On the receiver pays principle

This paper extends the theory of network competition between telecommunications operators by allowing receivers to derive a surplus from receiving calls (call externality) and to affect the volume of communications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate the extent to which receiver charges can lead to an internalization of the calling externality. When the receiver charge and the termination (access) charge are both regulated, there exists an e±cient equilibrium. Effciency requires a termination discount. When reception charges are market determined, it is optimal for each operator to set the prices for emission and reception at their off-net costs. For an appropriately chosen termination charge, the symmetric equilibrium is again effcient. Lastly, we show that network-based price discrimination creates strong incentives for connectivity breakdowns, even between equal networks.Networks, interconnection, competition policy

Distributed Random Access Algorithm: Scheduling and Congesion Control

This paper provides proofs of the rate stability, Harris recurrence, and epsilon-optimality of CSMA algorithms where the backoff parameter of each node is based on its backlog. These algorithms require only local information and are easy to implement. The setup is a network of wireless nodes with a fixed conflict graph that identifies pairs of nodes whose simultaneous transmissions conflict. The paper studies two algorithms. The first algorithm schedules transmissions to keep up with given arrival rates of packets. The second algorithm controls the arrivals in addition to the scheduling and attempts to maximize the sum of the utilities of the flows of packets at the different nodes. For the first algorithm, the paper proves rate stability for strictly feasible arrival rates and also Harris recurrence of the queues. For the second algorithm, the paper proves the epsilon-optimality. Both algorithms operate with strictly local information in the case of decreasing step sizes, and operate with the additional information of the number of nodes in the network in the case of constant step size

The pricing of academic journals: A two-sided market perspective

More and more academic journals adopt an open-access policy, by which articles are accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through author fees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on a journal’s quality standard. If the journal’s objective was to maximize social welfare, open access would be optimal as long as the positive externalities generated by its diffusion exceed the marginal cost of distribution. However, we show that if an open access journal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers’ payoffs, the impact of the journal or its profit), it tends to choose a quality standard below the socially efficient level.Academic Journals, Open-Access, Reader-Pays, Two-Sided Market, Endogenous Quality

Ising phases of Heisenberg ladders in a magnetic field

We examine the influence of weak anisotropic interactions on the T=0 phase diagram of the frustrated two-leg Heisenberg ladder, a well-studied spin model exhibiting integer and fractional magnetization plateaux separated by gapless incommensurate states. We find that the Dzyaloshinskii--Moriya coupling may substantially modify the phase diagram so that the half-integer plateau and the surrounding gapless phases merge into a single Ising-ordered phase breaking the translational symmetry of the lattice. A different Ising order is found for a weakly frustrated ladder. Implications for experimental ladder and dimer systems are discussed.Comment: 5 pages, 5 figure

Governing Corporations in National and Transnational Spaces:Cross-Level Governmental Orchestration of Corporate Social Responsibility in South Korea

The loose spatial and temporal coordination of national and transnational governmental corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies enables multinational corporations (MNCs) to externalize irresponsible behaviours. Political CSR (PCSR) and ‘government and CSR’ studies show how governmental authority shapes CSR at the domestic and transnational levels but provide only limited insights into how to govern MNCs across levels and over time. Combining the concept of orchestration with insights from power transition theory, we theorize cross-level governmental orchestration as power-imbued, dynamic, and involving multiple modes of orchestration. Through an analysis of how the South Korean state has deployed CSR domestic and transnational strategies over 30 years, we induce three configurations of cross-level governmental orchestration, blending coercive, directive, delegative and facilitative modes of orchestration, and identify the mechanisms behind Korea's transition from one configuration to another. Our results: (1) contribute to PCSR and ‘government and CSR’ studies by conceptualizing a systemic and dynamic view of cross-level orchestration of governmental CSR strategies; (2) advance transnational governance studies by consolidating orchestration theories and considering coercive power, and (3) add to power transition theory by explaining how regulatory capacity-building enables shifts of cross-level orchestration configurations

Labor Market Information Acquisition and Downsizing

We study the optimal mechanism for downsizing the public sector which takes into account different informational constraints (complete versus asymmetric information on each worker’s efficiency) and polit-ical constraints (mandatory versus voluntary downsizing). Under complete information, the optimal structure of downsizing (who is laid-off and who is not) does not depend on the political con-straint and is determined by the (marginal) cost of retaining a worker in the public sector. Since this cost includes his opportunity cost in the private sector, information acquisition on opportunity costs affects the structure of downsizing. Under asymmetric information, the political constraints determine which workers obtain information rents and therefore affect the struc-ture of downsizing. An increase in the precision of the information on workers ’ opportunity costs may increase or decrease social welfare depending on its impacts on the information rents

The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective

More and more academic journals adopt an open-access policy, by which articles are accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through author fees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on a journal’s quality standard. If the journal’s objective was to maximize social welfare, open access would be optimal as long as the positive externalities generated by its diffusion exceed the marginal cost of distribution. However, we show that if an open access journal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers’ utility, the impact of the journal or its profit), it tends to choose a quality standard below the socially efficient level