How to fulfill the expert role in public dialogue:The Dutch dialogue on human germline genetic modification as a case

Over the last decades science communication theory appears to have evolved at a much faster pace than science communication practice. Scientists seem willing to step into the public domain, but a genuine two-way interaction with the public is only rarely observed. We argue that part of this discrepancy between theory and practice may actually be caused by the lacking of a clear description of the modern expert role; the role a scientist should take in contemporary science communication. In this contribution we use an example of good practice—the Dutch dialogue on human germline genetic modification—to inform theory. We analyse guiding principles for the design and execution of this dialogue and observe expert behavior in three separate dialogue sessions. With the combined findings, we present a detailed description of the modern expert role in terms of three responsibilities, with for each responsibility three prompts for behavior. For the responsibility to share these are to select expert knowledge that is relevant to the goal; to present expert knowledge in a meaningful and accessible language; and to be cautious in sharing personal considerations. For the responsibility to listen and learn these are to consider interactions with members of the public as opportunities to learn; to be patient and supportive; and to assist in stimulating in-depth dialogue. For the responsibility to invest in relationships these are to assist in creating an ambiance of safety and relevance; to preserve trust; and to convey respect for every contribution and every point of view. Each behavioral prompt is further concretized with concomitant actions and practice examples as collected from observing experts in action. The implications for scientists engaging in contemporary science communication, as well as for science communication trainers, are discussed.</p

Implicit trust in clinical decision-making by multidisciplinary teams

In clinical practice, decision-making is not performed by individual knowers but by an assemblage of people and instruments in which no one member has full access to every piece of evidence. This is due to decision making teams consisting of members with different kinds of expertise, as well as to organisational and time constraints. This raises important questions for the epistemology of medicine, which is inherently social in this kind of setting, and implies epistemic dependence on others. Trust in these contexts is a highly complex social practice, involving different forms of relationships between trust and reasons for trust: based on reasons, and not based on reasons; based on reasons that are easily accessible to reflection and others that are not. In this paper, we focus on what it means to have reasons to trust colleagues in an established clinical team, collectively supporting or carrying out every day clinical decision-making. We show two important points about these reasons, firstly, they are not sought or given in advance of a situation of epistemic dependence, but are established within these situations; secondly they are implicit in the sense of being contained or nested within other actions that are not directly about trusting another person. The processes of establishing these reasons are directly about accomplishing a task, and indirectly about trusting someone else’s expertise or competence. These processes establish a space of reasons within which what it means to have reasons for trust, or not, gains a meaning and traction in these team-work settings. Based on a qualitative study of decision-making in image assisted diagnosis and treatment of a complex disease called pulmonary hypertension (PH), we show how an intersubjective framework, or ‘space of reasons’ is established through team members forging together a common way of identifying and dealing with evidence. In dealing with images as a central diagnostic tool, this also involves a common way of looking at the images, a common mode or style of perception. These frameworks are developed through many iterations of adjusting and calibrating interpretations in relation to those of others, establishing what counts as evidence, and ranking different kinds of evidence. Implicit trust is at work throughout this process. Trusting the expertise of others in clinical decision-making teams occurs while the members of the team are busy on other tasks, most importantly, building up a framework of common modes of seeing, and common ways of identifying and assessing evidence emerge. It is only in this way that trusting or mistrusting becomes meaningful in these contexts, and that a framework for epistemic dependence is established

Implicit trust in clinical decision-making by multidisciplinary teams

In clinical practice, decision-making is not performed by individual knowers but by an assemblage of people and instruments in which no one member has full access to every piece of evidence. This is due to decision making teams consisting of members with different kinds of expertise, as well as to organisational and time constraints. This raises important questions for the epistemology of medicine, which is inherently social in this kind of setting, and implies epistemic dependence on others. Trust in these contexts is a highly complex social practice, involving different forms of relationships between trust and reasons for trust: based on reasons, and not based on reasons; based on reasons that are easily accessible to reflection and others that are not. In this paper, we focus on what it means to have reasons to trust colleagues in an established clinical team, collectively supporting or carrying out every day clinical decision-making. We show two important points about these reasons, firstly, they are not sought or given in advance of a situation of epistemic dependence, but are established within these situations; secondly they are implicit in the sense of being contained or nested within other actions that are not directly about trusting another person. The processes of establishing these reasons are directly about accomplishing a task, and indirectly about trusting someone else’s expertise or competence. These processes establish a space of reasons within which what it means to have reasons for trust, or not, gains a meaning and traction in these team-work settings. Based on a qualitative study of decision-making in image assisted diagnosis and treatment of a complex disease called pulmonary hypertension (PH), we show how an intersubjective framework, or ‘space of reasons’ is established through team members forging together a common way of identifying and dealing with evidence. In dealing with images as a central diagnostic tool, this also involves a common way of looking at the images, a common mode or style of perception. These frameworks are developed through many iterations of adjusting and calibrating interpretations in relation to those of others, establishing what counts as evidence, and ranking different kinds of evidence. Implicit trust is at work throughout this process. Trusting the expertise of others in clinical decision-making teams occurs while the members of the team are busy on other tasks, most importantly, building up a framework of common modes of seeing, and common ways of identifying and assessing evidence emerge. It is only in this way that trusting or mistrusting becomes meaningful in these contexts, and that a framework for epistemic dependence is established

