765 research outputs found

    Foreign Investment Contracts – Host Country\u27s Concerns

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    Developing the reaction kinetics for a biodiesel reactor

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    The aim of this paper was to investigate the kinetics of the biodiesel reaction in order to find out how best to reach 96.5% methyl ester. The purity of the biodiesel product was examined using gas chromatography to the EN14214 FAME standard and real-time optical microscopy was used to observe the reaction. The problem was the reaction doesn’t reach completion and the mechanism is not understood. It was observed that droplet size had a major influence on reaction end point and that the reaction was mass-transfer limited. This observation was confirmed by developing a mass-transfer based reaction model using the data from the batch reactor which agreed with results from other researchers. The model predicted better conversion with more mixing intensity. The results show that significant improvements could be made to the conventional FAME process

    THREATS OF FORCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STRATEGY

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    Dr Francis Grimal, Routledge 2012, ISBN-13: 978-0415609852, Price £70.40 hbDr Grimal’s monograph on the law of armed conflict relating to threats of force, is a significant contribution to the literature. It ventures along one of the most perilous corridors of uncertainty in modern international law, and attempts with commendable courage to set the legal issues in the context of modern international relations. As Professor Breau writes in her Foreword, the existing literature concentrates overwhelmingly on the actual use of force, and there is little academic analysis of the meaning and significance of the threat of force in terms of the reference in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, to the duty of all members to ‘refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’

    Broader-based and Sectoral Bargaining Proposals in Collective Bargaining Law Reform: A Historical Review

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    Labour legislation regulating Canada’s private sector has incorporated forms of broader-based or sectoral certification and bargaining (BBB) in varying degrees for decades, particularly in British Columbia and Quebec. However, BBB had not been the subject of significant post-war labour law reform discussion until the 1990s. This decade saw a wave of interest in introducing BBB arise across several jurisdictions. Originating in Ontario in the late 1980s, it spread to British Columbia as a key part of labour law reform discussions in the early and late 1990s and became a minor issue in the federal labour law reform review process later that decade. In none of these instances were BBB proposals or recommendations adopted. Since then, and until the Changing Workplaces Review (CWR) of Ontario’s Labour Relations Act (OLRA) and Employment Standards Act (ESA) commenced in 2015, private sector BBB had not been an important reform issue. BBB gained significant attention in the CWR process but was less prominent in the subsequent labour law reform processes undertaken in Alberta and British Columbia. None of these reviews have resulted in substantial BBB amendments to the labour legislation. This article traces the history of BBB as an issue in labour law reform exercises across jurisdictions in English Canada from the late 1980s to early 2019, examining the context in which these issues arose, identifying key BBB proposals, and challenges to these proposals. It concludes with an analysis of the failure of efforts to incorporate BBB proposals into labour legislation, and an assessment of the key challenges to adopting significant BBB reforms in the future

    Captive Audience Meetings and Forced Listening : Lessons for Canada from the American Experience

