Public-Private Partnerships and Insurance Regulation

A public-private partnership (PPP) is an institutional arrangement that embodies a collaborative approach to policy and regulation; it is a joint venture between the government and one or more private sector entities. Joint financing partnerships link public financing and private insurance to pay for certain social goods. Where the financing for social goods is fragmented and overlapping, as it is for health and social care, joint financing PPPs may help organize existing financing streams. This piece argues that partnerships of this type also present an opportunity for consumer-protective regulation of the insurance industry if certain conditions are met. Private insurers must perceive benefits to the partnership, government actors must be motivated to protect the government’s financial stake, and government interests must align with those of consumers. It uses the Medicaid Partnership for Long-Term Care to illustrate the argument

Public-Private Partnerships and Insurance Regulation

A public-private partnership (PPP) is an institutional arrangement that embodies a collaborative approach to policy and regulation; it is a joint venture between the government and one or more private sector entities. Joint financing partnerships link public financing and private insurance to pay for certain social goods. Where the financing for social goods is fragmented and overlapping, as it is for health and social care, joint financing PPPs may help organize existing financing streams. This piece argues that partnerships of this type also present an opportunity for consumer-protective regulation of the insurance industry if certain conditions are met. Private insurers must perceive benefits to the partnership, government actors must be motivated to protect the government’s financial stake, and government interests must align with those of consumers. It uses the Medicaid Partnership for Long-Term Care to illustrate the argument

Rulemaking Inaction and the Failure of Administrative Law

The Trump administration may be the first presidency to go four years without promulgating new significant regulations to protect people and the environment. Although administrative law protects regulatory beneficiaries when agencies revoke or modify previous rules, those protections evaporate when an agency rejects a rulemaking petition, fails to answer a petition for years, or fails to work on pending regulatory protections. In effect, the courts have outsourced agency accountability for rulemaking inaction to political oversight, but as a defense of the interests of regulatory beneficiaries, political accountability is the “Maginot Line” of oversight. Despite the difficulty of judging an agency’s claim that it has higher priorities or that it needs more time to make a decision, judges should require more detailed explanations. Although less trusting judicial review is not without its problems, the current approach of abject deference to agency inaction ignores Congress’ commitment to protect people and the environment as specified in an agency’s mandate

Regulatory Horcruxes

The regulator that designs and first implements a federal regulatory program does not always have the ability to control the timing and process of how that regulatory program will, in this Symposium’s language, “exit.” As the 2016 election has demonstrated, the initiating regulator cannot necessarily plan in advance for the program’s expiration, diminution, or scaling back. A successor instead wields this power. Whether one views this as a terrible thing or a salutary feature of democracy depends in part upon one’s relationship to the regulatory status quo, but also implicates broader questions about policy stability and democratic accountability. At the very least, however, this fact raises several important questions about strategic regulatory design. First, is it possible to insulate or harden regulatory programs from successor exit? And second, when, if ever, would this be a good thing? This Article offers a systematic account of how regulators can make regulatory exit more challenging by looking outward, beyond the walls of a single, primary federal agency to other potential regulators or co-regulators, including secondary federal agencies, the states, and private actors. This Article identifies as a potential antidote to regulatory exit a constellation of strategic techniques that I call regulatory horcruxes—much like the horcruxes Lord Voldemort created by placing portions of his soul into multiple external objects in order to ensure his immortality. An initiating regulator, be it Congress or a federal agency, can use such horcruxes in an effort to make successor exit more difficult by splitting programs beyond the walls of a single federal agency into other institutions. This Article first offers an analytical framework laying out five primary types of horcrux. It then examines horcruxes from a normative perspective, evaluating the comparative benefits and costs of their use in terms of their potential impact both on the durability of regulatory programs and on the quality of democratic deliberation. It acknowledges that horcruxes are an imperfect solution. Although dispersal or fragmentation of regulatory authority may insulate a program from deregulatory pressure, the fragmented regulatory program may exist in a weakened form that cannot accomplish as much as more direct, centralized regulation can. The Article concludes by offering a research agenda, including suggestions for further empirical research

Collateral Damage: When Should the Determinations of Administrative Adjudications Have Collateral Estoppel Effect in Subsequent Adjudications?

Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine under which a court gives issue-preclusive effect to findings of fact or law made in previous proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that under certain circumstances, the determinations of administrative adjudications have collateral estoppel effect in federal court. The Court, however, did not address under which circumstances the determinations of administrative adjudications should have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent administrative adjudications. There has been little clear and consistent reasoning in lower federal courts about when collateral estoppel should apply in administrative adjudications, and administrative agencies vary widely in their application of collateral estoppel when conducting adjudications. This Note argues that neither the balancing test used to apply collateral estoppel in federal court nor the more formalistic per se rules proposed by some commentators are appropriate when applying collateral estoppel between administrative adjudications. Instead, courts should defer to agencies, granting them wide discretion to recognize or not recognize the collateral estoppel effect of prior administrative adjudications

Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation

Administrative law and financial regulation might be thought closely connected, sharing a focus on federal regulation and intertwined at key historical junctures such as the birth of the New Deal administrative state. Yet, oddly, in many ways these two fields stand today poles apart, divided not simply by their separation in law school curricula and faculty, but even more by opposite precepts and framing principles. Modern U.S. administrative law takes notice-and-comment rulemaking as the paradigmatic example of administrative action, with the goal of such regulation often being to compensate for market deficiencies. Accountability, particularly political accountability through presidential and congressional oversight and legal accountability through the courts, is administrative law’s central obsession. While financial regulatory agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking, their regulatory mode is often more informal and hidden from public view, with the market serving as much as an arbiter of successful financial regulation as the object of regulators’ attention. Here the defining structural precept is not accountability but independence, and the vast majority of financial regulators enjoy a range of independence protections, including protection from removal, budgetary autonomy, and exemption from White House regulatory oversight. This essay explores the historical contrasts between administrative law and financial regulation, with the aim of elucidating the contingent and contestable nature of each field’s framing presumptions. Its aim is to provide the basis for a sustained and reciprocal engagement that will provide room for rethinking regulatory approaches in both. Indeed, in part as a result of the financial crisis that rethinking is already underway, and the essay also identifies ways in which the historical differences between these two fields are abating