On the use of fractional Brownian motion simulations to determine the 3D statistical properties of interstellar gas

Based on fractional Brownian motion (fBm) simulations of 3D gas density and velocity fields, we present a study of the statistical properties of spectro-imagery observations (channel maps, integrated emission, and line centroid velocity) in the case of an optically thin medium at various temperatures. The power spectral index gamma_W of the integrated emission is identified with that of the 3D density field (gamma_n) provided the medium's depth is at least of the order of the largest transverse scale in the image, and the power spectrum of the centroid velocity map is found to have the same index gamma_C as that of the velocity field (gamma_v). Further tests with non-fBm density and velocity fields show that this last result holds, and is not modified either by the effects of density-velocity correlations. A comparison is made with the theoretical predictions of Lazarian & Pogosyan (2000).Comment: 28 pages, 14 figures, accepted for publication in ApJ. For preprint with higher-resolution figures, see http://www.cita.utoronto.ca/~mamd/miville_fbm2003.pd

Detection of a Corrugated Velocity Pattern in the Spiral Galaxy NGC 5427

Here we report the detection, in Halpha emission, of a radial corrugation in the velocity field of the spiral galaxy NGC 5427. The central velocity of the Halpha line displays coherent, wavy-like variations in the vicinity of the spiral arms. The spectra along three different arm segments show that the maximum amplitude of the sinusoidal line variations are displaced some 500 pc from the central part of the spiral arms. The peak blueshifted velocities appear some 500 pc upstream the arm, whereas the peak redshifted velocities are located some 500 pc downstream the arm. This kinematical behavior is similar to the one expected in a galactic bore generated by the interaction of a spiral density wave with a thick gaseous disk, as recently modeled by Martos & Cox (1998).Comment: Accepted for publication in Ap

Poverty and social security: concepts and principles.

Author's note, 2013: Poverty and social security was published in November 1992 (though the title page states 1993). First published 1993 by Routledge, ISBN 0-415-05935-6 and 0-415-05936-4. The rights to publish have reverted to me, and I am making it freely available on the internet. The book has dated in some respects, but I have not attempted to update it. Much of what the book had to say about the idea of poverty, the contribution of social security and the methods that can be used is still relevant. After I had written the book, I came to change my views on poverty in particular, under the influence of the multidimensional, multi-faceted views that came to the fore in international organisations. By the time I came to write The idea of poverty (Policy Press, 2007) I was firmly committed to a different normative and analytical framework. I would not now even attempt to combine the treatment of poverty and social security in the same book. One of the arguments I was taken by when I wrote this book has been translated into a different framework. When budget standards were first tested, they seemed not to work in the way that I expected - the term came to stand for the kind of normative budgeting that was associated with Rowntrees household budgets. Subsequently, however, the approach - looking at what people actually do, rather than what experts suppose they might do - has yielded valuable insights into minimum income standards and the nature of a living wage. See, e.g., D Hirsch, 2013, a Minimum income standard for the UK in 2013, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. I have not changed the text in any way. Preface (1992) This book is concerned with the ways in which poverty can be defined and identified, and the responses which have been made to the problems of poverty in the development of financial assistance for people who are poor. The first part of the book is concerned with the idea of poverty, the way it has been operationalised, and the kinds of responses which might be made to it. The second part is concerned with social security: its connection with poor relief, the way in which benefit systems operate, and the extent to which such systems do effectively relieve poverty. On the face of it, this seems straightforward enough as a field for a critical study; on closer examination, though, the focus may seem difficult to justify. The definition of the subject matter depends crucially on a set of conventional interpretations about the ideas of 'poverty' and 'social security'. If the idea of 'poverty' was to be examined adequately, it probably ought to be considered in much wider terms than a consideration of financial assistance would imply; equally, any proper consideration of income maintenance touches on many topics beyond the relief of poverty. The justification for a narrower focus is in large part centred on a particular kind of problem: the discussion of what sort of benefits should be provided for the relief of poverty, and at what level they should be provided. This problem has been dominant historically in the development of services, and continues to be a major concern in the debates about social security now. The debates around this issue have to a large extent affected the way in which the issues of poverty and poor relief are discussed. The purpose of the book is, then, to discuss a set of problems and responses. It does this principally by considering a range of inter-related concepts. For reasons which I explain in the text, the book does not offer any authoritative definition of the problems, an approach which I know might drive some readers to distraction. The method has more to do with social philosophy than with social science. What it does is to outline options and ways and thinking about the issues, in the hope that it will help to establish an understanding of the relationship between poverty and social security, and inform discussion in the future. Part of the focus, too, is comparative. My own experience is from Britain. I have found it useful to draw on that experience for many of the examples, but concentration on Britain alone is not really adequate to understand either the problems of poverty or the methods which are available to respond to them. Many of the arguments made about social security in Britain - like the case for Child Benefit, or arguments against meanstesting - rely on a received wisdom based on a restricted range of policies, and the most effective way to put them into perspective is to draw on material from other countries. The book is intended mainly for an academic audience: it should be of interest to those studying social policy, sociology, politics and public administration, and there are elements which may be useful to students of economics and philosophy. On the principle that a better understanding should make for better policy - though I really ought to know differently by now - it may also be helpful for those who are involved in policy-making and administration for the poor

Discretion in overpayment recovery.