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    Widespread adoption of mandatory representation votes and express protection of employer speech invite employer anti-union campaigns during union organizing, including employer-held captive audience meetings. Therefore, the problem of whether and how to restrict employers’ captive audience communications during union organizing is of renewed relevance in Canada. Captive meetings are a long-standing feature of American labour relations. This article considers how treatment of captive meetings evolved in the U.S., including the notion of employee choice; the “marketplace of ideas” view of expression dominating the American debate; and the central role of the contest between constitutional and statutory rights. It also considers the concept of “forced listening” and the associated Captive Audience doctrine in U.S. constitutional law and considers its possible application to captive audience meetings and the Charter definition of free expression. Finally, it offers suggestions about how Canadian labour law can benefit from lessons learned from the American experience.Avec l’adoption rĂ©cente et largement rĂ©pandue du vote de reprĂ©sentation obligatoire et d’une protection explicite du droit de parole de l’employeur, avec le recours intensif aux rencontres en auditoire contraint comme tactique anti-syndicale, l’encadrement juridique de la communication en privĂ© au Canada vaut la peine d’ĂȘtre rĂ©Ă©valuĂ©. L’expĂ©rience amĂ©ricaine en matiĂšre d’auditoire contraint sert d’enseignement appropriĂ© au moment de la formulation d’une approche canadienne.De nombreux facteurs ont façonnĂ© l’expĂ©rience amĂ©ricaine. D’abord, l’approche amĂ©ricaine a subi l’influence du « marchĂ© des idĂ©es » eu Ă©gard Ă  la libertĂ© d’expression. Essentiellement, la mĂ©taphore du marchĂ© prĂ©tend que la vĂ©ritĂ© va surgir de la confrontation des idĂ©es. Cependant, dans un contexte de relations du travail, cette mĂ©taphore peut bien s’avĂ©rer inutile. Son application est minĂ©e par de nombreux facteurs, incluant les Ă©checs du marchĂ©, le pouvoir inĂ©gal de l’employeur et du poids de son message, l’inaptitude des employĂ©s Ă  Ă©tablir une distinction entre la forme et la substance en matiĂšre de communication.Un autre facteur important rĂ©side dans la façon dont est encadrĂ© le conflit entre le discours et l’effort de syndicalisation. La question s’est habituellement posĂ©e en termes de conflit entre le droit d’expression des employeurs en vertu du Premier Amendement et le droit statutaire des travailleurs d’adhĂ©rer librement Ă  un syndicat ou non. InĂ©vitablement, un droit constitutionnel l’emporte sur le droit statutaire. Si la question est formulĂ©e de la mĂȘme maniĂšre au Canada, le rĂ©sultat sera identique, en dĂ©pit de la Charte qui exige une approche plus nuancĂ©e que l’affirmation catĂ©gorique qu’on retrouve dans la constitution amĂ©ricaine.L’approche actuelle aux États-Unis a vu le jour en Ă©mergeant de la montĂ©e et de la chute ultĂ©rieure des interdictions de communication en auditoire contraint. Les changements variĂ©s reflĂštent les glissements dans l’importance qu’on accorde aux diffĂ©rentes facettes du discours de l’employeur : son contenu, sa mĂ©thode, le rĂ©glage du moment de la communication et l’occasion de rĂ©agir de la part du syndicat.À l’origine, les restrictions Ă  l’endroit de la communication en auditoire contraint s’intĂ©ressaient au contenu du discours des employeurs, quoique les employĂ©es ne se voyaient offrir aucune protection eu Ă©gard Ă  ce type de communication. Cette approche fut remplacĂ©e en 1940 par la doctrine de la « totalitĂ© de la conduite ». Le contenu du discours devint le coeur de l’affaire, quoique la doctrine reconnaisse le versant coercitif des communications de l’employeur. Les employeurs pouvaient faire connaĂźtre leur opinion au moment d’une campagne de syndicalisation, Ă  moins que le discours et la conduite, dans l’ensemble, ne deviennent coercitifs. Cependant, une dĂ©cision datant de 1945, reconnaissait de façon Ă©vidente le droit d’expression des employeurs comme partie inhĂ©rente Ă  la garantie du Premier Amendement. Contre cet arriĂšre-plan, une interdiction de courte durĂ©e eu Ă©gard aux communications en auditoire contraint ou obligatoire fut introduite en 1946, mais renversĂ©e en 1947. À ce moment-lĂ , la libertĂ© d’expression de l’employeur devint une exception Ă  l’interdiction d’interfĂ©rence de la part d’un employeur dans une campagne de syndicalisation.Alors, la libertĂ© de parole de l’employeur Ă©tait protĂ©gĂ©e en autant qu’elle ne menaçait pas de reprĂ©sailles Ă©conomiques et n’indiquait aucun recours