The doctrine on predicative judgment sustained by Frege and
Husserl reopens a discussion already present in the philosophical
tradition: Does predicative judgment consist in a “composition”
of concepts made by the understanding, or in an “assent” to a
propositional content? For Frege, the “thought”, i. e., the sense of
the proposition, as expresion of the judgment, presents such unity
that it cannot be explained by a “composition” of previous
elements; Husserl on the contrary, sustains that, although the
propositional content of judgments in composed judgments do
present a unity, in the case of the simple predicative judgment this
unity arises due to a “synthesis”. Thus, for Frege the act of
judging consists in “recognizing the truth-value of a thought”,
which agrees with the doctrine of an “assent” to a propositional
content. For Husserl, on the contrary, the basic act of judging
consists in a “synthesis” of basic representations, which is very
close to Aristotle’s doctrine
