Tax systems and tax reforms in Latin America: coubtry studies and general issues.

The two papers give a full analysis of Latin American taxaton since 1990 up to day. One paper deals with counry cases. Those examinated regard Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costarica, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay. For each country tax trends are examinated, starting by 1990 or before. Then main istitutional features of the existing tax systems are presented, Next, the main issues concerning tax burden are deepened. Finally the most relevant recent or planned reofms are discussed. The seconnd paper gives an analysis of the American Latina fiscal systems as a whole and deals with isseus like the polical economy of taxation in the area,the measures adopted to attrack Fdi and so on.Tax system, tax reform, America

Tax systems and tax reforms in Latin America: coubtry studies and general issues.

The two papers give a full analysis of Latin American taxaton since 1990 up to day. One paper deals with counry cases. Those examinated regard Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costarica, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay. For each country tax trends are examinated, starting by 1990 or before. Then main istitutional features of the existing tax systems are presented, Next, the main issues concerning tax burden are deepened. Finally the most relevant recent or planned reofms are discussed. The seconnd paper gives an analysis of the American Latina fiscal systems as a whole and deals with isseus like the polical economy of taxation in the area,the measures adopted to attrack Fdi and so on

Privatization and Efficiency: from principals and agents to political economy

We survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of political economy. The former extend the theory of regulation with incomplete information to address privatization issues, comparing state-owned enterprises with private regulated firms. The benefits of privatization may derive either from the constraints it places on malevolent agents or from the impossibility of commitment by a benevolent government because of incomplete contracts. Contributions dealing with political economy issues separate privatization from restructuring decisions. They either explore bargaining between managers and politicians or analyse the impact of privatization shaped by political preferences on efficiency. The theoretical results regarding the relation between privatization and efficiency do not lead to any definitive conclusion. Privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency still remain uncertain

The political economy of financing the EU budget

By adopting a more specific political economy perspective, this chapter aims at contributing to the debate on reforming the actual system of funding the EU budget. We argue that the present debate is often ill focused and that what is really at stake is the nature of the European Union, whether this is just a club of sovereign states or a true federation directly affecting European citizens, who have then the right to be represented even on matters concerning the EU budget. We also argue that the main reason to reform the present system lies in the legitimacy crisis the EU is currently facing and that proposed reforms should be assessed on the basis of their ability to address this problem. Also, a dynamic perspective, asking how a budget reform would affect the bargaining positions of the different European institutions, is essential to understand the forces at play and to assess the possibility that a reform will take place

Privatization and Efficiency: From Principals and Agents to Political Economy

We survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of political economy. The first ones extend the theory of regulation with incomplete information to address privatization issues, comparing State Owned Entreprises (SOEs) with private regulated firms. The benefits of privatization may either derive from the constraints it places on malevolent agents or to the impossibility of commitment by a benevolent government because of incomplete contracts. Contributions dealing with political economy issues separate privatization from restructuring decisions. They either explore bargaining between managers and politicians or analyze the impact of privatization shaped by political preferences on efficiency. The theoretical results regarding the relation between privatization and efficiency do not lead to any definitive conclusion. Privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency still remain uncertain

Main features of tax systems in Latin American countries

This paper provides an overview of the tax system in Latin American countries and its main features. We collect data and analyze the main trends of the evolution of fiscal burden and tax structure from the 1990s and we focus on the effects of taxation on income redistribution and equality, tax evasion and tax compliance. This helps us to underline that the tax systems of Latin American countries do not signifi66 cantly contribute to the reduction of income inequality: Gini post tax coefficients continue to be very high, implying that the higher tax burden is especially born by low income taxpayers