Cicero's Philosophy

Cicero was not only a great politician, a lawyer and an orator: he wanted to deal with philosophy because he believed that philosophy constituted the sure ground on which to support his civil commitment. He did not limit himself to the translation of the philosophical thought proposed by the Hellenistic schools: he was able to critically address the theoretical questions and to present them again in the forms and the language typical of the Roman intelligence of the world. This modern interpretation of Cicero makes use of the careful reading of what are considered his most explicitly philosophical works: De finibus bonorum et malorum, Tusculanae disputationes, De fato, De officiis, De amicitia, De senectute, Academica, De divinatione, De republica, De legibus. It will be fundamental to grasp the critical approach of Cicero with respect to what he studies and learns: both with regard to the Epicureanism, but also towards Stoicism. It will be important to recognize the limits of his understanding of the thought of Plato and Aristotle. Finally, advanced university students, postgraduate students and scholars of ancient philosophy will be able to use and appreciate this "guide" because it aims to overcome the boundaries between literature, linguistics and philosophical dimension

Providential Disorder in Plato’s Timaeus?

Plato tries to explain the becoming of the cosmos by referring to the concepts of order and disorder. Scholars have usually focused on the relationship between the cosmos and the demiurge that Plato puts forward to explain the reasonable (i.e., well-ordered) development. Along these lines, scholarship has examined the providential role played by both the demiurge and the soul of the world. Yet, an interesting prob­lem still remains open: what exactly is the function of disorder? What is the sense of the concept of a perfectly established order if we do not know the manner in which it is achieved, since we have no understand­ing of the conditions that make it possible? Pursuing this line of thought, one may point to a providential role of the disorder given the balance of forces that operates in Plato’s cosmic becoming

Риск в образовательной стратегии Сенеки

Nella prospettiva pedagogica di Seneca si inserisce il progetto educativo nei confronti di Nerone. La scelta del registro "tragico" implica la costruzione di una forma teatrale in funzione "apotropaica": l'esasperazione e l'eccesso mirano ad allontanare l'allievo dal rischio di esiti emotivamente compromessi. Il "rischio" del fallimento è riferito sia l'allievo che al maestro. Si presuppone che nella condizione di "rischiare" l'allievo possa guadagnare una sua forma di maturit

Is there an effective therapy available for non-alcoholic fatty liver disease?

Non-alcoholic fatty liver disease (NAFLD) is defined as fat accumulation in the liver, ranging from simple steatosis to non-alcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH). Although it used to be considered a benign condition, nowadays it is known to be associated with liver injury and the development of end-stage liver disease. NAFLD is the hepatic manifestation of metabolic syndrome (MS) with an incidence rising in accordance with the increased prevalence of MS, the latter being considered the most common cause of liver enzyme elevation in Western countries. To date, no medications or surgical procedures have been approved for effective treatment of NAFLD, and all of the therapies tested so far must still be regarded as experimental. It is expected that, based on the large amount of data produced in the last few years and the ongoing large multicenter clinical trials, the effective treatment(s) for NASH will soon be defined. Meanwhile, lifestyle interventions and behavior therapy, the only treatments shown to be effective, must be introduced in daily clinical practice and, if possible, supported by public health programs

The philosophical category of risk

Although not all scholars are willing to recognize it, "risk" is a real philosophical catego-ry. However, it is necessary to distinguish risk from danger. The danger is something defined and arranged by reason. So we can face it and we can defend ourselves from it. The risk is in the background: it remains beyond rational awareness. The analysis of the etymology of risk leads us to the Arab-Byzantine era. The Greek language instead possessed the word kindynos, in which the thing or the action you want to experiment is probably hidden. For this reason, risk and courage are frequently combined. Probably, we can catch the essence of Western civilization in the game between risk and reason. The foundation of this is in Greek culture: from Homer to Plato and Aristotle. Greek tragedy is the place where "risk" appears conjugated to destiny

Valéry Laurand, Ermanno Malaspina, François Prost (éds) Lectures plurielles du “De ira” de Sénèque. Interprétations, contextes, enjeux

This reviewed work fills a surprising gap in the investigation into Seneca's psychology. It is now clear to us, in detail, what path the philosopher has been developing with respect to a project that is philosophical, psychological and – at the same time – prophylactic/therapeutic. In fact, the de ira should be placed at the very moment in which the brilliant rhetorician understands that the philosophical-theoretical study becomes urgent and that this will allow him to imagine a paideutic project valid not only for his own august pupil (for whom he was preparing the series of tragedies with apotropaic intention) but also for future pupils of whom Lucilius will be the representative

L’ATOMO DI LUCREZIO

Lucretius never uses the word atomus. There are no serious prosodic obstacles in inserting it into the hexameter; but, except for a senarius of Lucilius, atomus is testified only in seven late evidences of the whole Latin poetry. Perhaps Lucretius considers the mechanical character of indivisibility not a priority: atoms are indivisible because of their ‘continuous solidity’ (their ontological simplicitas/soliditas), and not vice vers

The Risk in the Educational Strategy of Seneca

Traduzione inglese riveduta e aggiornata di contributo apparso come saggio provvisorio in volume precedent

Fate, Chance, and Fortune in Ancient Thought

The volume contains 11 contributions of the best experts on the topics of fate, fortune and free will, in reference to Ancient Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Plotinus

‘Desiderium voluntas non est’

Starting from the definition of Cic. Tusc. 4.12, voluntas appears as the most suitable Latin translation for βούλησις. But βούλησις only partially corresponds to what both Cicero and Seneca mean by voluntas. From the Roman perspective it seems that ‘wanting’ is immediately connected to ‘desiring’, provided that a rational dimension is recognised in ‘desiring’. But this is a stretch, because desiderium, and even more cupiditas or adpetitio, in themselves refer to an irrational dimension. From the Greek perspective, then, this juxtaposition does not appear so obvious at all. The act of will (or, better, the exercise of a choice intended to produce an action) maintains its own identity with respect to ‘desiring’ precisely by virtue of its autonomous manifestation in immediate consonance with reason; especially Aristotle and the Stoic school insist on this. There- fore, desiderium and cupiditas approximate rather to ἐπιθυμία (while adpetitio to ὁρμή), that is to say to an area where the absence of reason prevails: here are the θυμός and the πάθος. Both Cicero and Seneca, when they must refer to the voluntas avoiding any misunderstanding involving the irrationality of deciding, specify that in those cases it is a question of recta voluntas: the will expressed in a rational way