Analysis of AIS Data of the Recluse Oil Field, Recluse, Wyoming

Airborne Imaging Spectrometer (AIS) data were flown over the Recluse, Wyoming oil field on September 9, 1984. Processing software was developed at Earth Satellite Corporation (EarthSat) for interactive analysis of the AIS data. EarthSat's AIS processing capabilities include destriping, solar irradiance corrections, residual calculations, geometric resampling, equal energy normalization, interactive spectral classifications and a variety of compressive algorithms to reduce the data to 8-bit format with a minimum of information loss. The in-house photolab facilities of EarthSat can routinely produce high-quality color renditions of the enhanced AIS data. A total of 80 lithologic samples were collected under the AIS flight lines. Correlation (within the atmospheric windows) between the laboratory and the AIS spectra of sample sites was generally poor. Reasonable correlation was only possible in large, freshly plowed fields. Mixed pixels and contrast between the natural and sample's surfaces were believed responsible for the poor correlation. Finally, a drift of approximately three channels was observed in the diffraction grating position within the 1.8 to 2.1 micron quadrant

Double wells, scalar fields and quantum phase transitions in ions traps

Since Hund's work on the ammonia molecule, the double well potential has formed a key paradigm in physics. Its importance is further underlined by the central role it plays in the Landau theory of phase transitions. Recently, the study of entanglement properties of many-body systems has added a new angle to the study of quantum phase transitions of discrete and continuous degrees of freedom, i.e., spin and harmonic chains. Here we show that control of the radial degree of freedom of trapped ion chains allows for the simulation of linear and non-linear Klein-Gordon fields on a lattice, in which the parameters of the lattice, the non-linearity and mass can be controlled at will. The system may be driven through a phase transition creating a double well potential between different configurations of the ion crystal. The dynamics of the system are controllable, local properties are measurable and tunnelling in the double well potential would be observable.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure

The Law Court\u27s Proper Application of Miranda in State v. Bragg: A Matter-of-Fact Communication to the Defendant Regarding Evidence Against Him Will Not Typically Constitute Interrogation

In State v. Bragg, Tammy Bragg was convicted of a Class D crime for operating under the influence (OUI) at the completion of a jury trial, and was ordered to pay a fine of $800 and her license was suspended for ninety days. During her trial, Bragg submitted a motion to suppress statements she made in the police officer’s vehicle and the police station on the grounds that she was not read her Miranda warnings prior to making the statements. The Superior Court denied her motion, however, concluding that Miranda warnings were not necessary in the officer’s vehicle because her statements were not made while “in custody.” In addition, the warnings were unnecessary at the police station when the officer informed Bragg that the intoxilyzer test confirmed that “her blood alcohol content (BAC) was .13%. . . . . and that the presumptive statements were not in response to “the functional equivalent of a question.” On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, was not as to rule for the first time in Maine whether a police officer’s statements to the defendant regarding evidence against her “was the functional equivalent of the direct questioning and reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,” requiring a Miranda warning. The Law Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress statement made by Bragg in the cruiser, and those made at the police station on the grounds that the officer’s statement informing Bragg of the intoxilyzer results were merely “a matter-of-fact communication of the evidence,” which was not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating reponse.” In coming to its conclusion, the Law Court held that Bragg was entitled to information regarding her BAC level upon request, and even though she did not request it, “the officer’s simple statement relating that information” would not trigger a Miranda warning. This Note considers whether the unanimous majority in Bragg properly concluded that criminal defendants who are only informed of evidence against them are not entitled to a Miranda warning. This Note begins in Part II with a brief history and overview of the purposes of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, and how Maine has determined when the warnings should be applied, particularly in the context of statements made by law enforcement officers that rise to the level of a “functional equivalent of a question.” In Part III, this Note determines how Bragg will likely pose obstacles for defendants in attempting to bring suppression motions regarding statements made in response to evidence presented against them by law enforcement. In Part IV, this Note proposes that Bragg is consistent with other jurisdictions and the purposes of Miranda, and quite clearly demonstrates that criminal defendants in Maine will be limited in arguing that they were entitled to a Miranda warning after being told of truthful evidence against them. Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes by arguing that courts should rely on Bragg in similar cases, as long as it is done on a case-by-case basis

Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc.: A Split in the Law Court as to the Definition of Employer Demonstrates the Need for Legislative Action to Amend the Maine Human Rights Act in Order to Protect Maine Employees

In Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., Jamie Fuhrmann submitted a complaint to the Maine Human Rights Commission (Commission) against her former employer, Staples Office Superstore East, Inc. (Staples), and four of her individual supervisors. After the Commission granted her right to sue, she filed a complaint in court alleging whistleblower retaliation under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), as well as sex discrimination under the MHRA. The Superior Court granted Staples’ motion for summary judgment on all counts, and granted the four supervisors’ motions to dismiss on the grounds that individual supervisor liability is not permitted under either the WPA or MHRA. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, vacated the grant of summary judgment as to Fuhrmann’s whistleblower claim on the grounds that there was enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to why Staples refused to accommodate Fuhrmann’s work schedule. In addition, the Law Court was asked to rule for the first time “whether the MHRA and the WPA provide for individual liability of supervisory employees.” Although the Commission interpreted the MHRA as allowing for “individual supervisor liability for employment discrimination” and argued that the Law Court should hold that the WPA does as well, the Law Court ruled in a 4-3 decision that neither the WPA nor the MHRA provides for individual supervisor liability in employment discrimination claims, and thereby affirmed the supervisors’ motions to dismiss. This Note considers whether the majority in Fuhrmann properly concluded that individual supervisor liability is nonexistent under the WPA and MHRA, or if the Law Court should have interpreted the language of the MHRA to provide for such liability and give deference to the Commission’s reasonable interpretation, as the dissent argues

The Law Court\u27s Proper Application of Miranda in State v. Bragg: A Matter-of-Fact Communication to the Defendant Regarding Evidence Against Him Will Not Typically Constitute Interrogation

In State v. Bragg, Tammy Bragg was convicted of a Class D crime for operating under the influence (OUI) at the completion of a jury trial, and was ordered to pay a fine of $800 and her license was suspended for ninety days. During her trial, Bragg submitted a motion to suppress statements she made in the police officer’s vehicle and the police station on the grounds that she was not read her Miranda warnings prior to making the statements. The Superior Court denied her motion, however, concluding that Miranda warnings were not necessary in the officer’s vehicle because her statements were not made while “in custody.” In addition, the warnings were unnecessary at the police station when the officer informed Bragg that the intoxilyzer test confirmed that “her blood alcohol content (BAC) was .13%. . . . . and that the presumptive statements were not in response to “the functional equivalent of a question.” On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, was not as to rule for the first time in Maine whether a police officer’s statements to the defendant regarding evidence against her “was the functional equivalent of the direct questioning and reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,” requiring a Miranda warning. The Law Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress statement made by Bragg in the cruiser, and those made at the police station on the grounds that the officer’s statement informing Bragg of the intoxilyzer results were merely “a matter-of-fact communication of the evidence,” which was not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating reponse.” In coming to its conclusion, the Law Court held that Bragg was entitled to information regarding her BAC level upon request, and even though she did not request it, “the officer’s simple statement relating that information” would not trigger a Miranda warning. This Note considers whether the unanimous majority in Bragg properly concluded that criminal defendants who are only informed of evidence against them are not entitled to a Miranda warning. This Note begins in Part II with a brief history and overview of the purposes of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, and how Maine has determined when the warnings should be applied, particularly in the context of statements made by law enforcement officers that rise to the level of a “functional equivalent of a question.” In Part III, this Note determines how Bragg will likely pose obstacles for defendants in attempting to bring suppression motions regarding statements made in response to evidence presented against them by law enforcement. In Part IV, this Note proposes that Bragg is consistent with other jurisdictions and the purposes of Miranda, and quite clearly demonstrates that criminal defendants in Maine will be limited in arguing that they were entitled to a Miranda warning after being told of truthful evidence against them. Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes by arguing that courts should rely on Bragg in similar cases, as long as it is done on a case-by-case basis

Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc.: A Split in the Law Court as to the Definition of Employer Demonstrates the Need for Legislative Action to Amend the Maine Human Rights Act in Order to Protect Maine Employees

In Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., Jamie Fuhrmann submitted a complaint to the Maine Human Rights Commission (Commission) against her former employer, Staples Office Superstore East, Inc. (Staples), and four of her individual supervisors. After the Commission granted her right to sue, she filed a complaint in court alleging whistleblower retaliation under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), as well as sex discrimination under the MHRA. The Superior Court granted Staples’ motion for summary judgment on all counts, and granted the four supervisors’ motions to dismiss on the grounds that individual supervisor liability is not permitted under either the WPA or MHRA. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, vacated the grant of summary judgment as to Fuhrmann’s whistleblower claim on the grounds that there was enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to why Staples refused to accommodate Fuhrmann’s work schedule. In addition, the Law Court was asked to rule for the first time “whether the MHRA and the WPA provide for individual liability of supervisory employees.” Although the Commission interpreted the MHRA as allowing for “individual supervisor liability for employment discrimination” and argued that the Law Court should hold that the WPA does as well, the Law Court ruled in a 4-3 decision that neither the WPA nor the MHRA provides for individual supervisor liability in employment discrimination claims, and thereby affirmed the supervisors’ motions to dismiss. This Note considers whether the majority in Fuhrmann properly concluded that individual supervisor liability is nonexistent under the WPA and MHRA, or if the Law Court should have interpreted the language of the MHRA to provide for such liability and give deference to the Commission’s reasonable interpretation, as the dissent argues

The Bases of Association Rules of High Confidence

We develop a new approach for distributed computing of the association rules of high confidence in a binary table. It is derived from the D-basis algorithm in K. Adaricheva and J.B. Nation (TCS 2017), which is performed on multiple sub-tables of a table given by removing several rows at a time. The set of rules is then aggregated using the same approach as the D-basis is retrieved from a larger set of implications. This allows to obtain a basis of association rules of high confidence, which can be used for ranking all attributes of the table with respect to a given fixed attribute using the relevance parameter introduced in K. Adaricheva et al. (Proceedings of ICFCA-2015). This paper focuses on the technical implementation of the new algorithm. Some testing results are performed on transaction data and medical data.Comment: Presented at DTMN, Sydney, Australia, July 28, 201