Ă  la force. L’insistance Ă  Ă©valuer si un employeur avait ou non eu recours Ă  des pratiques dĂ©loyales renvoyait au contenu de la communication, plutĂŽt qu’à la maniĂšre ou Ă  la mĂ©thode retenue. Une modification ultĂ©rieure survint en 1951 quand les syndicats exigĂšrent de se voir accorder une occasion Ă©gale de rĂ©agir aux messages des employeurs. Autrement, ces derniers seraient taxĂ©s de pratiques dĂ©loyales. Cette rĂšgle ne s’intĂ©ressait pas Ă  la maniĂšre de communiquer, ni au contenu, mais elle prĂ©voyait plutĂŽt la possibilitĂ© d’une rĂ©action. Cependant, peu de temps aprĂšs, cette rĂšgle a Ă©tĂ© Ă©galement supprimĂ©e. Elle fut remplacĂ©e par la rĂšgle de l’arrĂȘt Peerless, qui demeure encore en effet aujourd’hui. Cette rĂšgle interdit les discours tant chez l’employeur que chez le syndicat au cours de la pĂ©riode de 24 heures qui prĂ©cĂšde une Ă©lection prĂ©vue. Cette rĂšgle encadre seulement le moment et le lieu de la communication et oublie la façon de s’exprimer. Actuellement, une communication en audience captive peut se faire par un employeur avant cette pĂ©riode de 24 heures qui prĂ©cĂšde le vote. Cependant, en dehors d’un contexte syndical, la rĂ©glementation amĂ©ricaine en matiĂšre de communication en audience captive diffĂšre de façon importante. Des limites se prĂ©sentent dans les cas multiples de communication captive, fondĂ©e sur la notion de protection face Ă  l’écoute obligatoire. Cette approche est attribuable Ă  un intĂ©rĂȘt eu Ă©gard Ă  la vie privĂ©e et Ă  la libertĂ© individuelle. Encore que cette protection puisse aussi apparaĂźtre comme un corollaire Ă  la garantie du Premier Amendement.Les deux visions amĂ©ricaines, que ce soit en contexte de travail ou autrement, peuvent servir de leçons en matiĂšre de droit du travail canadien. En premier lieu, l’encadrement de cette question joue un rĂŽle important dans l’élaboration d’une rĂ©ponse. Un droit constitutionnel l’emportera sur le droit statutaire. Il a Ă©tĂ© conçu de cette maniĂšre au Canada. La protection d’un employĂ© dans le cas de rencontres en auditoire contraint reposera sur une base prĂ©caire. L’article 1 est retenu sur une base de cas par cas et la protection contre la communication en auditoire contraint ne sera pas immunisĂ©e contre les problĂšmes que soulĂšve le conflit entre les droits constitutionnels et les droits statutaires.De plus, l’expĂ©rience amĂ©ricaine soulĂšve Ă©galement la question du rĂŽle que jouerait la clause de la libertĂ© d’expression prĂ©vue par la Charte canadienne Ă  titre de protection contre l’écoute obligatoire. La doctrine de la communication en auditoire contraint et de l’écoute obligatoire prĂ©sente en dehors d’un contexte de travail fournit quelques indications sur la maniĂšre dont la Constitution canadienne devrait ĂȘtre amĂ©nagĂ©e pour fournir une meilleure protection contre l’écoute obligatoire. Les dĂ©cideurs au Canada ont encore Ă  rĂ©aliser qu’il existe un vĂ©ritable lien entre l’écoute obligatoire et la libertĂ© d’expression.Pendant que l’expĂ©rience amĂ©ricaine s’achemine vers l’atteinte d’un rĂ©sultat spĂ©cifique oĂč le droit de l’employeur l’emporte sur les droits des salariĂ©s, cette expĂ©rience prĂ©sente nĂ©anmoins Ă  la fois une mise en garde et une occasion de traiter la communication en auditoire contraint dans un contexte canadien.La amplia adopciĂłn de la representaciĂłn laboral obligatoria y la expresa protecciĂłn del discurso del empleador favorecen las campañas anti-sindicales de parte del empleador durante el proceso de sindicalizaciĂłn, incluyendo las reuniones con participaciĂłn obligatoria que le aseguran una audiencia cautiva. En consecuencia, el problema en sĂ­ mismo y la manera de restringir las comunicaciones con audiencia cautiva durante el proceso de sindicalizaciĂłn es de una pertinencia renovada en CanadĂĄ. Las reuniones cautivas son una caracterĂ­stica ampliamente establecida en las relaciones laborales americanas. Este artĂ­culo considera cĂłmo el tratamiento de las reuniones cautivas evoluciona en Estados Unidos, incluyendo la nociĂłn de libre elecciĂłn del empleado; la visiĂłn del “mercado de ideas” como expresiĂłn dominante en el debate americano; y el rol central de la disputa entre los derechos constitucionales y el derecho estatutario. Se considera tambiĂ©n el concepto de “escucha forzada” y la doctrina asociada de audiencia cautiva en la ley constitucional de EU y considera su aplicaciĂłn posible a las reuniones a audiencia cautiva y la definiciĂłn de libre expresiĂłn segĂșn la Carta. Finalmente, se ofrece sugestiones sobre cĂłmo la ley laboral canadiense puede beneficiar de las lecciones provenientes de la experiencia americana

