The data-driven power of Google and co. A risk to competition? Bertelsmann Policy Brief #2018/04

Is data really the new oil? Some say that access to this basic commodity is decisive for the success and failure of entire business models in the digital markets. Would an obligation to share data with competitors be an adequate means of ensuring fair competition in these markets

Fixed to VoIP Interconnection: Regulation with Asymmetric Termination Costs

Typically, incumbent providers enjoy a demand-side advantage over any entrant. However, market entrants may enjoy a supply-side advantage in costs over the incumbent, since they are more efficient or operate on innovative technologies, such as the voice of internet protocol (VoIP) telephony. Regulation with a supply-side asymmetry has rarely been addressed. Considering both a supply-side and a demand- side asymmetry, the present model analyzes the effects different regulation regimes. Regulation may have adverse effects on subscribers, market shares, and profits. If providers can discriminate between on-net and off-net prices, asymmetric regulation has no local effect on market shares, independent of any demand- and supply-side asymmetry. Otherwise, with reciprocal termination charges, price discrimination leads to qualitatively same effects than nondiscriminatory pricing. --Termination charges,Interconnection,Regulation,Price Discrimination,Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)

Access regulation with asymmetric termination costs

In many telecommunications markets incumbent providers enjoy a demand-side advantage over any entrant. However, market entrants may enjoy a supply-side advantage over the incumbent, since they are more efficient or operate on innovative technologies. Considering both a supply-side and a demand-side asymmetry, the present model analyzes the effect of two regulatory regimes: An access markup for a low cost network and reciprocal charges below the costs of a high cost network. Both regimes may have adverse effects on subscribers, market shares, and profits. It can be shown that an access markup is not generally beneficial and an access deficit not generally detrimental for the respective networks. However, if providers discriminate between on-net and off-net prices a markup on the entrant's termination cost is generally to its benefit and to the incumbent's detriment. --Termination charges,Interconnection,Asymmetric Regulation,Price Discrimination

Regulating advertising in the presence of public service broadcasting

Television advertising levels in Europe are regulated according to the Audiovisual Service Media Directive where member states of the European Union usually impose stricter regulation on their Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) channels. The present model evaluates the effects of symmetric and asymmetric regulation of ad levels on competition for viewers and advertisers in a duopoly framework where a public and a private broadcaster compete. If both broadcasters face the same advertising cap, regulation can be profit-increasing for both channels. If the public broadcaster is more strictly regulated, this may benefit the commercial rival if higher revenues in the advertising market outweigh the loss in viewership. --media markets,two-sided markets

Investment in intellectual capital needs to increase by 35 billion euros per year. Bertelsmann Policy Brief #2019/07

In today’s world, not only do businesses invest in machinery and buildings, they also increasingly invest in research and development, software and digital skills. Yet German companies are well behind their international counterparts in terms of investment in socalled intellectual capital. This represents a threat to the overall competitiveness of the German econom

Das Leistungsschutzrecht für Presseverleger: Eine ordnungspolitische Analyse

Since the beginning of the year 2009 the German press publishers have lobbied for their own neighbouring right which should cover even short snippets of online press articles. The new right should basically protect the press publishers' investments in the online environment. Currently there is an intensive debate among several involved interest groups about the expected effects of such a right. The present article aims to sheds some light on the expected economic effects. It states that a neighbouring right is not sufficiently justified by economic theory and can distort efficiency both from an ex ante and an ex post point of view. --Leistungsschutzrecht,Urheberrecht,Nachrichtenaggregatoren

We must protect competition. Policy Brief #2020/03 May 2020.

Germany's economic output slumped by 2.2 per-cent in the first quarter of this year, amounting to the sharpest drop since the financial crisis of 2008/2009. For the year as a whole, the federal government even expects the largest decline in gross domestic product since the post-war pe-riod. In its efforts to counteract the stark economic im-pact of the Corona pandemic, the federal govern-ment is putting in place aid programmes worth billions. Various packages are designed to se-cure the liquidity of companies with a functioning business model before the crisis. But the corpo-rate landscape will inevitably change. Many sec-tors such as tourism and the hospitality industry are massively affected by the lockdown and re-lated measures. Industries that are strongly inte-grated into international supply chains, such as the metal, electrical, and automotive industries, are also struggling with disruptions and losses. Despite the aid packages, there is a considera-ble risk of market upheaval. And on top, the packages themselves can come with negative ef-fects for competition, experts warn. Especially in heavily crisis-ridden sectors, there is a threat of reduced competition. Some companies will dis-appear from the market - ailing companies are good takeover candidates. All in all, an increase in market concentration is feared. And these developments have consequences for the competitiveness of the economy as a whole, as we show in our current study "Price Markups, Innovation, and Productivity: Evidence from Ger-many." We examine how competition between companies in Germany has developed in recent years and show that effective competition is an important driver of productivity and innovation. We summarize the key findings of the study in this policy brief

More cost-sharing, less cost? Evidence on reference price drugs

This paper evaluates the causal effects of changes in reference prices (RP) on prices, copayments, and overall expenditures for off-patent pharmaceuticals. With reference pricing, firms set prices freely and the health plan covers the expenses only up to a certain threshold. We use quarterly data of the German market for anti-epileptics at the package level and at the active substance level and exploit that the RP has been adjusted in some of the active substances but not in others in a difference-in-differences framework. At the product level, we find that a lower RP reduces prices for both brand-name drugs and generics, but leads to higher copayments, especially for brand-name drugs. At the aggregate level, we find that a lower RP leads to savings for the public health insurer since revenues decrease substantially for brand-name firms and, to a lesser extent, also for generic firms. Overall expenditures (payments by the health insurer and the patients) for brand-name drugs decrease in proportion to the decrease in the RP, while the adjustment does not significantly influence overall expenditures for generics

Supernumerary kidneys: a clinical and radiological analysis of nine cases.

BACKGROUND: A supernumerary kidney (SK) is an additional kidney with its own capsule and blood supply that is not fused with the ipsilateral kidney (IK). Because individual case reports indicate a high morbidity rate, the aim of this retrospective study was a detailed analysis of this rare anatomical variant. METHODS: Our systematic imaging-based search for SKs, conducted in the period from 2000 and to 2017, yielded 9 cases in total (5 men, 4 women; mean age: 51.8 ± 22.8 years). RESULTS: The SKs were observed on the right in six and on the left side in three cases. In six subjects (66%) they were located caudal and in three cases (33%) cranial to the ipsilateral kidney. Calculi were found in three (33%) of the renal collecting systems. Five (56%) of the SKs had hydronephrosis grade IV and one SK had recurrent pyelonephritis (11%). Two of the ureters opened into the ipsilateral seminal vesicle (22%). Two (22%) SKs were functional but atrophic. Clinically relevant findings were made in 33% of the IKs: atrophy (n = 2), calculi (n = 1), and reflux with recurrent pyelonephritis (n = 1); another 33% had anatomical anomalies without functional impairment. The correct diagnosis of a SK is possible using CT imaging in all subjects. The prevalence of SK based on CT imaging can be estimated to be 1:26750. CONCLUSIONS: CT is the method of choice for visualizing SKs. The correct diagnosis is crucial in preventing dispensable surgical procedures and for providing optimal patient treatment and outcome