The Contribution of Nonmarket Valuation to Policy: The Case of Nonfederal Hydropower Relicensing

The contribution of nonmarket valuation studies to decisions about the operation of nonfederal hydroelectric facilities is examined. Hydropower licensing reforms by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to better weigh market and nonmarket tradeoffs did not require or use nonmarket valuation. License negotiation processes are interpreted as a substitute for valuation.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY REFORM: A TAXONOMY OF ECONOMISTS' PERSPECTIVES

As the environmental policy recommendations of economists become more acceptable, differences in the professional understanding of, and support for, different policy forms are becoming more apparent. These different approaches to environmental policy and research are described around a taxonomy of four perspectives: "rational analysts," "cost analysts", "market managers," and "free market environmentalists." These perspectives are compared and contrasted. Recognition of these differences can result in a better appreciation of the different research agendas of economists and can improve clarity in teaching and policy advising.Economic incentives, Environmental policy, Regulation, Environmental Economics and Policy,

The Use and Opportunity of Cooperative Organizational Forms as an Innovative Regulatory Tool Under the Clean Water Act

Numerous reforms to introduce financial incentives and flexibility into the Clean Water Act have been proposed. Cooperative organizational forms that consolidate multiple regulated entities under a single organizational umbrella are an overlooked, but potentially useful avenue for reform. In concept, these new organizational forms would function much like a farmer cooperative using coordination and consolidation to lower input costs to its members. Illustrations of how cooperative organizational forms can be used to lower costs and enhance regulatory flexibility in both the water quality and wetland programs are provided.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Environmental Services Programs for the Chesapeake Bay

Ecosystem Services, Payment for Ecosystem Services, Water Quality, Chesapeake Bay, Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Q25, Q28, Q53, Q57,

Evaluation Framework for Water Quality Trading Programs in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed

Water quality trading programs are being proposed and implemented across the US in a variety of forms and with differing objectives. The programs being proposed and implemented in the Chesapeake Bay region are no exception. Against this background the Chesapeake Bay Program's Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee and the Mid-Atlantic Water Program requested a general framework to inform and guide the evaluation of the performance trading programs. This resulting report was developed by a workgroup comprised of ten individuals with extensive experience in the study, design, and evaluation of trading programs. While the impetus for this report was to improve evaluation of trading programs in the Chesapeake Bay region, the evaluation framework is broad enough to apply to trading programs in general

Attenuation Coefficients for Water Quality Trading

Water quality trading has been proposed as a cost-effective approach for reducing nutrient loads through credit generation from agricultural or point source reductions sold to buyers facing costly options. We present a systematic approach to determine attenuation coefficients and their uncertainty. Using a process-based model, we determine attenuation with safety margins at many watersheds for total nitrogen (TN) and total phosphorus (TP) loads as they transport from point of load reduction to the credit buyer. TN and TP in-stream attenuation generally increases with decreasing mean river flow; smaller rivers in the modeled region of the Ohio River Basin had TN attenuation factors per km, including safety margins, of 0.19-1.6%, medium rivers of 0.14-1.2%, large rivers of 0.13-1.1%, and very large rivers of 0.04-0.42%. Attenuation in ditches transporting nutrients from farms to receiving rivers is 0.4%/km for TN, while for TP attenuation in ditches can be up to 2%/km. A 95 percentile safety margin of 30-40% for TN and 6-10% for TP, applied to the attenuation per km factors, was determined from the in-stream sensitivity of load reductions to watershed model parameters. For perspective, over 50 km a 1% per km factor would result in 50% attenuation = 2:1 trading ratio

Water Quality Trading Without Trades: An Analysis into the Lack of Agricultural Nonpoint Source Credit Demand in Virginia

Governmental agencies and agricultural organizations promote water quality trading programs as an innovative policy to engage agricultural producers in conservation activities. Cost analyses suggest regulated sources can reduce compliance costs by purchasing agricultural nonpoint source credits. Yet, such “point-nonpoint” trades are rare. This paper assesses the demand for agricultural nonpoint sources in well-developed nutrient trading programs in Virginia for industrial and municipal wastewater treatment plants, municipal stormwater programs, and land developers. Evidence suggests nutrient trading programs in Virginia will not stimulate investments in pollutant reduction practices on working agricultural lands. The lack of demand for agricultural nonpoint source credits can be attributed to a substantial degree to the design features and incentives present in multiple overlapping regulatory programs

The Use of Nutrient Assimilation Services in Performance-based Water Quality Incentive Programs

This paper reviews water quality investments that can increase the environment’s capacity to remove nutrients. The nutrient removal effectiveness, uncertainty, and cost of removing nutrients directly from ambient waters is compared to agricultural nonpoint source reductions in the context of water quality credit trading and payment for environmental services programs

The Use and Opportunity of Cooperative Organizational Forms as an Innovative Regulatory Tool Under the Clean Water Act

Numerous reforms to introduce financial incentives and flexibility into the Clean Water Act have been proposed. Cooperative organizational forms that consolidate multiple regulated entities under a single organizational umbrella are an overlooked, but potentially useful avenue for reform. In concept, these new organizational forms would function much like a farmer cooperative - using coordination and consolidation to lower input costs to its members. Illustrations of how cooperative organizational forms can be used to lower costs and enhance regulatory flexibility in both the water quality and wetland programs are provided