The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International Law

Ideally, a body of law comprises a set of coherent and consistent rules. These rules contribute to the creation of an environment that is predictable, efficacious, and just. Most international lawyers hope, expect, or believe that such a body of law can exist for the international system. This is a fool\u27s errand

Power and Constraint

John Bolton raises two distinct sets of questions about global governance: the first involves the creation of supranational authority structures; the second, the penetration of the American domestic political process, especially by transnational non-governmental organizations ( TNGOs ). Neither of these involves international legal sovereignty, the right of the United States, or any state, to freely enter into agreements with other states. Both do involve issues associated with the nature and autonomy of domestic authority structures, the ability of political actors to determine the kinds of political institutions within which they will function, and the decisions that emerge from these institutions. The rule that one state should not interfere in the internal affairs of another, first articulated by the international jurist Emer de Vattel at the end of the 18th century, has become one of the defining norms of sovereignty. It is, however, a norm that has been frequently violated, sometimes as a result of coercion, for example the Soviet Union\u27s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the American occupation of Panama in 1989, and sometimes as a result of voluntary agreements, such as the 1957 Treaty of Rome and subsequent accords that have created the European Union. Moreover, some political structures are inherently more open to official or unofficial external influence either because there are multiple avenues of access, as is the case with the United States, or because they are weakly institutionalized, as is the case in several African countries. Although domestic autonomy is a widely recognized rule it might, or might not, serve the interests of a specific state. John Bolton worries that the permeability of the American political process may be a threat to the United States. I suggest instead that, given the inordinate international power of the United States, the ability of external actors, including TNGOs, to involve themselves in American decision-making may make it easier to accomplish American objectives by reducing the temptation to balance against, rather than cooperate with, the United States

CAUSAS ESTRUTURAIS E CONSEQUÊNCIAS DOS REGIMES INTERNACIONAIS: REGIMES COMO VARIÁVEIS INTERVENIENTES

Os regimes internacionais são definidos como princípios, normas, regras e procedimentos de tomada dedecisões ao redor dos quais as expectativas dos atores convergem em uma dada área-tema. Como ponto departida, os regimes são conceituados como variáveis intervenientes, estando entre fatores causais básicose os resultados e comportamentos relacionados. Há três visões a respeito da importância dos regimes: asorientações estruturais convencionais desvalorizam os regimes como sendo, na melhor das hipóteses,ineficazes; as orientações grocianas vêem os regimes como componentes íntimos do sistema internacional;as perspectivas estruturalistas modificadas vêem os regimes como significativos somente em certas condiçõesrestritas. Para os argumentos grociano e estruturalista modificado – que concordam com a visão de que osregimes podem influenciar resultados e comportamentos –, o desenvolvimento de regimes é visto como umafunção de cinco variáveis causais básicas: auto-interesse egoísta; poder político; normas e princípiosdifusos; usos e costumes; conhecimento

International Nonregimes: A Research Agenda1

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/146934/1/j.1468-2486.2007.00672.x.pd