Clicking with dollars : how consumers can pay for purchases from E-tailers

The Internet is often referred to as the world’s largest mall. About half of all adults in the United States have made a purchase online. Worldwide, online shopping is considerably greater—and cybershopping is expected to continue to grow as more households become connected to the Internet and as improvements in mobile telecommunication technology allow wireless Internet access anywhere and anytime.> A byproduct of the dramatic increase in online shopping has been a heightened demand for convenient and secure online payment methods. Consumers make almost all their online purchases with credit cards. But study after study continues to identify concerns about the safety of providing credit-card numbers and personal information online as the biggest barrier to cybershopping. Without further improvements in consumers’ online payment options, e-tailing might not realize its full potential.> Schreft surveys and assesses what is new about the options consumers have to make payments at Internet retailers. She discusses how making payments in cyberspace differs from making payments in the bricks-and-mortar world and describes the use of traditional payment methods for cybershopping. She also examines the new means of payment designed especially for use online.Electronic commerce ; Payment systems

How and why do consumers choose their payment methods?

This essay provides an overview of the literature on consumer payment behavior. It considers the state of our understanding of how and why consumers choose their payment methods and what is needed to make more headway in understanding consumer payment decisions. It closes by discussing the policy issues that require that we make progress with payments research.Consumers ; Payment systems ; Consumer behavior

Risks of identity theft: Can the market protect the payment system?

Identity theft has been a feature of financial markets for as long as alternatives have existed to cash transactions. But identity theft has recently occurred on a much larger scale. Data breaches often involve the apparent loss or acknowledged theft of the personal identifying information of thousands--or millions--of people. ; Identity theft poses risks, not only to individuals, but to the integrity and efficiency of the payment system--the policies, procedures, and technology that transfer information for authenticating and settling payments among participants. Identity theft can cause a loss of confidence in the security of certain payment methods and an unwillingness to use them. Markets can cease operating or switch to less efficient payment methods. Either represents a loss of efficiency for the economy. ; Schreft looks at the nature of identity theft today and the factors underlying its mounting risks. She also explores whether markets are able to limit the risks identity theft poses to the payment system.Identity theft ; Payment systems

Credit controls: 1980

Experience suggests that in times of rising inflation and interest rates, political support emerges for the use of credit controls. In the U.S., such controls were last used in 1980. This article examines the 1980 controls and argues that the program had unintended and unforeseen effects that contributed to the severity of the 1980 recession.Credit ; Credit Control Act of 1969

Data security, privacy, and identity theft: The economics behind the policy debates

Privacy ; Identity theft ; Data protection

A Model of Financial Fragility

This paper presents a dynamic, stochastic game-theoretic model of financial fragility. The model has two essential features. First, interrelated portfolios and payment commitments forge financial linkages among agents. Second, iid shocks to investment projects’ operations at a single date cause some projects to fail. Investors who experience losses from project failures reallocate their portfolios, thereby breaking some linkages. In the Pareto-efficient symmetric equilibrium studied, two related types of financial crises can occur in response. One occurs gradually as defaults spread, causing even more links to break. An economy is more fragile ex post the more severe this financial crisis. The other type of crisis occurs instantaneously when forward-looking investors preemptively shift their wealth into a safe asset in anticipation of the contagion affecting them in the future. An economy is more fragile ex ante the earlier all of its linkages break from such a crisis. The paper also considers whether fragility is worse for larger economies.

Do consumers really want credit card reform?

Earlier this year, several bills were introduced in Congress to curb what many consumer advocates have described as abusive credit card practices. These bills were intended to keep credit card issuers from penalizing consumers for paying their card balances in full each month. In unveiling one of the measures, Congressman John LaFalce declared, "[Consumers] should not be tricked or trapped into escalating interest rates and unnecessary fees. And they clearly deserve better than to be punished for paying off debt and for responsibly using their credit cards."> Apparently, many consumers agree. According to a November 1996 survey by Money magazine, 79 percent of respondents supported legislation to restrict how credit card issuers set fees and account terms.> With such strong consumer support for credit card reform, it is not surprising that Congress responded. In fact, Congress has repeatedly considered similar measures, some even more restrictive, such as proposals to cap the interest rate charged on credit card accounts. These measures have in common one potentially disturbing feature: if passed into law, they each would impose price controls on credit card accounts.> Combs and Schreft address whether such legislative efforts can achieve the stated objective of benefiting consumers. They find that consumers as a whole generally do not benefit from reform measures of the type studied. The effective price of a credit card account might not fall for many---or any---consumers as a result of such pricing restrictions, and credit availability is likely to be reduced, at least to some consumers. Thus, consumers should think twice before asking for pricing restrictions on credit cards.Credit cards

Financial Fragility with Rational and Irrational Exuberance

This article formalizes investor rationality and irrationality, exuberance and apprehension, to consider the implications of belief formation for the fragility of an economy¦s financial structure. The model presented generates a financial structure with portfolio linkages that make it susceptible to contagious financial crises, despite the absence of coordination failures. Investors forecast the likelihood of loss from contagion and may shift preemptively to safer portfolios, breaking portfolio linkages in the process. The entire financial structure collapses when the last group of investors reallocates their portfolios. If some investors are irrationally exuberant, the financial structure remains intact longer. In fact, financial collapse occurs sooner when almost all investors are rationally exuberant than when they are irrationally exuberant. Additionally, a financial crisis initiated by real shocks is indistinguishable from one caused solely by the presence of rationally apprehensive investors in a fundamentally sound economy. Policies that make portfolio linkages more resilient can improve welfare.financial fragility, contagion, irrational exuberance, financial crisis

Data breaches and identity theft

This paper presents a monetary-theoretic model to study the implications of networks' collection of personal identifying data and data security on each other's incidence and costs of identity theft. To facilitate trade, agents join clubs (networks) that compile and secure data. Too much data collection and too little security arise in equilibrium with noncooperative networks compared with the efficient allocation. A number of potential remedies are analyzed: mandated limits on the amount of data collected, mandated security levels, reallocations of data-breach costs, and data sharing through a merger of the networks.