23 research outputs found

    Increased risk of hospitalisation and intensive care admission associated with reported cases of SARS-CoV-2 variants B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 in Norway, December 2020-May 2021

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    Introduction Since their emergence, SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern (VOC) B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 have spread worldwide. We estimated the risk of hospitalisation and admission to an intensive care unit (ICU) for infections with B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 in Norway, compared to infections with non-VOC. Materials and methods Using linked individual-level data from national registries, we conducted a cohort study on laboratory-confirmed cases of SARS-CoV-2 in Norway diagnosed between 28 December 2020 and 2 May 2021. Variants were identified based on whole genome sequencing, partial sequencing by Sanger sequencing or PCR screening for selected targets. The outcome was hospitalisation or ICU admission. We calculated adjusted risk ratios (aRR) with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) using multivariable binomial regression to examine the association between SARS-CoV-2 variants B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 with i) hospital admission and ii) ICU admission compared to non-VOC. Results We included 23,169 cases of B.1.1.7, 548 B.1.351 and 4,584 non-VOC. Overall, 1,017 cases were hospitalised (3.6%) and 206 admitted to ICU (0.7%). B.1.1.7 was associated with a 1.9-fold increased risk of hospitalisation (aRR 95%CI 1.6–2.3) and a 1.8-fold increased risk of ICU admission (aRR 95%CI 1.2–2.8) compared to non-VOC. Among hospitalised cases, no difference was found in the risk of ICU admission between B.1.1.7 and non-VOC. B.1.351 was associated with a 2.4-fold increased risk of hospitalisation (aRR 95%CI 1.7–3.3) and a 2.7-fold increased risk of ICU admission (aRR 95%CI 1.2–6.5) compared to non-VOC. Discussion Our findings add to the growing evidence of a higher risk of severe disease among persons infected with B.1.1.7 or B.1.351. This highlights the importance of prevention and control measures to reduce transmission of these VOC in society, particularly ongoing vaccination programmes, and preparedness plans for hospital surge capacity.publishedVersio

    COVID-19 and risk factors for hospital admission, severe disease and death 3rd update

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    The First GAEN-Based COVID-19 Contact Tracing App in Norway Identifies 80% of Close Contacts in “Real Life” Scenarios

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    The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) response in most countries has relied on testing, isolation, contact tracing, and quarantine (TITQ), which is labor- and time-consuming. Therefore, several countries worldwide launched Bluetooth-based apps as supplementary tools. The aim of using contact tracing apps is to rapidly notify people about their possible exposure to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and thus make the process of TITQ more efficient, especially upon exposure in public places. We evaluated the Norwegian Google Apple exposure notification (GAEN)-based contact tracing app Smittestopp v2 under relevant “real-life” test scenarios. We used a total of 40 devices, representing six different brands, and compared two different exposure configurations, experimented with different time thresholds and weights of the Bluetooth attenuation levels (buckets), and calculated the true notification rates among close contacts (≀2 m and ≄15 min) and false notification of sporadic contacts. In addition, we assessed the impact of using different operating systems and locations of the phone (hand/pocket). The best configuration tested to trigger exposure notification resulted in the correct notification of 80% of the true close contacts and incorrect notification of 34% of the sporadic contacts. Among those who incorrectly received notifications, most (67%) were within 2 m but the duration of contact was <15 min and thus they were not, per se, considered as “close contacts.” Lower sensitivity was observed when using the iOS operating systems or carrying the phone in the pocket instead of in the hand. The results of this study were used to improve and evaluate the performance of the Norwegian contact-tracing app Smittestopp

    Evaluation of the pilot wastewater surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 in Norway, June 2022 – March 2023

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    Abstract Background During the COVID-19 pandemic, wastewater-based surveillance gained great international interest as an additional tool to monitor SARS-CoV-2. In autumn 2021, the Norwegian Institute of Public Health decided to pilot a national wastewater surveillance (WWS) system for SARS-CoV-2 and its variants between June 2022 and March 2023. We evaluated the system to assess if it met its objectives and its attribute-based performance. Methods We adapted the available guidelines for evaluation of surveillance systems. The evaluation was carried out as a descriptive analysis and consisted of the following three steps: (i) description of the WWS system, (ii) identification of users and stakeholders, and (iii) analysis of the system’s attributes and performance including sensitivity, specificity, timeliness, usefulness, representativeness, simplicity, flexibility, stability, and communication. Cross-correlation analysis was performed to assess the system’s ability to provide early warning signal of new wave of infections. Results The pilot WWS system was a national surveillance system using existing wastewater infrastructures from the largest Norwegian municipalities. We found that the system was sensitive, timely, useful, representative, simple, flexible, acceptable, and stable to follow the general trend of infection. Preliminary results indicate that the system could provide an early signal of changes in variant distribution. However, challenges may arise with: (i) specificity due to temporary fluctuations of RNA levels in wastewater, (ii) representativeness when downscaling, and (iii) flexibility and acceptability when upscaling the system due to limited resources and/or capacity. Conclusions Our results showed that the pilot WWS system met most of its surveillance objectives. The system was able to provide an early warning signal of 1-2 weeks, and the system was useful to monitor infections at population level and complement routine surveillance when individual testing activity was low. However, temporary fluctuations of WWS values need to be carefully interpreted. To improve quality and efficiency, we recommend to standardise and validate methods for assessing trends of new waves of infection and variants, evaluate the WWS system using a longer operational period particularly for new variants, and conduct prevalence studies in the population to calibrate the system and improve data interpretation
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