What choice for the EU?

Confronted in its southern neighborhood with the choice between continued promotion of democratic transitions and the need for stability in the post Arab-Spring environment, the EU is tilting to the latter. Past EU efforts reflected the conviction that peace, stability, and prosperity were the outcomes of democracy. But threats of regional conflict, civil wars, waves of immigrants, and rise in terror is forcing a rethinking. While searching for stability is understandable, supporting a return of authoritarianism is counterproductive. Indeed, a return to tyranny in the Arab world has already created significant public discontent that has led to a second wave of Arab uprisings. The EU should seek to strengthen societal resilience by supporting democratic reforms, for example, by supporting local Arab civil society initiatives. Such support should be guided by local priorities, those that address the economic and well as the political, educational, and health needs of the Arab public

Growing Up Amid Ethno‐Political Conflict: Aggression and Emotional Desensitization Promote Hostility to Ethnic Outgroups

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/134287/1/cdev12599.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/134287/2/cdev12599_am.pd

Serious violent behavior and antisocial outcomes as consequences of exposure to ethnic‐political conflict and violence among Israeli and Palestinian youth

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/149258/1/ab21818.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/149258/2/ab21818_am.pd

Palestinian security sector reform : the view of the public; final narrative report (1/10/2010 – 31/12/2012)

This survey of public perception of the security sector moved forward the development of quantitative indicators measuring aspects of Security Sector Reform (SSR). Project findings were debated with senior officials in the security sector and with other critical sectors and players; recommendations were viewed as relevant and practical. By providing empirical and evidence-based data and conclusions, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) work has raised awareness of policy makers and commanders of security services. The project also helped PSR improve its ability to engage Palestinian and non-Palestinian policy makers particularly in the security sector area

Bitter frenemies : Fateh and Hamas and the democratization processes in Palestine

PowerPoint presentatio

La vieja y la joven guardias : la autoridad palestina y el proceso de paz en la encrucijada

This paper analyzes the power structure of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and reveals the existence of a contradiction between Palestinian leaders trained in the foreign struggle and the younger ones, led to carry out leadership and management within the territory. Within this contradiction, the first intifada appears as a catalyst that consolidated two significant dynamics in Palestinian politics and society. It is possible to perceive a delicate correlation of forces between the so-called Old and Young Guards, and between both and the most militant elements of Islamism and nationalism outside the PA. When reviewing the different possibilities of settlement, the analysis of Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the occupied territories is privileged. The only clear message that emerges from the deep dissatisfaction of Palestinian public opinion with the PA is that it must be reformed or disappear.El presente trabajo analiza la estructura de poder de la Autoridad Palestina (AP), y revela la existencia de una contradicción entre los líderes palestinos formados en la lucha exterior y los más jóvenes, llevados a desempeñar una conducción y gestión al interior del territorio. Dentro de esta contradicción, la primera intifada aparece como elemento catalizador que consolidó dos dinámicas significativas en la política y la sociedad palestinas. Es posible percibir una delicada correlación de fuerzas entre las llamadas Vieja y Joven Guardias, y entre ambas y los elementos más militantes del islamismo y el nacionalismo exterior a la AP. Al pasar revista a las distintas posibilidades de arreglo, se privilegia el análisis de la retirada unilateral de Israel de los territorios ocupados. El único mensaje claro que se desprende de la profunda insatisfacción de la opinión pública palestina respecto de la AP es que hay que reformarse o desaparecer

Willing to compromise: Palestinian public opinion and the peace process

Khalil Shikak

The Palestinian refugee problem and the right of return

In discussing final status issues, Palestinians and Israelis approach the question of the refugees and the right of return from radically different perspectives. The Palestinian narrative maintains that the Zionists forcibly expelled the Arab refugees in 1948. The Palestinians insist on the right of the refugees to return to their homes or, for those who choose not to do so, to accept compensation. And they demand that Israel unilaterally acknowledge its complete moral responsibility for the injustice of the refugees’ expulsion. In contrast, the Israeli narrative rejects the refugees’ right of return. Israel argues that it was the Arabs who caused the Palestinian refugee problem, by rejecting the creation of the State of Israel and declaring war upon it—a war which, like most wars, created refugee problems, including a Jewish one. Israel sees the return of Palestinian refugees as an existential threat, insofar as it would undermine the Jewish character and the viability of the state. The two sides’ traditional solutions make no attempt to reconcile these opposing narratives. Yet such an attempt is vital if the issue is to be engaged. Hence the Joint Working Group on Israeli–Palestinian Relations developed two compromise solutions. They narrow the gap between the positions, but do not fully reconcile them. The compromise solution espoused by the Palestinian members of the Joint Working Group would insist that Israel acknowledge both its responsibility for creating the refugee problem and the individual moral right of Palestinian refugees to return. But it recognizes that, in view of the changed situation of the refugees over 50 years, and taking into account Israel’s constraints, the return of only a limited number would be feasible. Israel would pay both individual and collective compensation. The Palestinians’ case for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders would be strengthened as a result of their willingness to absorb the refugees in the Palestinian state. Under the compromise solution proposed by the Israeli members of the Joint Working Group, Israel would acknowledge that it shares, with the other parties to the 1948 war, practical, but not moral, responsibility for the suffering of the refugees, and that rectification of their plight is a central goal of the peace process. Israel would accept repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees under its family reunification program. Israel would pay collective compensation to the Palestinian state, paralleled by Arab State compensation for Jewish refugees from 1948. In seeking to further reconcile these two compromise solutions, we note that they reflect a large measure of agreement between Palestinians and Israelis: that Israel had a historic role in the events that created the refugee issue; that a massive exercise of the right of return is unrealizable, and “return”/family reunification will be limited; that a larger number of Palestinians will “return” to the Palestinian state; that some resettlement will take place in host states, primarily Jordan; that Israel will pay some form of compensation; and that closing the file on the refugee issue means the dismantling of the entire international apparatus that has sustained the refugees—camps, UNRWA, etc. But there remain significant gaps between the two sides’ compromise proposals as well. These concern the nature of Israeli acknowledgement of Palestinian suffering and the responsibility for it; the nature and number of “return”/family reunification; the nature and size of compensation, and its linkage to compensation for Jewish refugees from 1948; and the size of “return” to the Palestinian state. In order to negotiate an agreed solution that bridges these remaining gaps, Israelis and Palestinians will have to develop the mutual trust required to further accommodate each other’s narratives. They will also, inevitably, have to factor the refugee/right of return issue into the broader fabric of tradeoffs and compromises that will characterize a comprehensive solution to the conflict. This will involve additional parties—primarily the refugee host countries—as well as related substantive issues, such as borders