The Organization of Discipline: From Performance Management to Perversity and Punishment

Over the past few decades, poverty governance in the United States has been transformed by the convergence of two powerful reform movements. The first, often referred to as “paternalist,” has shifted poverty governance from an emphasis on rights and opportunities to a stance that is more directive and supervisory in promoting preferred behaviors among the poor. The second, often described as “neoliberal,” has shifted governance away from federal government control toward a system that emphasizes policy devolution, privatization, and performance competition. During this period, public officials have proved remarkably willing to hand policy control over to lower jurisdictions and private providers. They have been equally eager to use public policies in ways that overtly promote values, enforce obligations, and curtail deviance among the poor. In the era of neoliberal paternalism, poverty governance has become more dispersed in its organization, more muscular in its normative enforcement, and more firmly rooted in the logics of performance-based accountability and market competition

Distributing Discipline: Race, Politics, and Punishment at the Frontlines of Welfare Reform

Numerous studies have confirmed that race plays an important role in shaping public preferences toward both redistribution and punishment. Likewise, studies suggest that punitive policy tools tend to be adopted by state governments in a pattern that tracks with the racial composition of state populations. Such evidence testifies to the enduring power of race in American politics, yet it has limited value for understanding how disciplinary policies get applied to individuals in implementation settings. To illuminate the relationship between race and the application of punitive policy tools, we analyze sanction patterns in the TANF program. Drawing on a model of racial classification and policy choice, we test four hypotheses regarding client race and sanctioning. Our study does not support a simple story in which racial minorities are always more likely to be targeted for discipline. Rather, we find the impact of race to be contingent on local politics, administrative decentralization, and other client characteristics

Devolution, Discretion, and Local Variation in TANF Sanctioning

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Devolution, Discretion, and the Effect of Local Political Values on TANF Sanctioning

One of welfare reform\u27s most significant consequences is the devolution of policy-making authority from the federal government and states to local governments and frontline workers. What is perhaps less often appreciated is that devolution of authority to state governments has been accompanied by a significant decentralization of policy-making authority within states. As a result, prior research has not given sufficient attention to local political context as a factor shaping program implementation. This article examines the effect of local political values on the use of sanctions to penalize welfare recipients. Analyzing administrative data from the Florida Department of Children and Families for over 60,000 welfare clients, we find that there is a statistically significant amount of local variation in sanctioning rates across the state of Florida, even after controlling welfare clients\u27 characteristics. Local sanctioning patterns are systematically related to selected characteristics of local communities, including their ideological orientations

Devolution, Discretion, and the Effect of Local Political Values on TANF Sanctioning

One of welfare reform\u27s most significant consequences is the devolution of policy-making authority from the federal government and states to local governments and frontline workers. What is perhaps less often appreciated is that devolution of authority to state governments has been accompanied by a significant decentralization of policy-making authority within states. As a result, prior research has not given sufficient attention to local political context as a factor shaping program implementation. This article examines the effect of local political values on the use of sanctions to penalize welfare recipients. Analyzing administrative data from the Florida Department of Children and Families for over 60,000 welfare clients, we find that there is a statistically significant amount of local variation in sanctioning rates across the state of Florida, even after controlling welfare clients\u27 characteristics. Local sanctioning patterns are systematically related to selected characteristics of local communities, including their ideological orientations

Already Hit Bottom: General Assistance, Welfare Retrenchment, and Single Male Migration

The claim is often made that welfare recipients move to states where benefits are more readily available in more generous amounts. To test that claim, this study uses data on state General Assistance (GA) programs, as well as data on single men from the Public Use Microdata Set of the 1990 U.S. Census. We find only slight evidence that men who lack access to GA seek it elsewhere, and overall we find that the availability of GA has no more than a marginal effect on the location decisions of the men we studied. It seems that poor people, like other people, are interested in more than government benefits (or other financial considerations) when they make such decisions. Among other things, they are likely to care about the quality of their social relations, including networks of family and friends that serve as critical sources of support

Race and the Local Politics of Punishment in the New World of Welfare

To illuminate how race affects the usage of punitive tools in policy implementation settings, we analyze sanctions imposed for noncompliant client behavior under welfare reform. Drawing on a model of racial classification and policy choice, we test four hypotheses regarding client race, local context, and sanctioning. Based on longitudinal and cross-sectional multilevel analyses of individual-level administrative data, we find that race plays a significant role in shaping sanction implementation. Its effects, however, are highly contingent on client characteristics, local political contexts, and the degree to which state governments devolve policy control to local officials