The Effects of Human Resource Management on Workers' Wages and Firm Productivity

We analyze whether the effects of human resource practices on workers’ wages and firm productivity are similar or different. We find that firms’ wage policies overestimate the relevance of sector-specific skills and underestimate the productivity enhancing effect of computer skills. Moreover, only the firm benefits from performance related pay, whereas only the workers benefit from performance evaluation interviews. Finally, our estimation results show that in small firms a more advanced HRM system may not result in a convergence of interests between workers and the firm.education, training and the labour market;

The role of peers in estimating tenure-performance profiles: Evidence from personnel data

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance profiles using unique panel data thatcontain detailed information on individual workers’performance. We find that 10per cent increase in tenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of astandard deviation. This translates to an average performance increase of about 75per cent within the first year of the employment relationship. Furthermore, we showthat there are peer effects in learning on-the-job: Workers placed in teams with moreexperienced and thus more productive peers perform significantly better than thoseplaced in teams with less experienced peers. An increase in the average team tenure byone standard deviation leads to an increase of 11 to 14 per cent of a standard deviationin performance.education, training and the labour market;

The role of peers in estimating tenure-performance profiles: evidence from personnel data

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance proles using unique panel data that containdetailed information on individual workers'' performance. We find that a 10 per cent increase intenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of a standard deviation. Thistranslates to an average performance increase of about 75 per cent within the first year of theemployment relationship. Furthermore, we show that there are peer effects in learning on-the-job:Workers placed in teams with more experienced and thus more productive peers performsignificantly better than those placed in teams with less experienced peers. An increase in theaverage team tenure by one standard deviation leads to an increase of 11 to 14 per cent of astandard deviation in performance.labour economics ;

Grandmotherhood and retirement in Italy

The article explores the relationship between becoming a grandmother and retiring in Italy. In contrast to the US and other countries in Europe, the two events do not overlap in Italy, and the former hardly influences the latter. Francesca Zanasi and Inge Sieben interpret the findings in relation to the familistic structure of Italy

The Role of Peers in Estimating Tenure-Performance Profiles: Evidence from Personnel Data

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance profiles using unique panel data that contain detailed information on individual workers' performance. We find that a 10 per cent increase in tenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of a standard deviation. This translates to an average performance increase of about 75 per cent within the first year of the employment relationship. Furthermore, we show that there are peer effects in learning on-the-job: Workers placed in teams with more experienced and thus more productive peers perform significantly better than those placed in teams with less experienced peers. An increase in the average team tenure by one standard deviation leads to an increase of 11 to 14 per cent of a standard deviation in performance.tenure-performance profiles, experience, learning on-the-job, peer effects, productivity, call centres

Morality and the Public Good in Post-Socialist European States

In this study, we investigate morality in relation to the public good in post-socialist Europe. Public good morality is defined as the (non)acceptance of behaviour that contravenes the law and harms society and the greater good of the collective, such as cheating on taxes if one has the chance, paying cash to avoid taxes, not paying one’s fare in public transport, and claiming state benefits one is not entitled to. Using data from the European Values Study in 2008 on more than 30,000 respondents in 23 post-socialist states, we find that on average the level of public good morality is quite high: 8.4 on a ten-point scale. However, there are marked differences between individuals and between countries, which we attempt to explain by looking at the legacy of communist rule, processes of democratization and compliance attitudes. We find that individuals living in former Soviet states are more ‘lenient’ when it comes to actions that harm the collective. However, those who lived under communist rule for a longer time display higher (and not lower) levels of public good morality. The level of democracy in a country does not seem to add any explanatory power, but individuals who hold more democratic values appear to be morally less strict. Finally, compliance attitudes such as interpersonal trust and confidence in government do not seem to mediate the observed relationships between communist rule and democracy on the one hand and public good morality on the other hand

Labour Market Segmentation Revisited: A Study of the Dutch Call Centre Sector

Employment in the call centre sector in the Netherlands, similar to the trend in other European countries, is expanding greatly. In 2001, Datamonitor (2002) estimated that 1,266 call centres were operating in the Netherlands. This number is expected to have risen to roughly 2,000 in 2006. An estimated 188,000 people work in this sector at the moment, representing 2.5% of the entire working population in the Netherlands. This represents the highest percentage in Europe with the exception of Ireland. The call centre workforce is employed by in-house and subcontractor call centres. In-house call centres are part of the firm for which they handle customer contacts, whereas subcontractor call centres, which provide customer contact services for other firms or institutions. The call centre sector features a large number of employees working in so-called atypical employment contracts, in particular ‘agents’ who handle the actual customer contacts (De Grip, Hoevenberg & Willems, 1997). Agents are often hired into temporary appointments, part-time contracts, irregular shifts, stand-by contracts, et cetera. The use of such atypical contracts is closely related to the great need for flexibility in the deployment of staff (Kalleberg, 2000). Such workforce flexibility is necessary in order to negotiate peaks and valleys in call volumes. In addition, many call centres prioritize on cost reduction, and this approach constrains investment in personnel. Call centres are therefore often classified as ‘electronic sweatshops’ offering only ‘dead-end jobs’ (Taylor, et al., 2002; Deery & Kinnie, 2004).The labour market for call centre agents could thus be characterised as a ‘secondary labour market’ of insecure, poorly paid jobs without any career opportunities (see e.g. Dekker, De Grip & Heijke, 2002). However, the call centre sector is heterogeneous with respect to employment conditions. For example, agents who work in in-house call centres have better employment conditions than their counterparts in subcontractor call centres. The Dutch industrial relations system offers one explanation for this difference. Agents working in in-house call centres have protections defined by the collective labour agreement (CLA) of the firm the call centre agents work in. In contrast, the subcontractor call centres did not have any comparable protections or their own CLA until 2003. The establishment of a CLA that covers agents employed in Dutch subcontractor call centres in 2003 is a unique phenomenon in the European call centre market (Roland, 2000b).The difference in working conditions between in-house and subcontractor call centres raises the following research question addressed in this paper: To what extent is the labour market for call centre agents a dual labour market, with a secondary segment in the subcontractor call centres, and a primary segment in the form of a ‘professional labour market’ in the in-house call centres?To answer this question, we analyze survey data collected from a national survey of call centre managers in the Netherlands. Moreover, we investigate whether the aforementioned need for workforce flexibility may provide an explanation for the labour market segmentation in the call centre sector and if this segmentation is embedded in Dutch industrial relations. We begin with a brief overview of labour market segmentation theory. Next, we describe the dataset, and provide some brief background about the Dutch call centre sector and its workforce. Then, we investigate the differences between employment conditions in in-house and subcontractor call centres, to determine whether there is a segmented labour markets. Finally, we assess the influence of industrial relations in the call centre sector, and determine whether these reflect the labour market segmentation.education, training and the labour market;