Deindividuation

Deindividuation is among the classic phenomena researched by the early pioneers of social psychology. Building on the theorizing of LeBon (1895/1985), deindividuation provided an explanation for aggression in the crowd, a concern as relevant today as it was in the previous two centuries. The theory predicts that behavior becomes more antinormative and aggressive under conditions of anonymity, associated with group immersion, and that this occurs because of reduced self-awareness and deregulated behavior. However, close scrutiny of the deindividuation literature provides scant evidence for the deindividuation process. Revisiting the primary literature reveals at best mixed support for the original claims and many contradictions, often belied by accounts in secondary sources and textbooks. Reformulation and refinement of the theory has not helped. I present a reinterpretation, in terms of social influence by group norms, in line with social identity principles, supported by experimental evidence and a meta-analysis of the original deindividuation literature

Two (or more?) cognitive approaches to stereotype-formation:Biased or reality based

Although the stage for cognitive theories of stereotype formation and stereotyping was set by Allport’s (1954) classic volume The Nature of Prejudice , two cognitive theories which have dominated research in this area have been Tajfel’s accentuation theory of stereotyping (e.g., Tajfel, 1957, 1959, 1969; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) and Hamilton’s distinctiveness theory of illusory correlation (e.g., Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). Whereas stereotype formation according to accentuation theory is the result of categorization processes, stereotype formation according to Hamilton is (or can be) the result of memory distortions in processing information about different groups. One major difference between these theories is that according to accentuation theory, stereotypes refl ect an accentuation of actual differences between social categories, whereas the mechanism proposed by Hamilton does not require real group differences to exist. The focus of this chapter is to address the explanation of stereotype formation by these to theories, particularly in relation to this reality versus bias theme

Do humans possess an autonomous system justification motivation? A Pupillometric test of the strong system justification thesis

To investigate the existence of an autonomous system justification motive that guides human behavior, we tested the dissonance-inspired strong system justification thesis: that the cognitive effort expended to justify societal systems on which people depend, is greater amongst the disadvantaged than amongst the advantaged when their group identities are weak in salience/strength. Using a novel pupil dilation paradigm to tap cognitive effort, we exposed an ethnic minority group (N-total = 263) to depictions of their ingroup as disadvantaged or advantaged after they had stated four things they liked about their ethnic group (strong group identity salience) or grandmother (weak group identity salience). We then measured fluctuations in their pupil diameter as they contemplated support for societal systems that were either relevant (high dependency) or irrelevant (low dependency) to their ethnic group. Results revealed that pupil sizes were larger in the group disadvantage condition than in the group advantage condition-indicating greater cognitive effort-but only when group identity was salient (Experiment 1) or when group identification was strong (Experiment 2). These effects occurred only for high dependency systems. Combined, this evidence contradicts the system-justification thesis, and questions the existence of an autonomous system justification motivation in humans

A normative perspective of discrimination in the minimal group paradigm:Does it apply to both Ingroup love and outgroup hate?

Research based on the normative perspective on intergroup discrimination showed that participants in the minimal group paradigm (MGP) discriminate because they perceive it to be in line with the ingroup's expectations (Iacoviello &amp; Spears, 2018, 2021). The present set of studies examined whether these normative dynamics are peculiar to ‘ingroup love’, or whether they also apply to ‘outgroup hate’ (Brewer, 1979). Three studies (Ns = 405, 210, 307) first examined norm perceptions and showed that 1) participants perceived outgroup hate to be proscribed by ingroup members less than by an external body (i.e., social scientists), and 2) they perceived ingroup love to be promoted by ingroup members, but proscribed by the external body. Study 3 further showed that both ingroup love and outgroup hate behaviors were dependent on the imagined audience, increasing when participants imagined the presence of the ingroup vs. an external body. Finally, Study 4 (N = 410) showed that both ingroup love and outgroup hate increased when the ingroup norm was pro-discriminatory (vs. anti-discriminatory). The discussion focuses on the relevance of the normative perspective to explain both ingroup love and outgroup hate in the MGP.</p

Having pity on our victims to save ourselves:Compassion reduces self-critical emotions and self-blame about past harmful behavior among those who highly identify with their past self

Previous research has shown that people often separate the present self from past selves. Applying knowledge gained from intergroup research to the interpersonal domain, we argue that the degree to which people identify with their past self (self-identification) influences their reaction when recalling a past event during which they harmed another person. Because they feel close to their past self, we expected this to be threatening for high self-identifiers, and expected them to be motivated to avoid self-critical emotions and blame. Using four meta-analyses, conducted on a set of seven experimental studies, we investigated four ways in which high self-identifiers can distance themselves from the event: by feeling compassion, by taking a third-person rather than first-person perspective, by emphasizing ways in which their present self is different to their past self, and by disidentifying with the past self altogether. We found the strongest interaction effects for compassion: whereas a compassion manipulation increased self-critical emotions and self-blame about the past event for low self-identifiers, it decreased them for high self-identifiers. We argue that this occurs because the other-focused nature of compassion allows high self-identifiers subtly to shift the focus away from their harmful behavior. Our concept of past self-identification had stronger effects than a measure of self-continuity beliefs. It also correlated only moderately with the latter, suggesting they are distinct concepts. Our findings suggest that, ironically, the most effective way to protect the self against reminders of an undesirable past, may be to have compassion for our victims