116 research outputs found

    Subjective Beliefs about Contract Enforceability

    Get PDF
    This article assesses the content, role, and adaptability of subjective beliefs about contract enforceability in the context of postemployment covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”). We show that employees tend to believe that their noncompetes are enforceable, even when they are not. We provide evidence for both supply- and demand-side stories that explain employees’ persistently inaccurate beliefs. Moreover, we show that believing that unenforceable noncompetes are enforceable likely causes employees to forgo better job options and to perceive that their employer is more likely to take legal action against them if they choose to compete. Finally, we use an information experiment to inform employees about the enforceability of their noncompete. While this information matters for employee beliefs and prospective behavior, it does not appear to eliminate an unenforceable noncompete as a factor in the decision to take a new job. We discuss the implications of our results for the policy debate regarding the enforceability of noncompetes

    The Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts

    Get PDF
    Do contracts influence behavior independent of the law governing their enforceability? We explore this question in the context of employment noncompetes using nationally representative data for 11,500 labor force participants. We show that noncompetes are associated with reductions in employee mobility and changes in the direction of that mobility (i.e., toward noncompetitors) in both states that do and do not enforce noncompetes. Decomposing mobility into job offer generation and acceptance, we detect no evidence of differences in job search, recruitment, or offer activity associated with noncompetes. Rather, we find that employees with noncompetes—even in states that do not enforce them—frequently point to their noncompete as an important reason for declining offers from competitors. Our data further show that these employees’ beliefs about the likelihood of a lawsuit or legal enforcement are important predictors of their citing a noncompete as a factor in their decision to decline competitor offers

    Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project

    Get PDF

    Three Essays on Covenants Not to Compete.

    Full text link
    Covenants not to compete are contracts between an employer and an employee that prohibit the employee from joining a competing firm for a fixed amount of time after separating from the employer. The three articles contained in this thesis examine the incidence of noncompete contracts and the impact of different state-level noncompete enforcement policies, which vary from non-enforcement to enforcement even if the employee is fired. Chapter I examines the impact of noncompete enforcement policies on the willingness of firms to provide training for their employees. Chapter II examines the impact of noncompete enforcement policies on the creation, growth, and survival of new firms, taking into account differential effects for firms categorized as within-industry spinouts. Chapter III presents evidence from a new survey on the incidence of noncompetes across a broad array of employee-level and firm-level variables, including occupation, industry, education, and earnings. Together, these papers demonstrate the ubiquity of noncompetes and the large effects that state-level noncompete enforcement policies have on both workers and firms.PhDEconomicsUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/108768/1/starre_1.pd

    pp-adic quotient sets

    Get PDF
    For A⊆NA \subseteq \mathbb{N}, the question of when R(A)={a/aâ€Č:a,aâ€Č∈A}R(A) = \{a/a' : a, a' \in A\} is dense in the positive real numbers R+\mathbb{R}_+ has been examined by many authors over the years. In contrast, the pp-adic setting is largely unexplored. We investigate conditions under which R(A)R(A) is dense in the pp-adic numbers. Techniques from elementary, algebraic, and analytic number theory are employed in this endeavor. We also pose many open questions that should be of general interest.Comment: 24 page

    Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project

    Get PDF
    In recent years, scholars and policymakers have devoted considerable attention to the potential consequences of employment noncompetition agreements and to whether legislatures ought to reform the laws that govern the enforcement of these controversial contractual provisions. Unfortunately, much of this interest—and the content of proposed reforms—derives from anecdotal tales of burdensome noncompetes among low-wage workers and from scholarship that is either limited to slivers of the population (across all studies, less than 1%) or relies on strong assumptions about the incidence of noncompetition agreements. Better understanding of the use of noncompetes and effective noncompetition law reform requires a more complete picture of the frequency and distribution of noncompetes at the individual employee level. Accordingly, in 2014, we administered a nationwide survey of individuals in the labor force to ask them about their employment status, history, and future expectations—including their experience with and understanding of noncompetition agreements. In this Article, we describe the methods we used to carry out this survey and refine the data for analysis in hopes of encouraging other researchers to use survey approaches to fill other, similarly important gaps in our knowledge. To illustrate the value of the survey project, we present a surprising empirical finding from our data, one that raises questions about existing scholarship and theories about why employers use noncompetes: We find little evidence that the incidence of noncompetition agreements in a state (after controlling for potentially confounding factors) has any relationship to the level of enforcement of such agreements in that state. In other words, an employee in California (where noncompetes are prohibited) appears to be just as likely to labor under a noncompete as an employee in Florida (where noncompetes are much more likely to be enforced)

    Noncompete Agreements in the U.S. Labor Force

    Get PDF
    Using nationally representative survey data on 11,505 labor force participants, we examine the use and implementation of noncompete agreements and the employee outcomes associated with these provisions. Approximately 18 percent of labor force participants are bound by noncompetes, with 38 percent having agreed to at least one in the past. Noncompetes are more likely to be found in high-skill, high-paying jobs, but they are also common in low-skill, low-paying jobs and in states where noncompetes are unenforceable. Only 10 percent of employees negotiate over their noncompetes, and about one-third of employees are presented with noncompetes after having already accepted job offers. Early-notice noncompetes are associated with better employee outcomes, while employees who agree to late-notice noncompetes are comparatively worse off. Regardless of noncompete timing, however, wages are relatively lower where noncompetes are easier to enforce. We discuss these findings in light of competing theories of the economic value of noncompetes
    • 

    corecore