complete control of that process. This reality therefore forces us to focus on the interaction of the rebels with a whole range of ordering forces at play. As Joel Migdal pointed out in 1988 in his *Strong Societies and Weak States*¹¹ and later in his *State in Society*,¹² if formalised state structures are so penetrated by societal and cultural norms, even, as Chabal and Deloz,¹³ or Bayart, Ellis and Hibou¹⁴ demonstrate in the African context, to the extent that the state is overtaken by them; it is equally likely that rebel groups' governance abilities and the order over which they preside, whether largely collusive, coexistent or coercive in nature, will also be shaped by a range of factors and actors.

Ordering Structures

Clearly there are a range of different ordering structures which have been identified across varying traditions and disciplines of social-scientific study and it is important to outline some of the key forms before examining more closely how they interact in processes of order negotiation. What follows is a brief overview which both sets the scene and is subsequently used to facilitate the construction of the analytical framework.

Social Order

In terms of day-to-day ordering structures within society it is important to get beyond simplistic notions of patron-client relationships, which while often important for the structure of both social and political order, obscure the deeper ways in which social order is produced, both through and beyond patron-client ties. These often originate

in micro-level social conditions, such as the production of goods and provision of services and the iterative processes of transaction, distribution and redistribution of goods, favours and relationships with their inbuilt systems of reciprocity, trust and sociability. All of these 'produce order through their effects on how individuals understand the world'.¹⁵ Naturally, these processes rely upon, reinforce and evolve other norms, beliefs and values. Over time, these processes intertwine to form what Migdal terms 'configurations of symbols'¹⁶ which then allow for the formation and functioning of formal or informal organisations, which can play larger roles in formulating and regulating order. These processes also link together informal economies with larger more formal economies which often need to be more fully regulated by more formalised organisations as diversity increases within the system. While forms of social order often emerge and are co-constituted by forms of economic order, often however, economic co-dependence is insufficient as an ordering mechanism in its own right and culture then provides extra glue to link social order with economic order and to bind the constituent parts of each together in multiple ways.

There have been many attempts to formulate clear ideas of what constitutes social order. Marx focused on the underpinning economic relationships, Durkheim on shared norms,¹⁷ while sociologists such as Talcott Parsons have framed it through institutions of society, which are themselves framed in large part through culture and its associated values.¹⁸ All of these clearly have value and explore the underlying structures which will then express themselves as institutions in which people come together. This includes family, tribal and clan units, religion, business, educational establishments, sports clubs, or indeed in institutions made up of norms and cultural practices themselves, which impact upon the structure of social order. Thus cultural order both produces identity and expectations of values and norms; moral communities supply mediating mechanisms where states and rebels do not or cannot provide them.¹⁹ These moral codes also influence wider structures of order in society and come to pervade economic and social life. Traditionally though, violence is seen as an exception to these processes, violence represents 'the breakdown of meaning [and] the advent of the irrational',²⁰ but it may well be integral to many forms of order, including cultural order. The utility of discriminate violence connected to the actions of individuals are a tool to shape behaviour, thus upholding collaboration and

control over an area as Kalyvas has found²¹ but violence often has to be used in conformity with local ordering practices if it is to be a truly effective tool in upholding rebel governance.

Traditionally there have been two ways of explaining processes by which order emerges. Firstly that people give up rights and freedoms to a state which has a preponderance in coercive power in return for an ordered and predictable society. The second focuses on how the internalisation of norms and values by individuals produces social order, in one violence is key, the other socialisation.²² Clearly though, the two go hand in hand, they are processes which influence each other, and especially so in cases of rebel governance where rebels are so often operating on the very land, and within the very society, which nurtured them.

Territoriality is an important and frequently overlooked reality, and yet for rebel governance is often crucial. The relationship between people and land is deeply political in most societies. Territoriality is also, as Robert Sack points out, 'the attempt by an individual or group, to affect influence or control people, phenomena or relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.'²³ However we can go beyond Sack's conception by focusing on the political meanings of territory for those not only who wish to control but for those who inhabit that space. In this sense the *control territoriality* upon which Sack focuses, can be complemented by a *comprehension territoriality* which understands the order(s) present in that territory and how they also shape the ability of control territoriality to function.²⁴ It is through the interaction of the two that political order, which is the ultimate expression of territoriality can be best understood.

Political Order

Political Orders emerged as groups began to outgrow the ability to administer themselves through personal contact, as Jared Diamond puts it: 'it's impossible even for citizens of tiny Tuvalu to know all 10,000 fellow citizens...hence states need police, laws, and codes of morality...large populations cannot function without leaders who make the decisions, executives who carry out the decisions, and bureaucrats who administer the decisions'.²⁵ Diamond has of course been criticised for his focus on violence between tribal societies and for not 'appreciat[ing] the strong social forces mobilised by kinsmen to restrain anyone contemplating a hasty

and violent act that will expose all of them to danger', James Scott also points out that states and state-like structures are often more violent than the societies which they replaced.²⁶ The question is how these strong social forces and the violent authorities which replaced tribes interacted and co-existed.

