Constitutional Conventions in the Digital Era: Lessons from Iceland and Ireland

Mechanisms of constitutional development have recently attracted significant attention, specifically, instances where popular involvement was central to the constitutional change. Examples include attempts by British Columbia, the Netherlands, and Ontario at electoral reform, in addition to the more sweeping reforms sought in Iceland and Ireland. Each of these countries’ attempts exemplifies varied innovative avenues to reform involving participatory and partially citizen-led processes aimed at revitalizing politics. The little legal scholarship on these developments has provided an insufficient analytical account of such novel approaches to constitution-making. This Essay seeks to build upon the current descriptive work on constitutional conventions by focusing on the cases of Iceland and Ireland. The Essay further aims to evaluate whether the means undertaken by each country translates into novelty at a more substantive level, namely, the quality of the process and legitimacy of the end product. The Essay proposes standards of direct democratic engagements that adequately fit these new developments and further identifies lessons for participatory constitution-making processes in the digital twenty-first century

Eternity and the constitution: the promise and limits of eternity clauses

This thesis sets out to investigate whether eternity clauses—unamendable provisions in constitutions—are democratic. It proceeds to answer this question in two parts. The thesis's first three chapters look at eternity clauses' foundations and at the substantive values they protect, in an effort to ascertain whether unamendability and democracy may be reconciled based on these provisions' origins and normative content. The thesis's latter two chapters are concerned with identifying process-based alternatives to, or ways out of, unamendability. They call into question the possibility of revolution to do away with eternity clauses and also provide an initial investigation into the relationship between the macro-trends of rigidity and popular participation present in constitution-making today. The argument ultimately put forth is that eternity clauses and democracy remain in a state of tension with each other irrespective of the manner in which they are adopted, of the values they protect, and of the fact that they may in theory be repealed via a new constituent moment. This is because they institute a hierarchy of norms within constitutions, which is then zealously guarded by constitutional courts with or without an explicit mandate to do so. More often than not, that hierarchy contains first-order value commitments of the polity which these courts can only review with reference to judicial ideology rather than any objective standard of review. This is the inevitable outcome of the logic of unamendable entrenchment, and not merely its exception

Ciudadanía y justicia. El control de constitucionalidad desde la democracia deliberativa

In this article we criticise the defence of judicial review offered by Cristina Lafont in her book Democracy without Shortcuts. On one side, we analyse the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States to show that it does not work as Lafont’s thesis assumes. On another side, we develop two normative critics and one methodological. In regard to the normative, we first problematise the linkage of ideas of self-government and democracy with the issue of allegiance and agreement to the law and we then critically examine the idea of political equality that underpins Lafont’s proposal. Finally, we suggest engaging in discussions on institutional design of judicial review to explore the deliberative potential of alternative mechanisms to strong judicial review of legislation.Este artículo critica la defensa del control de constitucionalidad presentada por Cristina Lafont en su libro Democracia sin atajos. Por un lado, analiza el caso de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos para demostrar que no funciona como la tesis deliberativa de Lafont asume. Por otro lado, desarrolla dos críticas normativas y una metodológica. En relación con las críticas normativas, procede primero a problematizar la asociación de ideas de autogobierno y democracia con cuestiones de aquiescencia e identificación con el derecho, y después examina críticamente la idea de igualdad política que respalda la propuesta de Lafont. Finalmente, invita a la autora a explorar el potencial deliberativo que ofrecen las diferencias en el diseño institucional de distintos mecanismos de judicial review

Ciudadanía y Justicia. El control de constitucionalidad desde la democracia deliberativa [Citizenship and Justice. Judicial review in deliberative democracy]

RESUMEN En este artículo criticamos la defensa del control de constitucionalidad presentado por Cristina Lafont en su libro Democracy Without Shortcuts (OUP 2020). Por un lado, analizamos el caso de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos para demostrar que no funciona como la tesis deliberativa de Lafont asume. Por otro lado, desarrollamos dos críticas normativas y una metodológica. En relación a las críticas normativas, procedemos primero a problematizar la asociación de ideas de autogobierno y democracia con cuestiones de aquiescencia e identificación con el derecho, y después examinamos críticamente la idea de igualdad política que respalda la propuesta de Lafont. Finalmente, invitamos a la autora a explorar el potencial deliberativo que ofrecen las diferencias en el diseño institucional de distintos mecanismos de judicial review. ABTRACT In this article we criticise the defence of judicial review offered by Cristina Lafont in her book Democracy Without Shortcuts (OUP 2020). On one side, we analyse the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States to show that it does not work as Lafont’s thesis assumes. On another side, we develop two normative critics and one methodological. In regards to the normative, we first problematise the linkage of ideas of self-government and democracy with the issue of allegiance and agreement to the law and we then critically examine the idea of political equality that underpins Lafont’s proposal. Finally, we suggest engaging in discussions on institutional design of judicial review to explore the deliberative potential of alternative mechanisms to strong judicial review of legislation

Eternity Clauses as a Tool for Exclusionary Constitutional Projects

This chapter argues that, despite its presumed democracy-protecting role, unamendability can itself be prone to abuse. Taking the constitutional politics surrounding unamendability seriously reveals it to be open to misuse and instrumentalised at the stage of constitutional drafting, as a consequence of dynamics in the constituent assembly or drafting body, or indeed later, when a basic structure doctrine may emerge. As we have long known about constitutional rigidity mechanisms in general, they will on balance serve to insulate elites and have been relied on to stifle much-needed democratic change rather than protect against democratic erosion. The Asian case studies surveyed amply show this ambivalence within the practice of unamendability. The chapter thus serves as a reminder that the constitutional contexts where unamendability has most appeal – divided, post-conflict, fragile – are also the contexts most likely to result in the abuse of unamendability. The paradox then is that it is precisely where it is most needed that unamendability may be most vulnerable, and most likely to provide cover for – rather than protect against – the erosion of democratic and rule of law safeguards