The Objectivity of Ordinary Life

Metaethics tends to take for granted a bare Democritean world of atoms and the void, and then worry about how the human world that we all know can possibly be related to it or justified in its terms. I draw on Wittgenstein to show how completely upside-down this picture is, and make some moves towards turning it the right way up again. There may be a use for something like the bare-Democritean model in some of the sciences, but the picture has no standing as the basic objective truth about the world; if anything has that standing, it is ordinary life. I conclude with some thoughts about how the notion of bare, “thin” perception of non-evaluative reality feeds a number of philosophical pathologies, such as behaviourism, and show how a “thicker”, more value-laden, understanding of our perceptions of the world can be therapeutic against them

Introducing Epiphanies

I propose a programme of research in ethical philosophy, into the peak-experiences or wow-moments that I, following James Joyce and others, call epiphanies. As a first pass, I characterize an epiphany as an (1) overwhelming (2) existentially significant manifestation of (3) value, (4) often sudden and surprising, (5) which feels like it “comes from outside” – it is something given, relative to which I am a passive perceiver – which (6) teaches us something new, which (7) “takes us out of ourselves”, and which (8) demands a response. Often the correct response is love, often it is pity, or again creativity. It might also be anger or reverence or awe or a hunger to put things right – a hunger for justice; or many other things. It may be something that leads directly to action, but it may also be something that prompts contemplation; or other responses again. Since epiphanies are what I call a focal-case category, not all of the conditions listed above have to be fulfilled by all instances of epiphanies. In order to allow the reader to get a better grip on which range of phenomena may count as an epiphany, I examine in some detail several examples from literature, in particular from works by Murdoch, Hopkins, Wordsworth, C.S. Lewis, and by James Joyce

On not saying more than we know: New Natural Law Theory and anti-theoretical ethics

I say something about the relationship of Finnis’s work in ethics to my own, then summarise and criticise Finnis’s new natural law theory. My own view is an anti-theoretical view: there is no reason to expect any neatly systematic ethical theory to be true just because it is neatly systematic. The doubts that naturally arise about new natural law theory are mostly of this nature: they are based on suspicion of schematisms. I close with some positive suggestions about resources for ethics, in particular «the common understanding of humanity».Este trabajo, que constituye una reflexión personal sobre de la aportación de Finnis en el campo de la ética, presenta un resumen acerca de, y una crítica hacia, la Nueva Escuela del Derecho Natural del autor. Desde mi propia perspectiva antiteorética, no hay razón para esperar que una teoría ética que ofrezca una ordenación sistemática sea verdadera; sólo porque es el resultado de una ordenación sistemática. Las dudas, que naturalmente surgen sobre la nueva teoría del derecho natural son, en su mayoría, de esta naturaleza: es sospechosa de incurrir en esquematismos. Concluye con algunas sugerencias positivas sobre los recursos para la ética, con mención particular para «el entendimiento común de la humanidad»

Agamemnon at Aulis: On the Right and Wrong Sorts of Imaginative Identification

Williams’ discussion of dilemmas in his classic paper “Ethical consistency” famously focuses on an example that has not bothered commentators on and respondents to Williams as much as it should have bothered them: the example of Agamemnon in Aeschylus’ play. In this paper I try to pick apart what Williams wants to say from what is really going on in the text that he unfortunately chooses for his example. I compare with Williams’ discussion of Agamemnon four other commentators on this crucial passage in Aeschylus’ play: Plato, Socrates, Aristotle—and Bernard Williams’ Greats tutor Eduard Fraenkel, whose epochal Corpus Christi seminars on the play Williams attended (along with Iris Murdoch, Hugh Lloyd Jones, and other rising stars of the time). I shall argue that these commentators led Williams astray. They are surprisingly prone to the same flaws of rationalism, impersonality, and moralism in making sense of Aeschylus’ extraordinarily subtle and brilliant depiction of Agamemnon; and Williams’ discussion inherits these flaws. This is an obviously ironic fact, especially given that a very fruitful reading of the passage—one that I think makes much better sense of what Aeschylus actually says—points a deeply Williamsian moral. It takes Agamemnon at Aulis as a study of a key step in the corruption of a character, a study that gets its power and its horror from its ability to show us how that process looks from Agamemnon’s own viewpoint

Is Consciousness Gendered?

We can ask whether there anything it is distinctively like to be female or male (a question about sex). And we can ask whether there anything it is distinctively like to be feminine or masculine (a question about gender). I think the answer to both these questions is “Obviously yes”. Why yes? And why obviously? Consciousness is gendered, and obviously gendered, because the political realities of what it is like to be masculine, and what it is like to be feminine, are distinctively different. Moreover, consciousness is sexed too, and obviously sexed, because the physical realities of what it is like to be male, and what it is like to be female, are distinctively different. And that is why the answer to our two questions is not just “Yes”, but “Obviously yes”

The Riddle of Oedipus

What is the riddle of Oedipus? This paper is an exploration of the philosophy involved in Sophocles’ famous play Oedipus Tyrannus. The play involves a riddler who becomes king, a man who is famously good at understanding what others find obscure, and yet is unable to see it when he is confronted by an obvious set of uncomfortable truths about himself. As well as for Oedipus, the play poses a number of different riddles for us: in particular it is a study of responsibility and shame, and of deliberation and choice. Like any work of art, the play does not tell us what conclusions we should reach; but it does show us some questions that need asking, and indeed some riddles that we face

To Live Outside the Law You Must Be Honest

Section I states Sandis’s view in his paper (particularism for actions, generalism for dispositions); Section II describes and begins to criticize Dancy-style particularism; Section III applies these criticisms to Sandis’s view; Section IV delineates an alternative view (my own) about actions, dispositions, and the particularism/generalism debate; Section V raises and considers a further puzzle, about how in general we should understand virtue ascriptions anyway

Reply to Commentators

Reply to Simon Kirchin, Hans Maes, and Yanni Ratajczik, commentators on my book Epiphanies

Communities of Practice in Academic Administration: An Example from Managing Undergraduate Research at a Research-Intensive University

Inspired by the need to connect virtually during COVID-19 operations, a community of practice for facilitators of undergraduate research experiences was initiated at our university. Weekly virtual meetings quickly expanded to fill an unmet need for cross-campus support of research experiences more generally, including clarification of liability concerns, best practices for crafting inclusive application materials, culturally competent mentorship, and the abrupt transition to online research experiences. The resulting synergy of ideas also yielded significant new initiatives including an anti-racist research curriculum, federal grant proposals, and campus-wide outreach activities. The community of practice has continued to evolve with a sustainability focus, utilizing the model of a dedicated meeting facilitator and regular meeting times, coupled with responsiveness to pressing issues articulated by participants. Regular participants report improved outcomes for their students as a result of the community of practice discussions, as well as a space for personal and professional support and networking