As Francis Fukuyama explains, humans developed state-like institutions because order (in this sense, forms of co-operation) already existed rather than because it was fully imposed upon them or because individual decisions were made to cede sovereignty and the use of violence to the state - in other words the social order thus evolved naturally into political order.²⁷ Thus as Samuel Huntington explains '[t]he level of political community a society achieves reflects the relationship between its political institutions and the social forces which comprise it'.²⁸ They are co-constitutive and this, to a large extent necessitates the rulers maintaining a degree of legitimacy in order to function.

Legitimacy

Often studies of rebel governance will focus on legitimacy as the counterpart to the use of violence when exploring how rebel groups survive, grow and govern. In this way legitimacy is an important component of the ordering processes engaged in by rebel groups because it is a method of wielding power without (always) using violence. Legitimacy is generally generated with reference to local norms, identities and realities which resonate with target populations. In this sense it attempts to link to local ordering practices and structures but can equally derive strength by challenging these same processes. Therefore the link between legitimacy and order is not directly analogous, indeed legitimacy takes different forms (or combinations of forms) depending on the circumstances. Thus pragmatic forms of legitimacy are based on things such as the provision of services, protection or even a willingness to share power, while moral legitimacy is founded on narratives of goodness, compatibility with existing norms and moral codes, as well as those which are explicitly referenced against religion or ethnicity.²⁹

We should also realise that legitimacy is something which is as much accepted, embraced or challenged as it is framed, constructed and marketed. It is, like the shaping of order itself, co-constituted between a rebel group and its audience(s). Legitimacy can be received actively or passively and can of course wax and wane

over time. It may therefore act as a mirror to wider changes and challenges to rebel governance more broadly. As an important tool of power, any diminishment in rebel legitimacy will make it harder for rebel governance to influence the wider order in which rebel governance operates. This, in turn, may disrupt the ability of rebels to meet their own objectives in a manner which is relatively stable, and which ensures the continuing authority of the rebel group. In other words, if rebel governance disrupts order too much or is resisted by other ordering agents or societal institutions then there is a risk that rebel governance capacities more generally may decline (perhaps leading to the greater use of violence) - contestation over rebel legitimacy is itself partly reflective of wider negotiations over the shape of order.

Negotiating Order

The structures which play a role in the creation of order are many and varied, their interactions complex and shifting, and the key actors which uphold and shape order are diverse and possess different kinds of authority and power. It is thus inevitable that any rebel group which seeks to impose any form of governance (which of course is, in and of itself, a form of ordering device) upon a population will not encounter a *tabula rasa*. Instead, it enters upon a complex socio-political field and must compete with the power and authority of existing actors, norms, traditions and structures. In the earliest stages of a rebel group attempting to shape or impose a socio-political order which enables, and interlinks with, governance it is likely that coercive factors, and especially the group's violent capacities, will be the most commonly used tool of power. Despite this, it will often be the case that the rebel group will not have a clear field, even in terms of violent capabilities, with the existing government, local defence units, criminal gangs and even other rebel groups operating in the same terrain.³⁰

We must of course recognise that rebel governance may take a number of different forms and be conducted in different styles. Some rebels may govern by taking and holding territory to create proto-states, others may not have sufficient resources to formally hold territory in such an overt manner and may instead look at temporary or temporal forms of governance, while others still may exert control from a distance, using psychological techniques or surveillance.

What is certain however is that rebels must engage with civilian populations in some way and exercise enough control over them to facilitate their aims. Thus, we can

perhaps best conceive of rebel governance as a broad spectrum along which groups will move, as circumstances - opportunities and constraints - allow. This fits well with Paul Richards' concept of 'no peace - no war' in which he envisages the absence of binary notions of war and peace and embraces a spectrum in which full war and full peace are never actually reached.³¹ The complementarity here is enhanced by the continuing need of the rebel group to use violence as part of their system of governance, as order shifts and threatens their interests or authority. This image of rebel governance as being almost infinitely flexible, further fits with the very idea of order as something which is subject to constant forms of continuing negotiation amongst various actors which hold resources of violence, persuasion and legitimacy.

Conflict is, by its very nature, highly disruptive to existing forms of order, especially since it is so often a direct challenge to some kind of existing order. This does not mean however that existing forms of order do not survive during conflict but that they tend to be either very localised, or more general forms of social and cultural order which are long established. Conflict is likely to also accelerate the evolution of order; providing opportunities, imposing new constraints and causing social change.³² It is likely that traditional authorities, local actors and traditional ethical and moral codes will be marginalised if they lack the ability to engage in the successful application of violence. This does not mean, once a rebel group has established some form of order through a violent power preponderance, that these existing ordering forces and structures cannot re-emerge into a new environment and continue to play important roles in the negotiation and enforcement of order. Both modified forms of previous order and familiar 'age old' practices can assert or reassert themselves in a new more stable environment - this can of course be the case both in terms of ordering actors, as well as norms, rules and customs which retain legitimacy and utility. In fact a wide range of groups - civilians, pre-existing authority figures and the rebels themselves - are apt to reach for ideas from the past which give a sense of return to normalcy and which can best facilitate survival, profit and power.³³ Clearly, violence has limits of utility and must be supplemented by other tools of order. Quite where these limits lie remains difficult to pin down given the many variables involved, thus violence remains an essential tool in the box of rebel governance but it is rapidly replaced by other mechanisms, depending on their availability and the specific circumstances and actors involved.

