Bolsa Família, its Design, its Impacts and Possibilities for the Future

Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes, including the Bolsa Família programme, have been extensively studied over recent years. The books, working papers and articles that have been written on the subject, if placed on top of each other, would pile up very high indeed. What excuse do I have for spending my time writing this one and asking you to spend yours reading it? My excuse is twofold. The first excuse is that, in spite of the aforementioned pile of studies, much about the programme is still not common knowledge. In the different forums in which I have been I have seen that many elementary facts about Bolsa Família are still relatively unknown to audiences beyond (some) Brazilian policymakers and government officials. How did the programme come about? What exactly was the Lula government?s role in its creation? What impact has it had on poverty, inequality, education, health and labour supply? Did it have any significant political effects? What are its contradictions and possibilities for the future? My objective is to give brief and, if possible, conclusive answers to all these questions in a single text. (?)Bolsa Família, its Design, its Impacts and Possibilities for the Future

Bolsa Família: A Summary of Its Impacts

Targeted and Conditioned Cash Transfers (CCTs) began hesitatingly and somewhat chaotically in Brazil in 1995 and have grown in relevance ever since. From 1995 to 2003, there were many CCT programs, run by all levels of government and, within the federal government, by five different ministries, with very little coordination among them. While the lack of coordination certainly reduced their effectiveness, there is little doubt that the municipal and state level experimentation was crucial in the design of what was to follow. (?)Bolsa Família: A Summary of Its Impacts

Targeting and Coverage of the Bolsa Família Programme: What Is the Meaning of Eleven Million Families?

By the second half of 2006, Brazil?s Bolsa Família Programme (Programa Bolsa Família, PBF) had reached its pre-fixed target of covering 11 million families. That target was revised in January 2009, when an increase in coverage was authorised, expanding it to 12.5 million. Since the PBF?s ability to reach the entire poor population is based on the programme?s targeting and size (coverage), Soares et al. (2010) use data from the National Household Sample Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios, PNAD) to assess whether the programme?s expansion between 2004 and 2006 degraded its progressivity, and they estimate the number of benefits needed to fully encompass the entire target population. They use a targeting analysis tool such as the programme?s incidence concentration coefficient and binary analysis of eligibility versus receipt. (?)Targeting and Coverage of the Bolsa Família Programme: What Is the Meaning of Eleven Million Families?

Can all Cash Transfers Reduce Inequality?

.Poverty, CCT, Cash Transfers, Inequality

Covariates of efficiency in education production among developing pacific-basin and Latin American countries

COVARIATES OF EFFICIENCY IN EDUCATION PRODUCTION AMONG DEVELOPING PACIFIC- BASIN AND LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIESThe paper investigates why some schools in East Asia and Latin America are more efficient in the use of resources than others. It estimates input and output efficiencies and uses efficiency scores as dependent variables in analysis of variance and regression analyses. Input and output efficiencies are calculated using ?hard? inputs such as number and quality of teachers and student socio-economic status, and ?soft? inputs such as management; sorting and school autonomy are then used as explanatory variables in the variance and regression analysis. The results indicate that private management and student selection lead to high efficiencies and this result is negative for those who hope for quality public education for all; greater school autonomy leads to higher efficiencies, even for public schools that do not practice selection.Efficiency, Education quality, School inputs, Poverty

The Impact of Relative Prices on Welfare and Inequality in Brazil, 1995-2005

Our objective in this working paper is to analyze the impact of relative prices on the evolution of welfare and inequality in Brazil from 1995 to 2005. This period was characterized by monetary stability but also by large changes in relative prices. This implies that a homogeneous inflation index will yield questionable results. In order to take relative prices into account in our welfare analysis, we build specific inflation indices for each hundredth of the population ranked by per capita household income. To accomplish this task, we use data from the latest round of the Brazilian income and expenditure survey and price indices obtained from the national consumer price system. We use our distribution-specific inflation indices to deflate the nominal income distributions yielded by the Brazilian annual household survey from 1995 to 2005. Thus, we generate new income distributions that better represent the real purchasing power of the households. Based on these new income distributions, we calculate average incomes and Gini coefficients, investigate the relationships of stochastic dominance as well as Lorenz dominance, and calculate Atkinson?s social welfare function for inequality aversion parameters varying from 0.1 to 0.9. Our results can be summarized into three stylized facts: i) inflation during the 1995-2005 period was distributionally progressive up to the 93rd hundredth of the per capita household income distribution; ii) taking relative prices into account, the Gini coefficient falls 0.61 points (or 19 per cent) more than when a general price index is used; iii) surprisingly, average income deflated by the distribution-specific indices differs significantly from average income deflated by the general price index, i.e., it falls instead of rising slightly from 1995 to 2005.Relative Prices, Welfare, Inequality, Brazil

Targeting and Coverage of the Bolsa Família Programme: Why Knowing What You Measure Is Important In Choosing the Numbers

The trade-off between targeting and coverage has always been something of a quandary for progressive cash transfers, particularly those that are not entitlements. Undue inclusion errors mean that families or individuals whose need is not so great are being paid at the expense of either taxpayers or other budgetary priorities. Undue exclusion errors mean that those who are in need, sometimes in desperate need, are not being helped by the state. This trade-off is somewhat less extreme for entitlements. If the law says that families whose income is less than a quarter of a minimum wage are entitled to a given cash allowance, then all those whose income falls under that line should receive the allowance. There is still a trade-off because measurement error still occurs, but the discussion centres only on the inclusion criteria. Most conditional cash transfers (CCTs), however, are not entitlements. (...)Targeting and Coverage of the Bolsa Família Programme: Why Knowing What You Measure Is Important In Choosing the Numbers

O que Explica o Declínio da Desigualdade no Brasil?

O que Explica o Declínio da Desigualdade no Brasil?

O impacto distributivo do salário mínimo: a distribuição individual dos rendimentos do trabalho

The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact that changes in the value of the minimum wage will have upon the distribution of individual labor income. Two complementary approaches will be used. The first approach is to use non-parametric methods to estimate the individual income labor distribution. The estimator used is the kernel estimator and the data come from the five PNADs since the Real Plan. The next approach in the paper is quantify the elasticity of labor income with relation to minimum wage increases. The data come from the monthly PMEs since the Real Plan and the methodology is to use various comparison groups to net out the minimum wage effect