Differential Game for Environmental-Regulation in Green Supply Chain

[[abstract]]This paper demonstrates that a proper design of environmental-regulation pricing strategies is able to promote Extended Product Responsibility for green supply chain firms in a competitive market. A differential game model comprising Vidale-Wolfe equation has been established in light of sales competition and recycling dynamics as well as regulation related profit function. Analytic solutions of Markovian Nash equilibriums are provided with the necessary condition derived from Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We found that governments should opt to gradually raise regulation standards so that rational manufacturers will gradually improve its product recyclability, and, in turn, Extended Product Responsibility will get promoted

Environmental-Regulation Pricing Strategies for Green Supply Chain Management

This paper demonstrates that a proper design of environmental-regulation pricing strategies is able to promote Extended Product Responsibility for green supply chain firms in a competitive market. A differential game model comprising Vidale-Wolfe equation has been established in light of sales competition and recycling dynamics as well as regulation related profit function. Analytic solutions of Markovian Nash equilibriums are provided with the necessary condition derived from Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We found that governments should opt to gradually raise regulation standards so that rational manufacturers will gradually improve its product recyclability, and, in turn, Extended Product Responsibility will get promoted

Environmental-Regulation Pricing Strategies for Green Supply Chain Management

This paper demonstrates that a proper design of environmental-regulation pricing strategies is able to promote Extended Product Responsibility for green supply chain firms in a competitive market. A differential game model comprising Vidale-Wolfe equation has been established in light of sales competition and recycling dynamics as well as regulation related profit function. Analytic solutions of Markovian Nash equilibriums are provided with the necessary condition derived from Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We found that governments should opt to gradually raise regulation standards so that rational manufacturers will gradually improve its product recyclability, and, in turn, Extended Product Responsibility will get promoted

Factors influencing follow-on public offering of shippng companies from investor perspective – a hybrid multiple-criteria decision-making approach

The shipping industry transports nearly 80% of the goods worldwide and requires large funding. The shipping industry shifted from debt to equity as the source of funding in the last decade. Because most shipping companies already had their initial public offering before 2013, these companies tend to engage in follow-on equity offerings (FPO). However, the challenge faced by the shipping companies is the lack of knowledge on successful FPO. The purpose of this study is to identify the most influential factors affecting shipping companies’ FPO from the investor perspective. This research applies a hybrid multiple-criteria decision-making model integrating the fuzzy-Delphi method and Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory, processing survey responses covering four dimensions and 16 criteria from 33 investment experts. The results show that financial indicator is the primary cause affecting offering condition, technical indicators. An increase in earnings per share would help the financial performance of the shipping companies to appear most attractive to investors

Marketing-driven channel coordination with revenue-sharing contracts under price promotion to end-customers

This paper explores the equilibrium behavior of a basic supplier-retailer distribution channel with and without revenue-sharing contracts under price promotion to end-customers. Three types of promotional demand patterns characterized by different features of dynamic price sensitivity are considered to rationalize price promotional effects on end-customer demands. Under such a retail price promotion scheme, this work develops a basic model to investigate decentralized channel members' equilibrium decisions in pricing and logistics operations using a two-stage Stackelberg game approach. Extending from the basic model, this work further derives the equilibrium solutions of the dyadic members under channel coordination with revenue-sharing contracts. Analytical results show that under certain conditions both the supplier and retailer can gain more profits through revenue-sharing contracts by means of appropriate promotional pricing strategies. Moreover, the supplier should provide additional economic incentives to the retailer. Furthermore, a counter-profit revenue-sharing chain effect is found in the illustrative examples. Such a phenomenon infers that the more the retailer requests to share from a unit of sale the more it may lose under the revenue-sharing supply chain coordination scheme.Supply chain management Channel coordination Promotional effect Revenue sharing

Green supply chain management, reverse logistics and nuclear power generation

Built on the concepts of green supply chain management (G-SCM), this paper presents a multi-objective optimization programming approach to address the issue of nuclear power generation. In this study, a linear multi-objective optimization model is formulated to optimize the operations of both the nuclear power generation and the corresponding induced-waste reverse logistics. Factors such as the operational risks induced in both the power generation and reverse logistics processes are considered in the model formulation. Numerical results indicate that using the proposed approach, the induced environmental impact including the corresponding costs and risks can be improved up to 37.8%.Green supply chain management Nuclear power generation Reverse logistics Multi-objective optimization