In order to succeed in creating a form of order which enables governance, and then to continue to uphold that order over the longer term, it must be recognised that since the sum of order is a mixture of different styles and types of order with different roots, it is very unlikely that rebel governance will be entirely dominant. In fact, depending on the situation, the rebels may in fact be little more than *primi inter pares* and may hold little more than their capabilities for violence. In these circumstances the rebels will be even more reliant upon existing ordering structures in order to govern. Clearly the levels of support, legitimacy and capabilities (bureaucratic, technical, financial and violent) which the rebel group enjoys will influence their ability to govern and in turn to shape order. Likewise, the resilience and legitimacy of existing ordering structures and agents will also shape the extent to which rebel governance can re-shape order.³⁴

It is also important to realise that different elements of order are challenged and evolve at different rates, the rebel group may well be an important actor in some of these but in others may lack the power, legitimacy and authority to influence, or may simply not perceive an interest in attempting to influence, events. The reality is that there are multiple fields of play in which elements of order are negotiated and evolve, and yet all of these fields will have some impact upon each other, and upon the general form of order which exists within, and even beyond, the sphere of rebel governance.

A Framework For Exploring Order Negotiations In Rebel Governance

In order to construct a framework for examining the negotiations of order, we must first identify the levels of analysis with which we are engaging. In deploying clear levels of analysis we can focus on the specific dynamics of each level and then also explore how the order negotiation at each level in turn impacts on negotiations at other levels. The simplest identification of levels of analysis relies on the identification of coherent groups but is also based to some extent on the geographic realities in place. Other levels can, of course, subsequently be added if required within these levels. It should be made clear that this is not an attempt to build a theory but more of a initial tool which can structure deeper forms of investigation of the negotiations present when rebels attempt to govern, and how order is crucial to rebel governance. Thus three obvious levels of analysis when it comes to the

negotiation of order within spaces influenced by attempts at rebel governance present themselves: firstly the *internal rebel order*, secondly, *other societal agents and structures of order*, and thirdly, *external orders* which influence the territory in question.

As the named actor, a critical element in the negotiation of rebel governance are the internal discussions within the rebel group - how different rebels view the constraints and possibilities for the production of order is essential, as are their individual hierarchy of group and personal needs and objectives. Thus, clearly the *internal dynamics* of the rebel group are vital. If the rebels are divided in their aims in negotiating order they can be co-opted or penetrated by other actors and will be unable to readily shape order. If they are united in aim and will then they will have more opportunities to shape order and thus to govern. Thus the internally negotiated order within the rebel group is essential. This level of analysis has received increasing attention in recent years with various approaches being taken principally to understand when and where these groups use violence. Thus, for example, Paul Staniland examines rebel coherence as being composed of the 'horizontal' linkages amongst rebel leaders and 'vertically' to its support in society. He formulates a four-fold typology, thus, 'integrated' groups have strong cohesion in both these categories, 'parochial' rebels have weak cohesion at the centre but strong local linkages, 'vanguard' groups have a strong centre but weak local bases, and finally 'fragmented' groups which have neither.³⁵ His work is further important in that it alerts us to the pre-war origins of rebel groups and the changes in group dynamics and cohesion over time. We should also recognise that as in the example of the continuum in the previous section rebel governance will fluctuate, even to the extent that it may not look much like governance at some points in time.³⁶

Rebel groups may disagree on specific aims, the order in which they are to be ranked and the means by which to achieve them. They are also clearly affected by structural factors, thus as Jeremy Weinstein has argued, '[l]eadership, skill, and ideology all take a backseat to broader, macro-level factors that structure the universe of possibilities individual rebels confront',³⁷ he also argues that 'groups commit high levels of abuse not because of ethnic hatred or because it benefits them strategically but instead because their membership renders group leaders unable to

discipline and restrain the use of force – and membership is determined in important ways by the endowments leaders have at their disposal at the start of a rebellion'.³⁸ Indiscriminate violence is probably the most likely to result in resistance from other ordering forces.

Equally, the more a rebel group's internal order is weak and contested, the more likely it is to be influenced by other actors and the less likely it is to be able to govern, i.e. to resist or influence other forms of order. The internal order of the rebel group is crucial to the wider negotiation of order. In the case of Hezbollah, group cohesion and internal order is generally quite strong. Hezbollah is often portrayed as being essentially the ultimate rebel group, with its charismatic and wily leader in charge of a slick operation which is unified, coherent and obedient to the will of the leadership. Yet Hezbollah is by no means immune from the pressures facing any other organisation, in fact 'the movement has been unable to divorce itself from the clan, tribe and family structures of the Shi'a',³⁹ from which it emerged in the early 1980s, this requires a careful balancing of diverse interests and the deployment of internal discipline and inducement to manage the different factions and interests within Hezbollah. From its beginnings as 'an organization originally established as a religious network with narrowly defined politico-socioeconomic goals, [it] has eroded. Many of its individual cells now serve primarily their own self-interest instead of their perception of God's will', it is becoming increasingly well known that the movement allows its members to engage in private illicit activities.⁴⁰ This has become a key internal ordering tool and in turn allows the movement to maintain its core activities and thus to govern the areas which it controls.

