Hume's Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science

This book contextualizes David Hume's philosophy of physical science, exploring both Hume's background in the history of early modern natural philosophy and its subsequent impact on the scientific tradition

Inference of Sparse Networks with Unobserved Variables. Application to Gene Regulatory Networks

Networks are a unifying framework for modeling complex systems and network inference problems are frequently encountered in many fields. Here, I develop and apply a generative approach to network inference (RCweb) for the case when the network is sparse and the latent (not observed) variables affect the observed ones. From all possible factor analysis (FA) decompositions explaining the variance in the data, RCweb selects the FA decomposition that is consistent with a sparse underlying network. The sparsity constraint is imposed by a novel method that significantly outperforms (in terms of accuracy, robustness to noise, complexity scaling, and computational efficiency) Bayesian methods and MLE methods using l1 norm relaxation such as K-SVD and l1--based sparse principle component analysis (PCA). Results from simulated models demonstrate that RCweb recovers exactly the model structures for sparsity as low (as non-sparse) as 50% and with ratio of unobserved to observed variables as high as 2. RCweb is robust to noise, with gradual decrease in the parameter ranges as the noise level increases.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figure

Universal Gravitation and the (Un)Intelligibility of Natural Philosophy

This article centers on Hume’s position on the intelligibility of natural philosophy. To that end, the controversy surrounding universal gravitation shall be scrutinized. It is very well-known that Hume sides with the Newtonian experimentalist approach rather than with the Leibnizian demand for intelligibility. However, what is not clear is Hume’s overall position on the intelligibility of natural philosophy. It shall be argued that Hume declines Leibniz’s principle of intelligibility. However, Hume does not eschew intelligibility altogether; his concept of causation itself stipulates mechanical intelligibility

Hume, the Philosophy of Science and the Scientific Tradition

Although the main focus of Hume’s career was in the humanities, his work also has an observable role in the historical development of natural sciences after his time. To show this, I shall center on the relation between Hume and two major figures in the history of the natural sciences: Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and Albert Einstein (1879–1955). Both of these scientists read Hume. They also found parts of Hume’s work useful to their sciences. Inquiring into the relations between Hume and the two scientists shows that his philosophical positions had a partial but constructive role in the formation of modern biology and physics. This is accordingly a clear indication of Hume’s impact on the scientific tradition. Before proceeding to analyze Hume’s contribution to the history of science, it is important to address his broader role in the history of philosophy of science. Hume’s discussions concerning the topics of causation, induction, the distinction between mathematical and empirical propositions, and laws of nature have been important for the philosophy of science of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries