The Threat of Exclusion and Relational Contracting

Relational contracts have been shown to mitigate moral hazard in labor and credit markets. A central assumption in most theoretical and experimental studies is that, upon misbehaving, agents can be excluded from their current source of income and have to resort to less attractive outside options. This threat of exclusion is unrealistic in many environments, and especially in credit and investment contexts. We examine experimentally the emergence and time structure of relational contracts when the threat of exclusion is weakened. We focus on bilateral credit relationships in which strategic default is possible. We compare a weak exclusion treatment in which defaulting borrowers can reinvest borrowed funds, to a strong exclusion treatment in which defaulting borrowers must liquidate borrowed funds. We find that under weak exclusion more relationships break down in early periods and credit relationships are more likely to “start small”

Complexity and Biases

We examine experimentally how complexity affects decision-making, when individuals choose among different products with varying benefits and costs. We find that complexity in costs leads to choosing a high-benefit product, with high costs and overall lower payoffs. In contrast, when complexity is in the benefits of the product, we cannot reject the hypothesis of random mistakes. We also examine the role of heterogeneous complexity. We find that individuals still (mistakenly) choose the high-benefit but costly product, even if cheaper and simple products are available. Our results suggest that salience is a main driver of choices under different forms of complexity

Peer Effects in Risk Taking

This paper examines the effect of peers on individual risk taking. In the absence of informational motives, we investigate why social utility concerns may drive peer effects. We test for two main channels: utility from payoff differences and from conforming to the peer. We show experimentally that social utility generates substantial peer effects in risk taking. These are mainly explained by utility from payoff differences, in line with outcomebased social preferences. Contrary to standard assumptions, we show that estimated social preference parameters change significantly when peers make active choices, compared to when lotteries are randomly assigned to them

Teaching teenagers in finance: does it work?

Many initiatives worldwide aim at improving financial literacy through targeted education programs, yet there is little evidence regarding their effectiveness. We examine the impact of a short financial education program on teenagers in German high schools. Our findings reveal that the training program significantly increases teenagers' interest in financial matters and their financial knowledge, especially their ability to properly assess the riskiness of assets. Behaviorally, we observe a decrease in the prevalence of self-reported impulse purchases, but at the same time find no evidence of a significant increase in savings. Our data reveals strong gender differences already before adulthood: Girls show less interest in, and self-assessed knowledge of, financial matters, and are less likely to save

The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance

We investigate the elasticity of preferences for moral ignorance with respect to monetary incentives and social norm information. We propose a model where uncertainty differentially decreases the moral costs of unethical behavior, and benchmark the demand curve for moral ignorance against a morally neutral context. In line with the model, selfishness is a main determinant of moral ignorance, and the demand curve for moral ignorance is highly elastic when information shifts from being costly to incentivized. Moral ignorance is considered morally inappropriate. Providing this information increases moral behavior but does not shift the demand curve for ignorance

Understanding demand for COVID-19 antibody testing

We study individual demand for COVID-19 antibody tests in an incentivized study on a representative sample of the US population. Almost 2,000 participants trade off obtaining an at home test kit against money. At prices close to zero, 80 percent of individuals want the test. However, this broad support of testing falls sharply with price. Demand decreases by 19 percentage points per $10 price increase. Demand for testing increases with factors related to its potential value, such as age, increased length and strength of protective immunity from antibodies, and greater uncertainty about having had the virus. Willingness to pay for antibody tests also depends on income, ethnicity and political views. Black respondents show significantly lower demand than white and Hispanic respondents, and Trump-supporters demonstrate significantly lower demand for testing. The results suggest that charging even moderate prices for antibody tests could widen health inequalities

Economic Crises, Health and Education in Jamaica

We study the impact of growth fluctuation on education and health indicators in Jamaica. Using household surveys between 1989 and 2007, we study the impact by using pseudo-panel regressions at the parish level, instrumenting growth fluctuations with variations in major Jamaican export commodities, to account for the endogeneity of growth in its relationship with education and health indicators. The main finding of the instrumental variable regression is that GDP fluctuation has mixed impacts on education and health.Jamaica, economic crisis, human development, education, health

The Impact of Financial Education on Adolescents' Intertemporal Choices.

We examine the impact of a large high-school financial education program on the intertemporal choices of adolescents. We randomly assigned the program among a sample of almost 1,000 students and measured their intertemporal choices using an incentivized experiment. While intertemporal choices in the control group exhibit significant present bias, choices among treated students are time consistent on average. We structurally estimate individual preference parameters, explicitly allowing choices to be stochastic. Participation in the program increases time consistency and decreases error rates. These findings suggest that financial education can have significant effects on intertemporal choice already at a young age

The Impact of Financial Education on Adolescents' Intertemporal Choices

We study the impact of financial education on intertemporal choice in adolescence. The educational program was randomly assigned among high school students, and choices were measured using an incentivized experiment. Students who participated in the program make more time-consistent choices; are more likely to allocate payments to a single payment date, as opposed to spreading payment across two dates; and display increased consistency of choice with the law of demand. These findings suggest that financial education increases the quality of intertemporal decision-making and decreases narrow bracketing. (JEL C93, D14, D15, I21, J13