Structure & Agency

Clearly all of this raises questions of the interactions of structure and agency in these complex ordering processes. Without wishing to get too embroiled in these debates, this article takes a viewpoint in which the role of agency is enhanced by structure but wishes also to recognise that most structures can be (slowly) re-shaped by agency. Clearly, agents and structures mutually enact forms of order and it is difficult to separate the two. In this sense Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration is a direct inspiration here.⁴¹ The theory however is not directly amenable to use *en bloc* as a tool which is why it is perhaps more useful as a device which alerts us to the way in

which order is shaped over space and time by the interaction of various ordering forces with which the rebels must often engage whilst attempting to govern.

It is therefore useful if we also add in the work of Pierre Bourdieu here, since it is important to recognise that different forms of order are present in different spheres of activity and at different times. Thus there are different orders which co-exist with each other and there are also commonalities and overlaps which join these areas together, and as a whole they produce a wider form of order in given territorial spaces. Bourdieu calls these separate spheres fields⁴² and it is a concept which is designed to bridge the agency-structure dichotomy and has some clear complementarity to Giddens' theory. By focusing on the more specific dynamics of order within smaller spheres it is possible to track actors interactions and the impacts of agency on these interactions, thus we can then begin to judge the impact of rebel governance upon the orders present in different fields and to judge by their impacts both the relative power distributions but also the level of importance rebels attach to each separate field - this in turn then might enable a greater understanding of the impact of rebel governance upon the broader form of order which emerges from the interactions of the different fields (large and small) within the wider societal order. Indeed, within this wider order it could be said that the internal order of a rebel group is itself a field but one where the outcomes have impacts in other but not necessarily all fields.

This discussion leads us on to the second level of analysis which is much wider than the *internal order* of the rebels, and can be considered to be all of the *other agents and structures of order* located within the specific population the rebels target, or if the population is mixed, the specific area in which the rebels attempt to govern.⁴³ These aspects of order are likely to be much more diverse and dependent upon cultural, economic and political realities. Identifying key actors, be they traditional authority figures, those with technical know-how, connections or who are entrepreneurial, in all senses of the word, is critical here in exploring the interests, power resources and skills at play and where negotiations will be necessary, over what, when and with what likely outcomes.

Hezbollah initially used violence to contain and control its rivals. This was especially the case with the Lebanese Communist Party,⁴⁴ and Amal, its main competitor,

which Hezbollah confronted militarily in the famous War of the Camps between 1985 and 1989.⁴⁵ Once defeated, Amal has survived as an ordering structure, with Hezbollah recognising that it has legitimacy and influence, and that should it be destroyed, predictable (and useful) patterns of order would be disrupted, which may also damage Hezbollah's authority and legitimacy. Hezbollah prefers to work with Amal, create space for it and to benefit from co-habitation. Indeed, for over a decade now Amal and Hezbollah have had electoral pacts which protect the representation of both parties in Parliament.⁴⁶ This is also in part a recognition of the clan structures present in the territory controlled or influenced by both parties. This recognition of local realities even extends to the protection of the position of religious and ethnic minorities who live in Hezbollah controlled areas.

These key agents alone however (whether they are co-opted, ignored or if they resist the rebels), while often useful proxies with interests in using their agency to uphold their position in the existing structure of order, are insufficient in conceptualising this second level of analysis of how order functions in rebel governed areas.

It is crucial here to make a distinction here between different levels: firstly, the existing social, economic and political *structures* themselves, secondly, the key *agents* in positions of power, i.e. those with capital, and finally, the broader *mass* of weaker players whose agency is expressed in different ways. These three levels can to some extent be mapped onto Bourdieu's three key concepts. Thus the first is analogous to the idea of the field outlined above, the second with its focus on the key agents who have the most resources, or as Bourdieu puts it, capital, to deploy on that field,⁴⁷ finally, the third level is in many ways analogous to Bourdieu's conception of *habitus* which are those broad tendencies which structure how people perceive and understand the social world and interact with it. The importance of *habitus* is that it is the expression of intuition, or fuzzy logic and that decisions or moves made this way are often almost instinctive and occur without rational thought. Meaning that how social order is reproduced is often the result of the way in which the *habitus* of individuals interacts with that of others.⁴⁸

