An Economic Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage

The institution of marriage is the foundation of the family and of society. Even though it is a private institution, it has been regulated by society, depending on the specific time and history, religious perceptions, legal rules or customs, and norms. According to historical judicial interpretation, marriage has been viewed as a heterosexual union, same-sex rela-tionships are precluded from the definition of "marriage". Same-sex relationships, regardless of their duration, have not been legally recognised in most countries and, as a result, homosexual partners are denied many of the legal and eco-nomic privileges automatically granted with the marital status. Only recently, some countries have become more open to grant rights for same-sex couples, but the justification is rather on egalitarian than on economic grounds. The aim of the paper is to examine whether restricting the marriage option to heterosexual couples is efficient. It will be argued that there are hardly any grounds for denying same-sex couples the rights heterosexuals are granted when they wish to enter a legally recognised relationship. Furthermore, legalising same-sex marriage and implementing a social change might bring about a welfare gain for society as a whole. Yet, tradition and social values might make it more desir-able to let the relationship be recognised under a different name than “marriage”: a domestic partnership.

The Dynamic Relationship Between Freedom of Speech and Equality

This Article examines the dynamic intersection between freedom of speech and equal protection, with a particular focus on the race and LGBT equality movements. Unlike other works on expression and/or equality, the Article emphasizes the relational and bi-directional connections between freedom of speech and equal protection. Freedom of speech has played a critical role in terms of advancing constitutional equality. However, with regard to both race and LGBT equality, free speech rights also failed in important respects to facilitate equality claims and movements. Advocacy and agitation on behalf of equality rights have also left indelible positive and negative marks on free speech doctrines, principles, and rights. The free speech-equality relationship underscores several important lessons regarding reliance on speech rights to advance constitutional equality. Moreover, through a comparative analysis, the Article demonstrates that freedom of speech intersects in distinctive ways with different types of equalities. The Article’s general lessons and comparative observations carry important implications for future equality movements, including the current campaign for transgender equality

The Canon Wars

Canons are taking their turn down the academic runway in ways that no one would have foretold just a decade ago. Affection for canons of construction has taken center stage in recent Supreme Court cases and in constitutional theory. Harvard Dean John Manning and originalists Will Baude and Stephen Sachs have all suggested that principles of “ordinary interpretation” including canons should inform constitutional interpretation. Given this newfound enthusiasm for canons, and their convergence in both constitutional and statutory law, it is not surprising that we now have two competing book-length treatments of the canons—one by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner, Reading Law, and the other by Yale Law Professor William N. Eskridge, Interpreting Law. Both volumes purport to provide ways to use canons to read statutes and the Constitution. In this Review of Interpreting Law, we argue that this contemporary convergence on canons raises some significant interpretive questions about judicial power and the very idea of a canon

Family Courts as Certifying Agencies: When Family Courts Can Certify U Visa Applications for Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence

Undocumented intimate partner violence survivors living in the UnitedStates have limited options for immigration relief. One of the only avenuesopen to them is the U Visa: a nonimmigrant visa established by the BatteredImmigrant Women Protection Act of 2000. To apply for a U Visa, a survivormust prove to immigration authorities that she was the victim of a crime;suffered substantial abuse; and was, is,or is likely to be helpful in theinvestigation of her abuser. The statute requires that all U Visa applicationsbe certified by an appropriate officialwho testifies to the applicant’shelpfulness with the investigation. This certification is a tremendous obstaclefor survivors: agencies are under nolegal obligation to provide thesecertifications, the procedure to obtainthem is often complicated and timeconsuming, and the decision-makingprocess is opaque. Moreover, manyundocumented survivors fear involvement with the criminal courts or policeout of fear of their abusers and deportation.In response, survivor advocates approach certification creatively and seekcertification from less obvious authorities. Undocumented survivors aremore likely to be involved in family court proceedings—seeking orders ofprotection from, or adjudicating custody and visitation disputes with, theirabusers—than criminal proceedings. Advocates have likewise turned tofamily courts to certify U Visa applications. Family courts are unclear onwhether they are authorized to certifythese applications and are oftenreluctant to make a final decision.This Note proposes that family courts are empowered by statutorylanguage and history to certify U Visa applications for undocumentedsurvivors. After a textual and legalprocess analysis of the statutoryprovisions regarding U Visa certification, this Note proposes guidelines for practitioners seeking U Visa certification from a family court and for familycourt judges ruling on these applications

Quantifying Bar Strength: Morphology Meets Methodology

A set of objective bar-classification methods have been applied to the Ohio State Bright Spiral Galaxy Survey (Eskridge et al. 2002). Bivariate comparisons between methods show that all methods agree in a statistical sense. Thus the distribution of bar strengths in a sample of galaxies can be robustly determined. There are very substantial outliers in all bivariate comparisons. Examination of the outliers reveals that the scatter in the bivariate comparisons correlates with galaxy morphology. