Deepening democratisation? Exploring the declared motives for ‘late’ lustration in Poland

Lustration was one of, if not the, most important and controversial transitional justice methods to be used in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, and Poland is an archetypal case of late and recurring lustration. Many of the attempts in the literature to tackle such changes of lustration trajectory divide between those who focus on the partisan and electoral-strategic drivers of its protagonists, and those who ascribe more ideological-programmatic motives to them. The re-emergence of the lustration issue in the Polish case was entwined with broader debates about the quality of post-communist democracy more generally and often felt to be indicative of the need to deepen the democratisation process

Three roads to institutionalisation: Vote-, Office- and Policy-seeking explanations of party switching in Poland.

Party institutionalisation is a central problem in political science. The literature tends to understand it as a syndrome, and therefore has difficulty explaining variations in institutionalisation. We suggest a new approach based on the transaction between a legislative party and its deputies, the failure of which is observable in party switching. We identify three routes to institutionalisation by appealing to the vote-seeking, office-seeking or policy-seeking motivations of deputies. Poland has had a large volume of party switching, along with wide variation in the incentives facing differently-motivated deputies. Our survival analyses of switching in four Polish parliaments find that vote-seeking is the most likely route to institutionalisation for Polish parties. Moreover, we establish a concrete hypothesis for comparative testing: legislative parties can survive as long as their popular support exceeds forty per cent of their share in the previous election

Together forever? Explaining exclusivity in party-firm relations

Parties and firms are the key actors of representative democracy and capitalism respectively and the dynamic of attachment between them is a central feature of any political economy. This is the first article to systematically analyse the exclusivity of party-firm relations. We consider exclusivity at a point in time and exclusivity over time. Does a firm have a relationship with only one party at a given point in time, or is it close to more than one party? Does a firm maintain a relationship with only one party over time, or does it switch between parties? Most important, how do patterns of exclusivity impact on a firm’s ability to lobby successfully? We propose a general theory, which explains patterns of party-firm relations by reference to the division of institutions and the type of party competition in a political system. A preliminary test of our theory with Polish survey data confirms our predictions, establishing a promising hypothesis for future research

At the Origins of Welfare State? Social Expenses in the Budgetary Policy in the Second Polish Republic

In the period of the Second Polish Republic, social policy became an important field of activity for public authorities. It was distinguished by a high level of awareness of the prevalent social problems, progressive legislation, and advanced management. The only missing element was sufficient financing. In the budgetary policy of the Second Polish Republic, social expenses were of minor importance. For the most part of the period, they amounted to approximately 3% of all expenses. The Ministry of Social Care was underfunded, which was evident in nearly every aspect of its activity. Hence, if one wonders if the origins of the Polish welfare state can be traced back to the Second Polish Republic, the answer must be “no”. Although extra funds (spent on tackling unemployment, pensions, or disability benefits) were found outside of the ministerial budget, the arguments presented in this article only confirm the hypothesis presented above