Russell-names: an introduction to Millian descriptivism

This essay studies the semantic properties of what I call Russell-names. Russell-names bear intimate semantic relations with descriptive conditions, in consonance with the main tenets of descriptivism. Yet, they are endowed with the semantic properties attributed to ordinary proper names by Millianism: they are rigid and non-indexical devices of direct reference. This is not an essay in natural language semantics, and remains deliberately neutral with respect to the question whether any among the expressions we ordinarily classify as proper names behave as Russell-names. Its aim is rather that of casting a new light on the traditional debate about descriptivism on the one hand, and, on the other, what is commonly understood as a radically anti-descriptivist approach. From the viewpoint of descriptivism, the conceivability of Russell-names provides welcome relief from the pressure exerted by considerations at odds with a flaccid and/or indexical treatment of proper names. Conversely, from a Millian standpoint, the conceivability of Russell-names indicates that the Millian stance, far from providing a meagre picture of names as ‘mere tags’, is at least in principle consistent with the recognition of their semantic bonds with richer descriptive material. The Appendix provides a formal treatment of Russell-names within a model theoretic semantics for indexical intensional languages, developed within an original ‘double-context’ framework

Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?

My topic is moderate modal skepticism in the spirit of Peter van Inwagen. Here understood, this is a conservative version of modal empiricism that severely limits the extent to which an ordinary agent can reasonably believe “exotic” possibility claims. I offer a novel argument in support of this brand of skepticism: modal skepticism grounds an attractive (and novel) reply to Humean skepticism. Thus, I propose that modal skepticism be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility as a tool for dissolving philosophical paradox

Unity through truth

Renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block for any traditional conception of propositions. These worries are often framed in terms of how entities independent of mind and language can have truth conditions: why is the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio true if and only if she loves him? I argue that the best understanding of these worries shows that they should be solved by our theory of truth and not our theory of content. Specifically, I propose a version of the redundancy theory according to which ‘it is true that Desdemona loves Cassio’ expresses the same proposition as ‘Desdemona loves Cassio’. Surprisingly, this variant of the redundancy theory treats ‘is true’ as an ordinary predicate of the language, thereby defusing many standard criticisms of the redundancy theory

Plucked human hair as a tissue in which to assess pharmacodynamic end points during drug development studies

We have demonstrated the feasibility of detecting and quantifying six cell-cycle-related nuclear markers (Ki67, pRb, p27, phospho-p27 (phosphorylated p27), phospho-pRb (phosphorylated pRb), phospho-HH3 (phosphorylated histone H3)) in plucked human scalp and eyebrow hair. Estimates of the proportion of plucked hairs that are lost or damaged during processing plus the intra- and intersubject variability of each nuclear marker with these techniques are provided to inform sizing decisions for intervention studies with drugs potentially impacting on these markers in the future

Naming and Non-necessity

Kripke’s examples of allegedly contingent a priori sentences include ‘Stick S is exactly one meter long’, where the reference of ‘meter’ is fixed by the description ‘the length of stick S’. In response to skepticism concerning apriority Kripke replaced the meter sentence with a more sophisticated variant, arguing that the modified example is more immune to such skepticism. The case for apriority is examined. A distinction is drawn between apriority and a broader notion, “qua- priority,” of a truth whose epistemic justification is dependent on no experience other than that required to justify belief of the deliverances of pure semantics. It is argued that Kripke’s examples are neither a priori nor qua-priori

Electronically delivered, multicomponent intervention to reduce unnecessary antibiotic prescribing for respiratory infections in primary care: a cluster randomised trial using electronic health records—REDUCE Trial study original protocol

Introduction Respiratory tract infections (RTIs) account for about 60% of antibiotics prescribed in primary care. This study aims to test the effectiveness, in a cluster randomised controlled trial, of electronically delivered, multicomponent interventions to reduce unnecessary antibiotic prescribing when patients consult for RTIs in primary care. The research will specifically evaluate the effectiveness of feeding back electronic health records (EHRs) data to general practices. Methods and analysis 2-arm cluster randomised trial using the EHRs of the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD). General practices in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are being recruited and the general population of all ages represents the target population. Control trial arm practices will continue with usual care. Practices in the intervention arm will receive complex multicomponent interventions, delivered remotely to information systems, including (1) feedback of each practice's antibiotic prescribing through monthly antibiotic prescribing reports estimated from CPRD data; (2) delivery of educational and decision support tools; (3) a webinar to explain and promote effective usage of the intervention. The intervention will continue for 12?months. Outcomes will be evaluated from CPRD EHRs. The primary outcome will be the number of antibiotic prescriptions for RTIs per 1000 patient years. Secondary outcomes will be: the RTI consultation rate; the proportion of consultations for RTI with an antibiotic prescribed; subgroups of age; different categories of RTI and quartiles of intervention usage. There will be more than 80% power to detect an absolute reduction in antibiotic prescription for RTI of 12 per 1000 registered patient years. Total healthcare usage will be estimated from CPRD data and compared between trial arms. Ethics and dissemination Trial protocol was approved by the National Research Ethics Service Committee (14/LO/1730). The pragmatic design of the trial will enable subsequent translation of effective interventions at scale in order to achieve population impact. <br/

Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?

The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others

The Prenective View of Propositional Content

Beliefs have what I will call ‘propositional content’. A belief is always a belief that so-and-so: a belief that grass is green, or a belief that snow is white, or whatever. Other things have propositional content too, such as sentences, judgments and assertions. The Standard View amongst philosophers is that what it is to have a propositional content is to stand in an appropriate relation to a proposition. Moreover, on this view, propositions are objects, i.e. the kind of thing you can refer to with singular terms. For example, on the Standard View, we should parse the sentence ‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’ as: [Simon] believes [that Sharon is funny]; ‘Simon’ is a term referring to a thinking subject, ‘that Sharon is funny’ is a term referring to a proposition, and ‘x believes y’ is a dyadic predicate expressing the believing relation. In this paper, I argue against the Standard View. This is how I think we should parse ‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’: [Simon] believes that [Sharon is funny]; here we have a singular term, ‘Simon’, a sentence ‘Sharon is funny’, and a ‘prenective’ joining them together, ‘x believes that p’. On this Prenective View, we do not get at the propositional content of someone’s belief by referring to a reified proposition with a singular term; we simply use the sentence ‘Sharon is funny’ to express that content for ourselves. I argue for the Prenective View in large part by showing that an initially attractive version of the Standard View is actually vulnerable to the same objection that Wittgenstein used against Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment