232 research outputs found
The Paris Conference of 1919 Between the Traditions of European Congresses and the âNew Diplomacyâ
The conflicting combination of Old and New Diplomacy imparted to the Versailles treaty, through numerous compromises, a flexibility which tends to be overlooked and which was meant also to gain time in face of quite rabid Allied public opinion in 1919. Many provisions could be modified (reparations for instance), many delays could be shortened (as the occupation of the Rhineland). The treaty could be implemented harshly, as in 1921â1923, or more leniently, as after Locarno (1925). It was one of the few great international treaties which contained the means for its revision. It is not true that all the disasters of the 1930s were implied by the treaties, even if their legacy was much more short-lived and less successful than that of the Vienna Congress
1918 : la fin de la PremiÚre Guerre mondiale ?
En modifiant un peu la citation la plus connue de Clausewitz, on pourrait dire que : « la paix, câest la poursuite de la guerre par dâautres moyens ». Cette formule sâapplique en tout cas trĂšs bien Ă la pĂ©riode qui commence le 11 novembre 1918. En fait, lâArmistice de 1918 prĂ©jugeait dâentrĂ©e de jeu un certain nombre de questions essentielles pour la paix future. On pourrait dâailleurs en dire autant des autres armistices de lâautomne 1918, conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Turquie, lâAutriche-Hongrie, sans doute moins connus mais fort importants aussi. Il sâagissait non pas dâarmistices militaires, mais politico-militaires. DâoĂč lâimportance de cette pĂ©riode au cours de laquelle sâarrĂȘte la Grande Guerre, mais alors que les traitĂ©s de paix se font attendre.1918: the end of the First World War? In modifying slightly the best known citation of Clausewitz, one can say that: âPeace is the pursuit of war by other means.â This formula applies very well in every case to the period that commenced on 11 November 1918.  In fact, the Armistice of 1918 witnessed the entry into play of a certain number of essential questions for the future peace.  One can read of this elsewhere with the other armistices of the autumn of 1918, concluded with Bulgaria, Turkey, Austria-Hungary, which are without doubt less known but very important also. It was a question not of a military armistice, but a political-military one. From this comes the importance of this period during which the Great War was stopped while the treaties of peace were being awaited
La France et la non-prolifération nucléaire
Lâattitude de la France Ă lâĂ©gard de la prolifĂ©ration nuclĂ©aire a Ă©tĂ© particuliĂšrement complexe. Paris a Ă©tĂ© Ă la fois, mais pas toujours, la victime de politiques de non-prolifĂ©ration, en particulier de la part des Ătats-Unis, et par moments un prolifĂ©rateur de premiĂšre importance. En mĂȘme temps lâattitude française en la matiĂšre a Ă©voluĂ©. De façon, au fond, peu surprenante, au fur et Ă mesure des progrĂšs de ses propres armements nuclĂ©aires, Paris sâengagea de plus en plus en faveur de la non-prolifĂ©ration. Ce qui dominait Ă©taient les considĂ©rations de politique internationale. NĂ©anmoins, dâimportants intĂ©rĂȘts scientifiques, industriels Ă©conomiques Ă©taient Ă©galement en jeu, et les politiques françaises en matiĂšre de non-prolifĂ©ration en ont largement tenu compte.France and nuclear non-proliferation. A complex history   The attitude of France towards nuclear proliferation has been particularly complex. Paris has been at times, but not always, a victim of policies of non-proliferation, especially from the United States, and at times a proliferator of first importance. At the same time the French attitude in this matter has evolved. In a fashion somewhat surprising, as in the gradual progress of its own nuclear weapons, Paris pledged more support to non proliferation. That which dominated were considerations in international politics. However, significant scientific, industrial economics interests were also involved, and French policies on non-proliferation were largely ignored
La IVe RĂ©publique et lâĂ©volution de la politique de neutralitĂ© armĂ©e de la Suisse Ă lâĂ©poque de la guerre froide
