Is the ECB sufficiently accountable and transparent? CEPS Working Document No. 169, July 2001

More than two years after its inception, the ECB is still perceived as lacking transparency by many academics and market participants.1 Our analysis, based on a series of indicators, suggests instead that the ECB is, at least on paper, one of the most transparent and accountable central banks. The discrepancy between theory and public perception suggests that much remains to be done within the given institutional framework to improve the transparency of the ECB. What is the best way to achieve this goal? Several suggestions have been put forward, such as publishing the detailed minutes of the ECB Governing Council meetings. This would result in shifting the true debate to informal meetings of the Governing Council, while formal meetings would only record pre-packaged consensus with no or little discussion. In our view, the best way to make the ECB more accountable is to engage it in substantive discussions about its policy. The ECB should provide more information about the background analysis that leads to policy decisions. For example, the ECB should transform its ‘staff projections’ into true inflation forecasts and it should be more open about the arguments that shape the internal debates, which precedes decisions. Accountability cannot be ensured by the ECB alone. An important role has to be played by its counterparts, such as the European Parliament, the Council of EU Finance Ministers and the public at large

How Can the ECB be Credible?

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020

Austerity: European democracies against the wall. CEPS Paperbacks. July 2013

The crisis in the eurozone has had a dramatic impact on the economic and social fabric of European countries. However important it may be, the economic dimension is only the symptom of a broader problem. The crisis is primarily political in nature. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi argues in this book that the crisis reflects the inability of western democracies to solve problems that have been building for over two decades. He finds that democratically elected officials are loathe to take unpopular decisions that could jeopardise their re-election. Emergency thus becomes the engine of political action, and the justification for corrective measures vis-à-vis the voters. As a consequence, the cure in the form of austerity, administered belatedly and under pressure from the markets, becomes even more painful and unpopular, giving rise to populist movements and endangering democracy itself

The politics of IMF–EU cooperation : institutional change from the Maastricht Treaty to the launch of the Euro

How do regional changes affect the process of global governance? This article addresses this question by examining how the International Monetary Fund (IMF) responded to the challenges presented by Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) between the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the launch of the euro in 1999. Based on primary research from the IMF archives, the article illustrates how the IMF's efforts to reconfigure its relationship with European institutions evolved gradually through a logic of incremental change, despite initial opposition from member states. The article concludes that bureaucratic actors within international organizations will take advantage of informal avenues for promoting a new agenda when this fits with shared conceptions of an organization's mandate. The exercise of informal influence by advocates for change within an international organization can limit the options available to states in formal decision-making processes, even when these options cut across state preferences

Barriers and enablers experienced by health care workers in swabbing for COVID-19 in Papua New Guinea: A multi-methods cross-sectional study.

OBJECTIVE: We aimed to identify the barriers and enablers that Health Care Workers (HCWs) in Papua New Guinea experienced in swabbing for COVID-19. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional multi-methods study: a qualitative scoping exercise and a telephone survey. The target population was COVID-19-trained HCWs from all provinces of Papua New Guinea. A descriptive analysis of survey responses was conducted alongside a rapid qualitative analysis of interviews and open-ended survey questions. RESULTS: Four thematic areas were identified: human resources, logistics, HCW attitudes and community attitudes. The survey response rate was 70.3% (407/579). Commonly reported barriers to COVID-19 swabbing were insufficient staff trained (74.0%, n = 301), inadequate staffing in general (64.9%, n = 264), insufficient supply of personal protective equipment (60.9%, n = 248) and no cold chain to store swabs (57.5%, n = 234). Commonly reported enablers to swabbing were community awareness and risk communication (80.8%, n = 329), consistent and sufficient supplies of personal protective equipment (67.8%, n = 276), increased surge workforce (63.9%, n = 260) and having a fridge to store swabs (59.7%, n = 243). CONCLUSIONS: A comprehensive community and HCW engagement strategy combined with innovations to improve the supply chain are needed to increase COVID-19 swabbing in Papua New Guinea to reach national testing targets. Investments in increasing numbers of frontline workforce, consistent supplies of PPE, swabs, transport medium, cold boxes and ability to make ice packs, in addtion to establishing regular tranport of specimens from the facility to the testing site will strengthen the supply chain. Innovations are needed to address these issues