Where we depart from Bourdieu is in his conception of social actors (especially in this third level) as automatons.⁴⁹ It is clear that in some circumstances actors, in the sense here of the 'general public', rather than those with extensive forms of capital at

their disposal, may decide to uphold existing facets of order either through continuing to act according to these practices or by actively correcting those who do not.⁵⁰ This may not however always be the case, since the composition of *habitus* in individuals differs and therefore the ways in which it is expressed can lead to social change over time. It is this third level which is by far the most difficult to study and to predict because it can be both a force for stasis *and* for change in structures of order. It is this unpredictable social sense, or to some extent the unified feeling of crowds, which can spur acts of resistance both large and small.⁵¹ To illustrate this we can take two examples of resistance to *Daesh* or the so-called Islamic State. The first is just one story from Raqqa in which the group's feared morality police were about to beat an old woman whose dress did not exactly meet their interpretation of modesty and who was surrounded and defended by her fellow citizens who angrily contested the norms used to justify the punishment with direct reference to local practices present in Raqqa.⁵² The second, much more high-profile, act of resistance was when the citizens of Mosul came out to defend the city's famous minaret from destruction.⁵³ These examples show the limits even of the most brutal and unpredictable form of rebel governance and highlights the limits of violence. In Lebanon, while Hezbollah are now dominant actors in their main zones of control - the Bekaa Valley, South of the Litani and Beirut's southern suburbs, the *Dahiyya* - even within these zones are diverse populations which have been shaped by norms, values and interests which are common across Lebanon.⁵⁴ There are after all plenty of Shi'a who are not especially religious and whose worldview is shaped more by other realities which come from wider Lebanon and beyond. Similarly, there remain existing structures and authorities which retain a role in shaping order. Thus while Daniel Meier notes that, '[the] quasi-state capacity enjoyed by Hizbullah in the former occupied zone [south of the Litani] allowed the movement to define new social rules (e.g. compliance to the party, Islamic morality, refraining from vengeance)',⁵⁵ equally, Hezbollah's attempts to ban the sale of alcohol and the mixing of the sexes in southern cities of Sur and Tyre did not go down well with the population and had to be scaled back. When faced with social norms which had developed through contact between faiths over centuries and the economic reality that many Lebanese travel to the beaches of southern Lebanon at the weekend and for holidays, Hezbollah had to rapidly recognise that even Islamic norms (and its own power) have limits.⁵⁶

Our final level of analysis is equally important and consists of the continuing potential for *external actors* to both affect order within the zone(s) of rebel governance and to structure the wider order within which the rebel group operates. It will always be the case that rebels are in competition with other actors, and especially the central state. We must also recognise that absolute monopolisation may not always be the aim of civil war actors, either because they cannot, or simply do not wish to, achieve this level of control.⁵⁷ Equally, as we have seen thus far, monopolisation requires very high levels of resources and skill to achieve. This means that there is a consistently high chance that localised, even formalised, arrangements are likely to have to be reached with a potentially wide range of other actors. These arrangements may even be alliances or agreements which usually impose limits on violence.⁵⁸ These 'ordering deals' might be motivated by differing long-term or short-term considerations, and can produce a wide range of collusive ordered relationships at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. These deals can draw in a range of actors and are not always likely to be as obvious as formalised relations between specific organisations. Indeed, as Ana Arjona points out, these forms of order between rebels and external actors are likely to be specific to localities⁵⁹ and are equally likely to have been negotiated between sub-factions of different entities, and especially of the state itself.⁶⁰

In Hezbollah's case, the Lebanese political system requires the building of alliances, a game in which Hezbollah has been remarkably successful. This is because the Party has been influenced by existing ordering practices, despite its initial opposition to them, it has in effect been socialised into the Lebanese cultural and political milieu. Once outside its own Shi'a arena (to which, as we have seen, it has adapted) Hezbollah frequently acts moderately in negotiations with other potential partners such as the Christian, Free Patriotic Movement.⁶¹ The existence of both tacit and formally negotiated alliances is an important part of Hezbollah's attempt to order politics in its own interest within Lebanon.

Hezbollah's initial reasons for entering into direct politics and participating in elections were defensive, clearly indicating that the possession of the means of violence and a clear powerbase emerging from areas in which Hezbollah had been able to structure order largely in its own interests and image, were insufficient for the

group's long term success or even perhaps survival.⁶² Entering this new game of playing a role in negotiating the shape of the national order necessitated an acceptance of the need for compromise, alliance management and formal pact making. Having established its position in the Lebanese political system Hezbollah seems content to largely work within these confines, only using its coercive capabilities when its core interests are threatened, as in 2009 over its telecommunications network.⁶³

Facilitating Analysis - Existing and (Re-)Emergent Orders

The next category of analysis combines with these levels of analysis and works through them. This is especially visible in terms of the second level of analysis and requires the division of order into its broad constituent categories identified above. Thus specific examination of social order, economic order, cultural order and political order is required. This enables us to examine how rebel governance attempts to shape each of these fields, to place specific actors and norms as either enabling or constraining rebel governance, and to explore how negotiations take place and what their outcomes are. Facilitating this analysis is extremely difficult without using specific themes or issues. Thus for example the rebels' ability to govern market interactions in towns they control can tell us much about how order has been structured and what level of influence rebel governance has in setting the rules, governing disputes and extracting resources for themselves.⁶⁴

There will always be a temptation to focus on the upper levels of rebel governance and their interactions with other senior 'ordering actors' such as tribal and religious leaders, the central government, other rebel group leaders and influential businessmen. This is natural and simplifies analysis but leaves us without a clear picture either of the full range of institutions which play a role in the ordering process, or of the role of less visible actors. This is especially the case when it comes to the ability of the wider population to influence shifts in norms over time, or indeed to attempt to directly influence rebel governance in its negotiations with other actors. Thus it is important to distinguish between direct negotiating partners in terms of the structuring and enforcement of order but also to recognise the role of indirect order negotiation when there is no formal interlocutor, as patterns of behaviour and co-

existence emerge and evolve over time - shaped as much by these informal negotiations as those between formal actors.

