The Corporate Social Responsibility is just a twist in a M\"obius Strip

In recent years economics agents and systems have became more and more interacting and juxtaposed, therefore the social sciences need to rely on the studies of physical sciences to analyze this complexity in the relationships. According to this point of view we rely on the geometrical model of the M\"obius strip used in the electromagnetism which analyzes the moves of the electrons that produce energy. We use a similar model in a Corporate Social Responsibility context to devise a new cost function in order to take into account of three positive crossed effects on the efficiency: i)cooperation among stakeholders in the same sector, ii)cooperation among similar stakeholders in different sectors and iii)the stakeholders' loyalty towards the company. By applying this new cost function to a firm's decisional problem we find that investing in Corporate Social Responsibility activities is ever convenient depending on the number of sectors, the stakeholders' sensitivity to these investments and the decay rate to alienation. Our work suggests a new method of analysis which should be developed not only at a theoretical but also at an empirical level.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure

The dynamics of ethical product differentiation and the habit formation of socially responsible consumers

In our model of ethical product differentiation two duopolists (a zero profit socially concerned producer and a profit maximizing producer) compete over prices and (costly) socially and environmentally responsible features of their products under a given law of motion of consumer habits. In a continuous time model in which the location of the zero profit social responsible entrant is fixed and the profit maximizing producer (PMP) limits himself to price competition without ethical imitation, we show that the optimal dynamic price is always lower than his optimal static price since the PMP producer knows that, by leaving too much market share to the other producer, he will reinforce the habit of socially responsible consumption and loose further market share in the future. We inspect the properties of equilibria when the PMP can ethically imitate the entrant and when the entrant is free to choose his location. We find that, in the first case, the threshold triggering a PMP strategy of ethical imitation and minimum price differentiation is lower in the dynamic than in the static case, depending on the shadow cost of changes in consumers social responsibility.Socially responsible consumers; ethical product differentiation; profit maximizing producer

An Italian case-study of Eco-innovations: drivers and barriers for SMEs in Calabria

We aim to investigate the drivers and barriers of eco-innovations in Calabria and the role of intermediaries to enhance in the organizations the concept of sustainable development. We analyse three case studies of environmentally sustainable companies. Our analysis shows that several critical issues need to be addressed by national and regional policies to remove relevant barriers to these investments. The interwied companies identified these difficulties mainly in the problems to access credits and get funds alongside to the excess of complicate beaurocracy. On the other side, the attention for the environmental issues and the opportunity to promote products and services with a lower environmental impact on the market, in order to obtain a competitive advantage and possibly increase the turnover and customer portfolio, represents the most pushing factor for the adoption of radical eco-innovations. Nevertheless, intermediaries play an important role as these companies have in common that they had the possibility to benefit from the expertises and competences of a provider of services

On ethical product differentiation

In our model of ethical product differentiation two duopolists compete over prices and (costly) "socially and environmentally responsible" features of their products. We show that the incumbent finds it optimal to reduce the price after the ethical producer's entry when his (non ethical) location is fixed. His optimal price is halfway between his zero profit price and the zero profit price of the ethical producer. By removing the fixed location hypothesis we find that the ethical producer’s entry has positive indirect effects on aggregate social and environmental responsibility since the incumbent finds it optimal to imitate him when consumers’ perception of ethical costs is sufficiently high. In the paper we also show that the solution of the three-stage game - in which location and prices are simultaneously chosen and the profit maximising producer is Stackelberg leader in location – has three main features: minimum price differentiation, ethical imitation and non minimal ethical differentiation. We explain the differences between these findings and those from a traditional Hotelling game as depending from three main features: 1) the different goals of the two (profit maximising and zero profit) competitors; 2) the asymmetric costs of "ethical" distance and 3) the lack of independence between ethical location and prices

The dynamics of socially responsible product differentiation and the habit formation of socially responsible consumers

In our model of socially responsible (SR) product differentiation two duopolists (a zero profit socially concerned producer and a profit maximizing producer) compete over prices and (costly) “socially and environmentally responsible” features of their products under a given law of motion of consumer’s habits. In a continuous time model in which the location of the zero profit socially responsible entrant is fixed and the profit maximizing producer (PMP) limits himself to price competition without SR imitation, we show that the optimal dynamic PMP’s price is always lower than his optimal static price since the PMP knows that, by leaving too much market share to his competitor, he will reinforce the habit of socially responsible consumption and loose further market share in the future. We also inspect the properties of equilibria when the PMP can imitate the entrant’s SR and we find that, in this case, the threshold triggering a PMP strategy of SR imitation and minimum price differentiation is higher in the dynamic than in the static case, depending on the PMP’s shadow cost of changes in consumer social responsibility.product differentiation, social responsibility, fair trade

Spectators versus stakeholders with or without veil of ignorance: The difference it makes for justice and chosen distribution criteria

We document with a randomized experiment that being spectators and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders with veil of ignorance on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria to prefer rewarding talent (vis-à-vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. The removal of the veil of ignorance reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favour of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders’ choices before the removal of the veil of ignorance are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose under the veil the criterion in which they assume to perform relatively better.Distributive Justice; Perceived Fairness; Talent, Chance and Effort; Veil of Ignorance.

The economic analysis of a Q-learning model of Cooperation with punishment.

A Q-learning model is devised in order to see whether individuals can "learn" how to cooperate, when a virtuous system of punishment and reinforcement is adopted. The paper shows that, if it is possible to free-ride and not being adequately punished, there will always be an incentive to deviate from cooperation. Conversely, even if the others did not cooperate, it is still possible to have someone who cooperates when individuals are pushed by strong intrinsec motivations. Cooperation can be a learning process. It is possible to trigger a learning process that leads individuals to be equally cooperative. This happens much more easily, the more responsible the individuals are. It also depends on proper punishment

Spectators versus stakeholders with or without veil of ignorance: the difference it makes for justice and chosen distribution criteria

We document with a randomized experiment that being spectators and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders with veil of ignorance on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria to prefer rewarding talent (vis à vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. The removal of the veil of ignorance reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favour of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders? choices before the removal of the veil of ignorance are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose under the veil the criterion in which they assume to perform relatively better.Distributive Justice; Perceived Fairness; Talent, Chance and Effort; Veil of Ignorance

Human networks and toxic relationships

We devise a theoretical model to shed light on the dynamics leading to the so called toxic relationships. We want to investigate what policy interventions people could advocate to protect themselves and to reduce suffocant assuefaction so to escape to the trap of physical or psychological abuses either in family or at work. By assuming that the toxic partner's behavior is exogenous and that the main source of addiction is income or wealth, and solving a dynamical system of differential equations we find that an asympotically stable equilibrium with positive love is always possibile for enough high level of appealing unless subsides to reduces assuefaction are introduced. Also the existence of a third uncondicionally reciprocating part as a benckmark (which represents not only the real presence of another partner but also the support from family, friends and overall private organizations. These last may help victims of domestic abuses or private organizations by offering economic and psychological support as well as legal counseling to victims of bullying at workplace and placement offices which e ectively help to find soon another job)plays an important role in reducing the toxic partner's appealing. By solving our model we outline the condition for a best mixed policy where both monetary subsides and alternatives are at wor