Signos, convención y verdad

Semántica; Wittgenstein; Austin; lenguaje y verdad

El juicio predicativo simple en Frege y Husserl: Una confrontación

The doctrine on predicative judgment sustained by Frege and Husserl reopens a discussion already present in the philosophical tradition: Does predicative judgment consist in a “composition” of concepts made by the understanding, or in an “assent” to a propositional content? For Frege, the “thought”, i. e., the sense of the proposition, as expresion of the judgment, presents such unity that it cannot be explained by a “composition” of previous elements; Husserl on the contrary, sustains that, although the propositional content of judgments in composed judgments do present a unity, in the case of the simple predicative judgment this unity arises due to a “synthesis”. Thus, for Frege the act of judging consists in “recognizing the truth-value of a thought”, which agrees with the doctrine of an “assent” to a propositional content. For Husserl, on the contrary, the basic act of judging consists in a “synthesis” of basic representations, which is very close to Aristotle’s doctrine

La verdad práctica en Tomás de Aquino

This paper analyses two texts of Aquinas (Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3, and Expositio libri peryermeneias I, 3, 107 ss.) where the truth of practical intellect is defined in accordance with Aristotle’s account in Nicomachean Ethics, 1139a27-31. The proposed interpreta-tion tries to show that both texts are arguably not incompatible. A last important claim is that according to the definition of practical truth practical intellect is supposed to work as a mesure for reality

Determinismo o libertad. La idea de libertad en Schelling

Millán-Puelles' theory of freedom is radically separated from all other views that attribute an absolute character to human freedon. One of these theses is precisely that of Schelling, according to whom "the essence of the self is freedom"

La verdad práctica en Tomás de Aquino

This paper analyses two texts of Aquinas (Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3, and Expositio libri peryermeneias I, 3, 107 ss.) where the truth of practical intellect is defined in accordance with Aristotle’s account in Nicomachean Ethics, 1139a27-31. The proposed interpreta-tion tries to show that both texts are arguably not incompatible. A last important claim is that according to the definition of practical truth practical intellect is supposed to work as a mesure for reality

El juicio predicativo simple en Frege y Husserl: Una confrontación

The doctrine on predicative judgment sustained by Frege and Husserl reopens a discussion already present in the philosophical tradition: Does predicative judgment consist in a “composition” of concepts made by the understanding, or in an “assent” to a propositional content? For Frege, the “thought”, i. e., the sense of the proposition, as expresion of the judgment, presents such unity that it cannot be explained by a “composition” of previous elements; Husserl on the contrary, sustains that, although the propositional content of judgments in composed judgments do present a unity, in the case of the simple predicative judgment this unity arises due to a “synthesis”. Thus, for Frege the act of judging consists in “recognizing the truth-value of a thought”, which agrees with the doctrine of an “assent” to a propositional content. For Husserl, on the contrary, the basic act of judging consists in a “synthesis” of basic representations, which is very close to Aristotle’s doctrine