It is important to capture the dynamism and evolutionary nature of order of all kinds and at all levels of analysis, and measuring continuity and change is an important means of exploring the negotiations of order over the longer term. There is frequently much work already in existence which can be used to highlight continuities in social organisation and order in many societies. Focusing analysis on examining how forms of order re-emerge after conflict or in the spaces created by rebel governance is a useful focus of analysis. Equally, examining how these orders have evolved because of conflict can also allow us to identify the likely limits of rebels' ability to shape the space they inhabit. Thus, identifying what has and has not changed, and what the processes of change have been can tell us much about just how much ability rebels have to influence change in the areas they attempt to govern.

Hezbollah have had a number of advantages and have been quick to utilise them in order to solidify their support and create an identity based on a mixture of Shi'a Islam, othering, deprivation and a narrative of oppression which facilitates their goals.⁶⁵ We should also not forget that '[t]he concept of *istid`aaf* (oppression) unites the 'social' with the political and is a concept drawn directly from religious teachings',⁶⁶ this religious dimension can be overlooked when examining this discourse but it pervades the social provisions Hezbollah makes and is clearly based on existing ordered practices in Lebanon, and especially the clientelism of the old *zu'ama* system linked to Shi'a clans.⁶⁷ The Lebanese confessional system which orders politics and society clearly has an internal logic which has led to a need to protect your own community's interests. Political parties in Lebanon have long been involved in the provision of social welfare services to their communities.⁶⁸ These have an important, indeed quite foundational ordering function, they reinforce power, create dependencies, structures, patterns and predictability, leading to trust attained by iterative interaction. Initially for Hezbollah, one of the earliest reasons for providing these social services was, as its leader Hassan Nasrallah put it: 'to keep the people on their land, to prevent emigration from the villages'.⁶⁹ It is of course hard for rebels to govern if there is no-one present in the areas they control.

Styles of Rebel Governance

Different rebel groups clearly express their attempts to manage order negotiation in different ways. The very style of governance which the rebels adopt (whether coercive, co-existent or co-operative) can tell us much about their approach to the negotiations of order, which in turn are linked to the opportunities and constraints which they face. Thus an important part of the jigsaw when exploring order negotiations which facilitate rebel governance is to explicitly attempt to define the board style adopted by the rebels when it comes to their attempts at governance. Whereas the earlier part of the framework examined specifically how the rebels negotiate their internal ordering process, this factor instead demonstrates the outcomes of this process. The coherence of the rebels when they decide upon a position, and their ability to rule,⁷⁰ translates into a certain style of governance which often fits a pattern, with different rebel groups focusing on different issues, having different interests, aims and approaches to engaging with negotiating partners.⁷¹ While this is of course also a function of the constraints imposed upon the rebels by other actors and social forces in both levels two and three of the framework, there is also an identifiable tendency for rebel groups, like any other organisation, to evolve into a certain style which may include predictability emanating from standard operating procedures, the limits of group cohesion, worldview and patterns of previous interaction. Identifying the general style of rebel governance allows us to treat the rebels as more of a unified actor and to explore their specific role, choices and abilities when it comes to the range of different negotiations over order. It is also of course useful at this point to again deploy the device of the spectrum of order which allows us to see how the order created by the rebels has developed over time, and how it compares to other possibilities for rebel led-order. This leads us to ask questions about what has led rebel governance to this point and to reflect back upon the analysis and how it might be further developed.

Conclusion

Exploring the constellation of actors and institutions which play a role in the configuration of order both during and after conflict forces us to explore the complex negotiations at multiple levels which create the ordered space in which rebels are able to govern. To be able to exercise authority over the longer term, some form of order must be created which leads to a degree of stability and predictability in social, economic and political life. Rebels play a continuing role in the negotiations which

shape this order, while also relying upon order to rule. This symbiotic relationship is crucial to understanding the nature of rebel governance across place and time. Our definition of rebel governance as: *an attempt to create forms of order which enable the rebels to govern and meet their own objectives in a manner which is relatively stable, and which ensures the continuing authority of the rebel group* is helpful in facilitating this examination.

As we have seen, analysing these negotiations is not simple but is amenable to study if broken down and examined through different ordering prisms and by working out what the key ordering processes, norms and actors are. The three level framework of the *internal rebel order*, the *other societal agents and structures of order*, and the *external orders* which influence the space in question offers multiple sites of analysis. Where previous studies have tended to focus extensively on rebel politics and external politics (the first and third levels) and to reify the role of violence, this new model offers the opportunity to explore the wider environment which shapes and is shaped by multiple fields of order, multiple ordering agents and the wider social *habitus* of individuals and groups. Rebel coherence, will, power and legitimacy thus play a key role in ensuring their ability to govern and shape order but are by no means the only factors. It is the second level, the deeper forms of social order which often play a significant, and oft overlooked, role in enabling and constraining rebel governance.

