The Political Economy of the Research Exemption in American Patent Law

This Article approaches the research exemption, and related legal developments, as a case study in the political economy of patent law. Part I recounts the history of the research exemption, touching briefly on historical origins but emphasizing developments since the 1970s in legislative, executive, and judicial forums. It also examines changes during the same time frame in related areas of patent law, like the Bayh-Dole legislation and the attempted repeal of state immunity from patent infringement liability. These legal developments indirectly affected the research exemption, or implicated similar concerns about imbalance in the patent system and the use of patents to tax, control, or inhibit research activity. Part II analyzes this history to illustrate and expand upon two major themes in the political economy of patent law, namely the surprising persistence of faulty economic ideology in patent policymaking and the institutional bias exhibited by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in shaping modern patent law. One major conclusion is that together these forces have created an excessively complex and ill-designed policy environment that is placing a significant strain on the national research system, a strain that executive agencies and the courts have tried to alleviate through ad hoc agreements and modifications of other patent doctrines, like the doctrine of subject matter eligibility

Eelgrass Distribution in the Great Bay Estuary for 2009 : Final Report

Eelgrass in the Great Bay Estuary in 2009 was once again present only in Great Bay itself and in Portsmouth Harbor. For the second year in a row, there was no eelgrass in Little Bay or in the Piscataqua River. In 2009, there was a continued loss of eelgrass biomass in Great Bay; there has been a 66.4% loss of biomass in Great Bay since 1996 and distribution is 30% less than in 1996. Although eelgrass distribution in Great Bay itself increased between 2008 and 2009, primarily due to continued expansion from natural seeding of bare areas, the Bay’s eelgrass biomass continued to decline as a result of decreases in plant density in existing beds. Nuisance macroalgae in Great Bay continued to proliferate and impact eelgrass by smothering eelgrass shoots and reducing shoot density. In 2009, Portsmouth Harbor experienced a 16% loss of eelgrass distribution since 2008, for a loss of 31% of the Harbor’s eelgrass distribution in the past three years, an alarming trend. Although the number of acres of eelgrass has increased, driven by gains in Great Bay, even with these areal gains, biomass is down for the Bay itself and the trends of loss in Portsmouth Harbor of both eelgrass distribution and percent cover continue. Despite the increase in eelgrass distribution in Great Bay Estuary due to the increased seed recruitment in Great Bay, the loss of percent cover and biomass in Great Bay and in Portsmouth Harbor again this year (2008 – 2009) indicate the continuing adverse water quality conditions in the Estuary

The Political Economy of the Research Exemption in American Patent Law

This Article approaches the research exemption, and related legal developments, as a case study in the political economy of patent law. Part I recounts the history of the research exemption, touching briefly on historical origins but emphasizing developments since the 1970s in legislative, executive, and judicial forums. It also examines changes during the same time frame in related areas of patent law, like the Bayh-Dole legislation and the attempted repeal of state immunity from patent infringement liability. These legal developments indirectly affected the research exemption, or implicated similar concerns about imbalance in the patent system and the use of patents to tax, control, or inhibit research activity. Part II analyzes this history to illustrate and expand upon two major themes in the political economy of patent law, namely the surprising persistence of faulty economic ideology in patent policymaking and the institutional bias exhibited by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in shaping modern patent law. One major conclusion is that together these forces have created an excessively complex and ill-designed policy environment that is placing a significant strain on the national research system, a strain that executive agencies and the courts have tried to alleviate through ad hoc agreements and modifications of other patent doctrines, like the doctrine of subject matter eligibility

Eelgrass Distribution in the Great Bay Estuary for 2006

Eelgrass in Great Bay itself decreased substantially (43%) between 2005 and 2006, due to losses in both biomass and distribution. Little Bay and the Piscataqua River showed greater change(loss of 40%) between 2005 and 2006 than previously, with very low levels of eelgrass compared to historical distributions and the large beds of ruppia in the Bellamy, Oyster and upper Piscataqua Rivers also diminished. The Portsmouth Harbor – Little Harbor area experienced a decrease in eelgrass abundance (14%) between 2005 and 2006. All of the Great Bay Estuary has decreased eelgrass beds compared to historic distributions. In the decade from 1996 to 2006, the Great Bay Estuary has lost almost half its eelgrass

Eelgrass Distribution in the Great Bay Estuary for 2012

Eelgrass in the Great Bay Estuary declined in both distribution and biomass between 2011 and 2012, continuing the long-term trend of eelgrass loss. In 2012, eelgrass was once again mainly present in the Great Bay itself with limited distribution in Portsmouth Harbor and Little Bay. Eelgrass distribution in Great Bay decreased 1.5% between 2011 and 2012 with no change in biomass. In Great Bay,eelgrass distribution has declined 36% since 1996 and biomass is a quarter of what it was in the early 1990s. Nuisance macroalgae in Great Bay continued to proliferate in 2012 and to impact eelgrass by smothering eelgrass shoots and reducing shoot density. In the Piscataqua River, a new, small bed of eelgrass was present in 2012. The eelgrass bed in Little Bay that first appeared in 2010 retracted by 28% between 2011 and 2012 and had very low percent cover in 2012. In 2012, no significant change in eelgrass distribution or biomass was seen in the Portsmouth Harbor and Little Harbor area of the estuary. Overall, eelgrass distribution in the Estuary from 2011 to 2012 decreased 3.9%. The long-term trend of eelgrass decline in the Great Bay Estuary continued in 2012, with a loss of eelgrass distribution of 37% estuary-wide since 1996

Emotions & judgments : a critique of Solomon : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy at Massey University

The idea that we are passive victims of our emotions, that they are wild and uncontrollable things which just happen to (or "in") us is very common. Robert Solomon thinks that this idea stems from a faulty philosophical analysis: the analysis that emotions are a kind of "feeling" or physiological happening. On this analysis, "feelings" and occurrences are externally caused; as such they are non-rational and involuntary, the types of things that we cannot be held responsible for. In his seminal article "Emotions and Choice." Solomon opposes this view. He wants to show that we can be held accountable for our emotions, even praised or blamed for having them. To achieve this end, he shows that emotions are rational events, and hence are importantly conceptual events. Taken to its logical conclusion, Solomon proposes that emotions are judgments. That explains, in a way in which the traditional view can't explain, why emotions are subject to rational control and conscious manipulation, and therefore why we can rightly be held accountable for them. In this thesis I agree with Solomon that the intentionality of emotions cannot be accounted for by a "Components" model. What I don't agree with is that emotions are inferior judgments. If emotions really are a species of judgment (and I see no reason why the reverse might not be true, that judgments are a kind of emotion), then Solomon has given no adequate reason for his implicit view that emotions are inferior judgments. When we look more closely at Soloman's view of judgments, we see that he wobbles between a non-componential and a componential analysis. Since it is his thesis that emotions are importantly non-componential, and that emotions are judgments, this wobbliness jeopardises Soloman's entire philosophical project. After examining the second half of "Emotions and Choice", I conclude that Soloman's strongest reason for thinking emotions are inferior judgments really has nothing to do with the nature of judgments at all. It is because he is covertly, and maybe unwittingly, holding a view of emotions as self-deceptions