3,076 research outputs found
What is Probability?
Probabilities may be subjective or objective; we are concerned with both kinds of probability, and the relationship between them. The fundamental theory of objective probability is quantum mechanics: it is argued that neither Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, nor the pilot-wave theory, nor stochastic state-reduction theories, give a satisfactory answer to the question of what objective probabilities are in quantum mechanics, or why they should satisfy the Born rule; nor do they give any reason why subjective probabilities should track objective ones. But it is shown that if probability only arises with decoherence, then they must be given by the Born rule. That further, on the Everett interpretation, we have a clear statement of what probabilities are, in terms of purely categorical physical properties; and finally, along lines laid out by Deutsch and Wallace, that there is a clear basis in the axioms of decision theory as to why subjective probabilities should track these objective ones. These results hinge critically on the absence of hidden-variables or any other mechanism (such as state-reduction) from the physical interpretation of the theory. The account of probability has traditionally been considered the principal weakness of the Everett interpretation; on the contrary it emerges as one of its principal strengths
Indistinguishability
This is a systematic review of the concept of indistinguishability in both classical and quantum mechanics, with particular attention to Gibbs paradox. Section 1 is on the Gibbs paradox; section 2 is a defense of the concept of classical indistinguishability, that addresses (and refutes) the view that classical particles can always be distinguished by their trajectories so are distinguishable. Section 3 is on the notion of object more generally, and on whether indistinguishables should be thought of as objects at al
Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics has repeatedly been criticized on the grounds that probabilty makes no sense on its terms. These criticisms are considered in detail, and found to be wanting. I conclude that on the contrary the Everett interpretation provides a clear account of probability, and that its most radical feature, that it abandons a 1:1 relationship of identity over time, already has to be dealt with in classical physics
Mirroring as an a priori symmetry
A relationist will account for the use of `left' and `right' in terms of relative orientations, and other properties and relations invariant under mirroring. This analysis will apply whenever mirroring is a symmetry, so it certainly applies to classical mechanics; we argue it applies to any physical theory formulated on a manifold: it is in this sense an a priori symmetry. It should apply in particular to parity-violating theories in quantum mechanics; mirror symmetry is only broken in such theories as a special symmetry
Chance in the Everett interpretation
The notion of objective probability or chance, as a physical trait of the world, has proved elusive; the identification of chances with actual frequencies does not succeed. An adequate theory of chance should explain not only the connection of chance with statistics, but with degrees of belief, and more broadly the entire phenomenology of (seemingly) chance events and their measurement. Branching structure in the decoherence-based many worlds theory provides an account of what chance is that satisfies all these desiderata, including the requirement that chance involves uncertainty.
Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Decoherence
ABSTRACT. A variety of ideas arisi\U{fc}g in decoherence theory, and in the ongoing debate over Everett's relative-state theory, can be linked to issues in relativity theory and the philosophy of time, specifically the relational theory of tense and of identity over time. These have been systematically presented in companion papers (Saunders 1995, 1996a); in what follows we shall consider the same circle of ideas, but specifically in relation to the interpretation of probability, and its identification with relations in the Hilbert space norm. The familiar objection that Everett's approach yields probabilities different from quantum mechanics is easily dealt with. The more fundamental question is how to interpret these probabilities consistent with the relational theory of change, and the relational theory of identity over time. I shall show that the relational theory needs nothing more than the physical, minimal criterion of identity as defined by Everett's theory, and that this can be transparently interpreted in terms of the ordinary notion of the chance occurrence of an event, as witnessed in the present. It is in this sense that the theory has empirical content
Structural Realism, Again
The paper defends a view of structural realism similar to that of French and Ladyman, although it differs from theirs in an important respect: I do not take indistinguishabiity of particles in quantum mechanics to have the significance they think it has. It also differs from Cao's view of structural realism, criticized in my "Critical Notice: Cao's `The Conceptual Development of 20th Century Field Theories"
The Concept 'Indistinguishable'
The concept of indistinguishable particles in quantum theory is fundamental
to questions of ontology. All ordinary matter is made of electrons, protons,
neutrons, and photons and they are all indistinguishable particles. Yet the
concept itself has proved elusive, in part because of the interpretational
difficulties that afflict quantum theory quite generally, and in part because
the concept was so central to the discovery of the quantum itself, by Planck in
1900; it came encumbered with revolution. I offer a deflationary reading of the
concept "indistinguishable" that is identical to the Gibbs concept of "generic
phase", save that it is defined for state spaces with only finitely-many states
of bounded volume and energy (finitely-many orthogonal states, in quantum
mechanics). That, and that alone, makes for the difference between the quantum
and Gibbs concepts of indistinguishability. This claim is heretical on several
counts, but here we consider only the content of the claim itself, and its
bearing on the early history of quantum theory rather than in relation to
contemporary debates about particle indistinguishability and permutation
symmetry. It powerfully illuminates that history.Comment: 45 pages; 3 figure
The Everett Interpretation: Structure
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics divides naturally into two
parts: first, the interpretation of the structure of the quantum state, in
terms of branching, and second, the interpretation of this branching structure
in terms of probability. This is the first of two reviews of the Everett
interpretation, and focuses on structure, with particular attention to the role
of decoherence theory. Written in terms of the quantum histories formalism,
decoherence theory just is the theory of branching structure, in Everett's
sense.Comment: To be published in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics,
E. Knox and A. Wilson (eds.
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