All of this leads us to ask where the natural limits of rebel governance might lie, especially given that this article has argued that rebel governance is subject to ongoing negotiation as order shifts and evolves over time. While Hezbollah has undoubtedly come a very long way in its ability to negotiate and thus shape multiple forms of order across Lebanon, one might legitimately ask, to what end? Clearly the Party of God has had to compromise during negotiations over the shape of both political and social order in the country. Is rebel governance then, simply a phase before integration into the state, or is it a permanent condition? Clearly, the various path dependencies and lineages created suggest that either of these outcomes can occur, but equally, rebel governance has proven transitory in the past and many rebel groups have been unable to govern and have not survived. It is likely that continuing rebel governance depends entirely on the durability and stability of the

order which is created, and the ability of the rebels to hold the ring in terms of the continuing negotiations over this order. Here the proxy measurement of rebel legitimacy is often used in much of the literature but as has been argued here, legitimacy is more of a reflection of rebel influence on order more broadly. As, if rebels misunderstand the ordering environment in which they find themselves, or misjudge their power they will either disrupt the order upon which they depend or find that other ordering agents or societal institutions may resist, having potentially deleterious consequences upon rebel legitimacy. Rebel legitimacy is then a useful proxy when combined with wider examinations which explore negotiations over the shape of order, but is best understood as a factor within the confines of order negotiation.

It may be pertinent here to consider the concept of 'just enough power' which reflects this position. While power must be defended, (generally) expanded and used wisely, raw power (where based in violence or simple ideas of legitimacy) alone is insufficient to fully shape order and thus other abilities, especially those rooted in knowledge,⁷² must be deployed in the direct and indirect negotiations over the structure of order within which rebels govern. The main goal for rebel groups should simply be the creation of a stable form of order which best enables them to govern. This is a complex balancing act given the range of different forces at play. Using just enough power in this situation is inevitably better than using (or perhaps even having) too little or too much power, for both of these situations create imbalances in order negotiation processes which lead to the disruption of order, which in the end only makes governance more difficult. Rebel governance therefore may be likened to spinning multiple plates which all operate according to different rules of physics. Unlike the popular image of rebels as forces of disorder, in reality, as Hezbollah shows, rebels must not only negotiate the construction of their own order, alongside and overlaying existing orders, but to facilitate their survival, they must also attempt to understand and manage the continuing evolution of numerous orders that overlap and intertwine at multiple levels - a task which perhaps explains why rebel governance so often fails.⁷³

Notes

¹ Is not a new field. See: Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America*.

² Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud (eds.), *Order, Conflict and Violence*, also Granzow, Hasenclever & Sändig, 'Introduction: Framing Political Violence' 113-119.

³ Perhaps the best example of this, which examines the impact of rebel governance on civilians, is: Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers*.

⁴ There are some notable exceptions to this outside of civil war studies, especially focusing on groups such as Hamas and particularly upon their provision of goods and services. See for example: Berti, 'Non-State Actors as Providers of Governance', 9-31.

⁵ For a particularly pertinent example for the argument here see: Podder, 'Mainstreaming the Non-State', 213-243.

⁶ Hills, *Policing Post-Conflict Cities*, 12.

⁷ Conceptually here we assume that the survival of the rebel group is the main aim otherwise its goals simply cannot be met.

⁸ Alice Hills uses the concept of a security arena in her work in which different agents of security compete in terms of provision and often actions which deliberately undermine security in order to create demand for more effective security provision. See: Hills, 'Security Sector or Security Arena?', 165-180.

⁹ Kaldor, 'In Defence of New Wars', 2.

¹⁰ Thus we see that even in those seemingly radically different orders which emerge after revolution continuing influences of previous forms of order and a continuing negotiation over the developing shape of the new order is the norm. As a simple example, even in one of the greatest of the 'Social Revolutions', the French Revolution, the experiment in changing the calendar only lasted for 12 years.

¹¹ Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*.

¹² Migdal, *State in Society*.

¹³ Chabal and Deloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*.

¹⁴ Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*.

¹⁵ Hechter and Horne, *Theories of Social Order*, 82.

¹⁶ Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 26.

¹⁷ Through his idea of the collective consciousness: Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*.

¹⁸ Bourricaud, *The Sociology of Talcott Parsons*.

¹⁹ Hechter and Horne, *Theories of Social Order*, 258-260.

²⁰ Whitehead, 'Violence and the Cultural Order', 40.

²¹ Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 142-145.

²² Hechter and Horne, *Theories of Social Order*,

²³ Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History*, 19.

²⁴ The differences between control and comprehension territoriality are developed in: Worrall, 'Bringing The Soil Back In', 127-143.

²⁵ Diamond, *The World Until Yesterday*, p.9.

²⁶ Scott, 'Crops, Towns, Government', 13-15.

²⁷ Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order*, 34.

²⁸ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 8.

²⁹ I borrow these initial two categorisations from Eric Schoon's work on legitimacy for example: 'Rethinking Legitimacy and Illegitimacy in Violent Political Conflict', 143-152; see also his contribution to this Special Issue of *Small Wars & Insurgencies*.