Immune Subversion and Quorum-Sensing Shape the Variation in Infectious Dose among Bacterial Pathogens

Many studies have been devoted to understand the mechanisms used by pathogenic bacteria to exploit human hosts. These mechanisms are very diverse in the detail, but share commonalities whose quantification should enlighten the evolution of virulence from both a molecular and an ecological perspective. We mined the literature for experimental data on infectious dose of bacterial pathogens in humans (ID50) and also for traits with which ID50 might be associated. These compilations were checked and complemented with genome analyses. We observed that ID50 varies in a continuous way by over 10 orders of magnitude. Low ID50 values are very strongly associated with the capacity of the bacteria to kill professional phagocytes or to survive in the intracellular milieu of these cells. Inversely, high ID50 values are associated with motile and fast-growing bacteria that use quorum-sensing based regulation of virulence factors expression. Infectious dose is not associated with genome size and shows insignificant phylogenetic inertia, in line with frequent virulence shifts associated with the horizontal gene transfer of a small number of virulence factors. Contrary to previous proposals, infectious dose shows little dependence on contact-dependent secretion systems and on the natural route of exposure. When all variables are combined, immune subversion and quorum-sensing are sufficient to explain two thirds of the variance in infectious dose. Our results show the key role of immune subversion in effective human infection by small bacterial populations. They also suggest that cooperative processes might be important for successful infection by bacteria with high ID50. Our results suggest that trade-offs between selection for population growth-related traits and selection for the ability to subvert the immune system shape bacterial infectiousness. Understanding these trade-offs provides guidelines to study the evolution of virulence and in particular the micro-evolutionary paths of emerging pathogens

GWAS meta-analysis of over 29,000 people with epilepsy identifies 26 risk loci and subtype-specific genetic architecture

Epilepsy is a highly heritable disorder affecting over 50 million people worldwide, of which about one-third are resistant to current treatments. Here we report a multi-ancestry genome-wide association study including 29,944 cases, stratified into three broad categories and seven subtypes of epilepsy, and 52,538 controls. We identify 26 genome-wide significant loci, 19 of which are specific to genetic generalized epilepsy (GGE). We implicate 29 likely causal genes underlying these 26 loci. SNP-based heritability analyses show that common variants explain between 39.6% and 90% of genetic risk for GGE and its subtypes. Subtype analysis revealed markedly different genetic architectures between focal and generalized epilepsies. Gene-set analyses of GGE signals implicate synaptic processes in both excitatory and inhibitory neurons in the brain. Prioritized candidate genes overlap with monogenic epilepsy genes and with targets of current antiseizure medications. Finally, we leverage our results to identify alternate drugs with predicted efficacy if repurposed for epilepsy treatment

Epistemology for interdisciplinary research – Shifting philosophical paradigms of science

In science policy, it is generally acknowledged that science-based problem-solving requires interdisciplinary research. For example, policy makers invest in funding programs such as Horizon 2020 that aim to stimulate interdisciplinary research. Yet the epistemological processes that lead to effective interdisciplinary research are poorly understood. This article aims at an epistemology for interdisciplinary research (IDR), in particular, IDR for solving ‘real-world’ problems. Focus is on the question why researchers experience cognitive and epistemic difficulties in conducting IDR. Based on a study of educational literature it is concluded that higher-education is missing clear ideas on the epistemology of IDR, and as a consequence, on how to teach it. It is conjectured that the lack of philosophical interest in the epistemology of IDR is due to a philosophical paradigm of science (called a physics paradigm of science), which prevents recognizing severe epistemological challenges of IDR, both in the philosophy of science as well as in science education and research. The proposed alternative philosophical paradigm (called an engineering paradigm of science) entails alternative philosophical presuppositions regarding aspects such as the aim of science, the character of knowledge, the epistemic and pragmatic criteria for accepting knowledge, and the role of technological instruments. This alternative philosophical paradigm assume the production of knowledge for epistemic functions as the aim of science, and interprets ‘knowledge’ (such as theories, models, laws, and concepts) as epistemic tools that must allow for conducting epistemic tasks by epistemic agents, rather than interpreting knowledge as representations that objectively represent aspects of the world independent of the way in which it was constructed. The engineering paradigm of science involves that knowledge is indelibly shaped by how it is constructed. Additionally, the way in which scientific disciplines (or fields) construct knowledge is guided by the specificities of the discipline, which can be analyzed in terms of disciplinary perspectives. This implies that knowledge and the epistemic uses of knowledge cannot be understood without at least some understanding of how the knowledge is constructed. Accordingly, scientific researchers need so-called metacognitive scaffolds to assist in analyzing and reconstructing how ‘knowledge’ is constructed and how different disciplines do this differently. In an engineering paradigm of science, these metacognitive scaffolds can also be interpreted as epistemic tools, but in this case as tools that guide, enable and constrain analyzing and articulating how knowledge is produced (i.e., explaining epistemological aspects of doing research). In interdisciplinary research, metacognitive scaffolds assist interdisciplinary communication aiming to analyze and articulate how the discipline constructs knowledge