DĂšs le dĂ©but de la guerre froide, la France sâintĂ©ressa Ă la neutralitĂ© de la Suisse. Sur un plan politique tout dâabord, la guerre froide sortant des schĂ©mas conflictuels traditionnels, la neutralitĂ© posait problĂšme : quelles Ă©taient ses limites, face Ă un conflit idĂ©ologique total, au moins potentiellement, et qui transcendait les limites du systĂšme interĂ©tatique classique ? Sur le plan militaire ensuite, la Suisse pouvait couvrir une voie dâinvasion possible dans lâhypothĂšse dâune attaque soviĂ©tique. Mais la question de la valeur de lâarmĂ©e suisse divisait les autoritĂ©s françaises. Cependant, Ă partir de 1953, lâarmĂ©e suisse entama une rĂ©organisation Ă la fois stratĂ©gique et matĂ©rielle (qui devait la conduire jusquâĂ lâactuel ModĂšle ArmĂ©e XXI) : ce qui la fit entrer de façon dĂ©cisive dans le contexte de la guerre froide. En 1955, il Ă©tait clair que la stratĂ©gie de dĂ©fense du Plateau impliquait pour la Suisse une collaboration avec lâOTAN. Ne disposant pas de couverture aĂ©rienne adĂ©quate, la Suisse envisagea mĂȘme une coopĂ©ration avec les forces aĂ©riennes françaises. Sur un plan matĂ©riel, les Ă©changes entre les deux pays, sâils nâaboutirent pas toujours, devaient nĂ©anmoins ĂȘtre nombreux.The IVth Republic and the evolution of Swiss neutrality policy in the era of the Cold War. From the outset of the Cold War, Swiss neutrality concerned France. From a political standpoint, firstly, the Cold War departed from traditional structures of power rivalry and so Swiss neutrality raised a problem: what were its limits, faced by an ideological war that was at least potentially total and exceeded the bounds of classical inter-state conflicts? From militarystandpoint, secondly, Switzerland could protect a traditional invasion route in case of a Soviet attack. The question of the Swiss armyâs value prompted division among the French authorities. From 1953, however, the Swiss army initiated a reorganisation affecting both its strategy and its war material (which would lead it to its present-day âArmy 21â model), and placed it squarely in the context of Cold War strategic calculations. In 1955 it was clear that defence of the Swiss Plateau implied collaboration with NATO. Lacking an adequate air defence, Switzerland even envisaged cooperation with the French Air Force. And in more material respects many links occurred between the two countries, even if they did always reach conclusions
La France et la non-prolifération nucléaire
Lâattitude de la France Ă lâĂ©gard de la prolifĂ©ration nuclĂ©aire a Ă©tĂ© particuliĂšrement complexe. Paris a Ă©tĂ© Ă la fois, mais pas toujours, la victime de politiques de non-prolifĂ©ration, en particulier de la part des Ătats-Unis, et par moments un prolifĂ©rateur de premiĂšre importance. En mĂȘme temps lâattitude française en la matiĂšre a Ă©voluĂ©. De façon, au fond, peu surprenante, au fur et Ă mesure des progrĂšs de ses propres armements nuclĂ©aires, Paris sâengagea de plus en plus en faveur de la non-prolifĂ©ration. Ce qui dominait Ă©taient les considĂ©rations de politique internationale. NĂ©anmoins, dâimportants intĂ©rĂȘts scientifiques, industriels Ă©conomiques Ă©taient Ă©galement en jeu, et les politiques françaises en matiĂšre de non-prolifĂ©ration en ont largement tenu compte.France and nuclear non-proliferation. A complex history   The attitude of France towards nuclear proliferation has been particularly complex. Paris has been at times, but not always, a victim of policies of non-proliferation, especially from the United States, and at times a proliferator of first importance. At the same time the French attitude in this matter has evolved. In a fashion somewhat surprising, as in the gradual progress of its own nuclear weapons, Paris pledged more support to non proliferation. That which dominated were considerations in international politics. However, significant scientific, industrial economics interests were also involved, and French policies on non-proliferation were largely ignored
La France et le problÚme des Nationalités pendant la guerre de 1914-1918: le cas de la Serbie
Paris a suivi pendant la PremiĂšre guerre mondiale Ă lâĂ©gard de la Serbie une politique beaucoup plus complexe quâon ne le croit en gĂ©nĂ©ral. Bien sĂ»r, on soutenait par principe la Serbie, victime de lâagression austro-allemande. En mĂȘme temps, Ă plusieurs reprises pendant le conflit des considĂ©rations dâopportunitĂ© stratĂ©giques ou diplomatiques dĂ©terminĂšrent la position française bien plus que le soutien Ă la Serbie. A la fin de la guerre, tout en acceptant le principe de la Yougoslavie, Paris essaya de tenir compte Ă©galement des Ă©quilibres rĂ©gionaux des Balkans, en particulier en Ă©vitant de heurter frontalement lâItalie. Dans ces conditions, on comprend mieux les hĂ©sitations de la politique officielle française Ă lâĂ©gard de la Serbie, malgrĂ© la sympathie gĂ©nĂ©rale que suscitĂšrent les Serbes par leur rĂ©sistance hĂ©roĂŻque
Efeitos colaterais cutùneos após uso prolongado de hidroxiuréia na Policitemia Vera
Deutsche Einheit - EuropÀische Einigung : französische Perspektiven
Dieser Festvortrag anlĂ€sslich der 20-Jahr-Feier der UniversitĂ€t am 20. Juli 1990 wurde veröffentlicht mit UnterstĂŒtzung der Gesellschaft der Freunde der UniversitĂ€t Augburg
Localisation géographique de la Chanson de sainte Foy
Soutou André. Localisation géographique de la Chanson de sainte Foy. In: Annales du Midi : revue archéologique, historique et philologique de la France méridionale, Tome 82, N°97, 1970. pp. 109-122
- âŠ