³⁰ As Kalyvas has observed, violence is highest in areas where an armed group is attempting to consolidate its dominant position. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 213.

³¹ Richards, *No Peace-No War*, 1-21.

³² See: Coser, 'Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change', 197-207; Heydemann, *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East* and Smith, *War and Social Change*.

³³ Fukuyama points out the important role of religion in the formation of political order for instance, 37.

- ³⁴ We can see the reality of this in the example of how a conventional national government in Nigeria was willing to allow certain northern states to adopt Shari'a law. This hybrid form of political order can even serve to enhance legitimacy. See: Johnson and Hutchison, 'Hybridity, Political Order and Legitimacy', 37-52.
- ³⁵ Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion*, 5-9.
- ³⁶ See for example: Berti and Gutiérrez, 'Rebel-to-Political and Back?', 1059-1076.
- ³⁷ Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, 21.
- ³⁸ *Ibid*, 20.
- ³⁹ Worrall, 'Reading Booth in Beirut', 245.
- ⁴⁰ Hammond Schbley, 'Torn Between God, Family, and Money', 175–196. See also Dishman, 'The Leaderless Nexus', 237–252; Lowe, 'Counterfeiting: Links to Organised Crime', 255–257; Shelley and Melzer, 'The Nexus of Organized Crime and Terrorism', 43–63.
- ⁴¹ Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*.
- ⁴² Hilgers and Mangez, *Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields*.
- ⁴³ It is interesting to note here that order can be structured and negotiated over time even between humans and wild animals, thus for example, the anthro-biologist Elizabeth Marshall Thomas explores the way in which the Bushmen of Namibia and Botswana have reached a clear order between themselves and the local lion population. See: *Dreaming of Lions*. Another even more advanced example of this is to be found in terms of the complex orders developed between the residents of Harar in Ethiopia and the local hyena populations, see: Baynes Rock, *Among the Bone Eaters*.
- ⁴⁴ el Khazen, 'Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon', 605-624; 'Ideology and Practice of Hizballah in Lebanon', 390-403.
- ⁴⁵ Norton 'The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics', 475-491.
- ⁴⁶ Wiegand, 'Reformation of a Terrorist Group', 669-680.
- ⁴⁷ Bourdieu outlines a number of forms of capital within three broad categories: Economic, Cultural and Social. Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital', 241-258.
- ⁴⁸ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*.
- ⁴⁹ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 145.
- ⁵⁰ They may also seek to actively resist in a number of 'invisible' ways which are disruptive, see Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance; Weapons of the Weak and Seeing Like a State*, also: de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*.
- ⁵¹ Whether this is driven by contagion, convergence, or value-added understandings of crowds or social groups. See: Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds*. This perhaps best fits with Emergent Norm Theory, see: Turner and Killian, *Collective Behavior*.
- ⁵² 'Islamic State's' Most Wanted'.
- ⁵³ Arango, 'Tears, and Anger'.
- ⁵⁴ For a fascinating insight into Hezbollah's attempts to control morality and social order in southern Beirut see: Deeb and Harb, *Leisurely Islam*.
- ⁵⁵ Meier, '(B)ordering South of Lebanon', 104.
- ⁵⁶ Worrall *et al.* *Hezbollah: From Islamic Resistance To Government*, 82-83.
- ⁵⁷ Staniland, 'Counterinsurgency and Violence Management', 145.
- ⁵⁸ See for example: Idler, 'Exploring Arrangements of Convenience', 63-84 and Idler & Forest, 'Behavioral Patterns Among (Violent) Non-State Actors'. For a more in-depth study see: Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*.
- ⁵⁹ Arjona, 'Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda', 1360-1389.
- ⁶⁰ Migdal, *State in Society*, 11-14.
- ⁶¹ Bouyoub, 'The Free Patriotic Movement and Hizbullah Political Entente', 173–198.
- ⁶² Worrall *et al.* *Hezbollah: From Islamic Resistance To Government*, 86-96.
- ⁶³ Wege, 'Hezbollah's Communication System', 240-252.
- ⁶⁴ See for example: Reno, 'The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States', 837–858; Chamberlain, 'Finding The Flow', and Mason, 'Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant', 63-83.
- ⁶⁵ Childs, 'From Identity to Militancy', 363-372.
- ⁶⁶ Jawad, *Religion and Social Welfare in the Middle East*, 199.
- ⁶⁷ Hamzeh, 'Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends', 167-178; Makhoul and Harrison, 'Intercessory Wasta and Village Development In Lebanon', 25-41 and Norton, *Hezbollah: From Radicalism to Pragmatism?*, 147-158.
- ⁶⁸ Cammett, *Compassionate Communalism* and Baylouny, 'Born Violent', 329-353.
- ⁶⁹ Azani, 'Hezbollah's Strategy of "Walking on the Edge"', 745.
- ⁷⁰ Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion*.

⁷¹ Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers*, 48-93.

⁷² For an interesting development of types of power see: Hathaway, 'Lukes Reloaded', 118-130.

⁷³ McCormick *et al.*, 'Things Fall Apart: The End Game Dynamics In Internal Wars', 131.

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