    Workers’ Boards: Sectoral Bargaining and Standard-Setting Mechanisms for the New Gilded Age

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    This article explores the potential of sectoral standard-setting models (often referred to as “wage boards” or “workers’ boards”) as a solution for contemporary workplace issues, which existing labor relations and minimum standards regulatory systems continue to struggle to address. This argument, the article examines three historical statutory systems of sector-based minimum workplace standard-setting established in the early 20th century as a response to unacceptable wages and working conditions: the British Wages Council system, the Canadian Industrial Standards Act, and the US Fair Labor Standards Act. The article applies the conceptions of fairness identified in Seth Harris\u27s study of the origins of the Fair Labor Standards Act to analyze the three systems and offers a three-step approach to constructing a sectoral workplace standard-setting mechanism. This paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on worker representation and workplace standards by offering a conceptual starting point for designing a sectoral workplace standard-setting mechanism. The article highlights key design decisions and alternatives and maps out essential interrelated considerations, providing valuable insights for policymakers and stakeholders seeking to improve worker representation and workplace standards

    Wage Boards for the 21st Century: Revisiting Sectoral Standard-Setting Mechanisms for the Workplace

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    As existing labour relations and minimum standards regulatory systems have continued to struggle to ensure acceptable worker voice and workplace standards, attention has increasingly turned to whether broader-based or sectoral approaches can offer solutions. Broader-based or sectoral approaches can be understood as falling into three categories of models: multi-employer, juridical extension, and sectoral standard-setting models. A key difference among these is that the first two categories involve not only collective representation of workers but also collective bargaining; the third model – sectoral standard-setting – involves a form of collective representation, but does not involve collective bargaining, which is characterized by compelled recognition, a duty to bargain in good faith, and a duty of fair representation borne by employee representatives. Instead, sectoral standard-setting models involve forms of negotiation and consultation

    CORRUPTION AND MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE

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    CORRUPTION AND MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICEColin Nicholls QC, Tim Daniel, Alan Bacarese, James Maton and Professor John Hatchard, (3rd edn, OUP 2017) lxxviii and 934

    Structuring Reality So That the Law Will Follow: British Columbia Teachers\u27 Quest for Collective Bargaining Rights

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    The British Columbia Teachers\u27 Federation (BCTF), representing all public elementary and secondary school teachers in the province, is one of the largest and most powerful unions in British Columbia. BCTF has always sought formal rights to full-scope collective bargaining, and unrestricted access to striking at the school board level. It has employed a sustained, sophisticated series of strategies to achieve these objectives, quickly adapting to changing political and legal environments. The BCTF has had significant success in advancing its labour relations agenda, establishing a different trajectory for teachers than for most public sector workers in Canada. This article maps BCTF\u27s labour relations strategies and agenda against the backdrop of the political and legal environments, from BCTF\u27s inception to present-day. It argues that, as a result of these factors, BC teachers have experienced a different labour relations history than most public sector workers. Drawing on and adapting Rose\u27s (2004) eras of public sector labour relations, this article identifies the following eras of BC teacher labour relations: an era of exclusion (to 1982), resistance and revitalization (1982-86), expansion (1987-93), reform (1994), reprieve (1994-2001), restraint and consolidation (2002-2007), and reaching an era of realignment beginning in 2007

    Exploring Sectoral Solutions for Digital Workers: The Status of the Artist Act Approach

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    Digital workers have not had significant success in securing conventional forms of collective workplace representation, particularly statutory collective bargaining. This article examines an established sectoral bargaining statute, the Status of the Artist Act (SOA), as a possible model for collective bargaining legislation that is better suited to regulating digital work than the Wagner Act model (WAM) of labor legislation. Key features of the WAM labor legislation pose significant barriers for digital worker organizing. First, the necessity for applicant unions to demonstrate a threshold level of support among workers requires applicants to accurately estimate the number of workers in the proposed unit. This is difficult given that digital workers tend to be geographically dispersed and isolated. Second, the WAM is oriented towards single-employer, single location, enterprise-level bargaining units. Fragmented organization is ill-suited to the organization of digital work. Recent certification cases involving Uber, Lyft and Foodora illustrate the difficulties of these WAM features for digital worker organizing. The SOA, applicable to self-employed professional artists, shares much of the WAM framework. However, it departs from the WAM in crucial ways, designed to overcome collective bargaining barriers for the arts sector. Key differences include: no requirement for workers to establish employee status; a broader approach to appropriateness relieves against fragmented, small, units characteristic of WAM; demonstration that the applicant is the “most representative” association rather than majority support means certification does not turn on the applicant’s ability to accurately determine the number of workers in the proposed unit; limited challenges to representativeness; and, collective agreements provide a minimum floor, facilitating representation of heterogeneous workers in a unit. Organization of work and workers in the digital work and arts sectors share important similarities including the “gig” nature of the work and the geographic dispersion of workers. This article suggests that the structural similarities between digital and arts work, reflected in the SOA framework, offer guidance for a more effective statutory collective bargaining system for digital workers
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