R v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2023] EWHC 233 (Admin) calls into question at least three aspects of the long-established practice of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). The case concerns the DWP’s discretionary power to waive the recovery of overpayments. In former times, the rules governing recovery only rendered claimants liable if they had misrepresented or failed to disclose a material fact. Tax Credits had required low income families to repay substantial amounts of money delivered in error – a process the Ombudsman condemned as 'fundamentally unsuited' to their needs (Parliamentary and Service Ombudsman Citation2007, p. 5). Following this example, in 2013 a general power to recover overpayments from other benefits was introduced, governing Universal Credit, Jobseekers Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance. In the present case, the DWP had 'repeatedly' miscalculated the benefit, and assured the claimant that the payments were correct. The claimant had taken 'all reasonable steps to repeatedly clarify her entitlement and provide information' (para. 1). There was no dispute that the overpayment was the result of official error. The DWP had apologised for 'this profound lapse in service'. The claimant asked the DWP in three separate applications to exercise its discretion to waive repayments, and the DWP refused at every point

Five types of complexity.

This article describes five types of complexity in the operation of social security benefits. The first is intrinsic complexity: some benefits are complex in their concept, structure or operation. The second is extrinsic: systems become complicated when several benefits or agencies have to be dealt with. Third, there are complex rules. Some are imposed for administrative reasons, but there may also be some 'conditionality', including moral conditions and rules about rationing. Fourth, there are complex management systems, including the proliferation of agencies and the problems of information management. Finally, there is complexity that arises through the situation of claimants. Benefits which try to adjust to people's changing circumstances require elaborate rules and procedures, and they are always slightly out of step. If we want to simplify benefits, we need to focus on conditionality, administrative rules and management procedures. Some aspects of complexity, however, are unavoidable

Equality versus solidarity.

Although equality and solidarity are often thought of as constituent parts of the same ideological framework, there are inconsistencies between them. Both concepts refer to a range of meanings: equality can refer to equal treatment, opportunity or result, and solidarity, a term which is of growing influence in European social policy, can refer to mutual aid or group cohesion. Despite the close association of these ideas in theory, there is a tension between them, and they offer prescriptions for policy which are likely to conflict. British pensions policy is taken as an illustration; the case for solidaristic redistribution has had to be balanced against that for egalitarian policies, with some unpredictable results. The concepts of equality and solidarity can be reconciled, but this depends on the application of a set of limiting interpretations; they can just as easily be represented as incompatible

The Fairness Doctrine and Pro-Natalism in Television

It is a premise of this paper that television reflects a pro-natalist bias in its promotion of the traditional female role in society, and that such bias is evident in both commercial advertisements as well as in dramatic presentations particularly on daytime television. Those who are opposed to a pro-natalist point of view will find it virtually impossible to air their opposition effectively. At best anti-natalist groups may be able to garner only meager financial resources to air spot commercials, but this is hardly adequate to combat the subtle onslaught of the opposition. Suggestions have been made that pro-natalist attitudes be countered by means of the Federal Communications Commission\u27s Fairness Doctrine which might possibly enable anti-natalist groups to gain access to the airwaves. This paper will examine present television attitudes as well as the history and status of the Fairness Doctrine in an attempt to evaluate the availability of this doctrine as a tool for those interested in population control

Liberty, equality, fraternity

Available Open Access under CC-BY-NC licence. Paul Spicker's new book takes the three founding principles of the French Revolution - Liberty, Equality, Fraternity - and examines how they relate to social policy today. The book considers the political and moral dimensions of a wide range of social policies, and offers a different way of thinking about each subject from the way it is usually analysed

Needs as claims.

People 'need' things if they will suffer negative effects without them. Needs are based in problems, but they are not only problems; they have to be understood in terms of a relationship between functional problems and resources. Needs are a form of claim made against services. The concept of 'need' is not decisive in the allocation of resources, and this paper argues that the concept has to be understood as a form of claim-language. Once needs are understood in terms of claims, many of the apparent difficulties in conceptualising the issues dissolve; the main conflicts are between different types of claims, rather than contested definitions of need. Similarly, the establishment of priorities between greater and lesser needs depends on the strength of the claim which the needs present, and the context in which services operate, rather than on intrinsic comparisons between different levels of need. It follows that need is often not the sole, or even the primary, determinant of the legitimacy of a claim. Greater needs only have priority over lesser ones if they also constitute a claim of a different, and stronger, kind

Personalisation falls short.

Personalisation offers individualised treatment in circumstances where markets do not operate. Personalisation is described variously as a process involving an individualised assessment and response, the expression of individual preferences and choices, or a process in which users and professionals negotiate a common understanding of the needs of the individual. The core arguments for individualised approaches are effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness to need. However, personalisation sometimes falls short of the claims made for it. It is not always effective, because matching people to resources is time-consuming, difficult and dependent on so many conditions that mismatches are inevitable. It may be inefficient, because it is difficult to deliver selective services without either misplaced provision or inappropriate denial of service. There is only limited support to be found for the belief that services have become more responsive to individual circumstances as a consequence of personalisation, or that they are better matched to need. The case for personalisation has to be argued and proved in the context in which it is applied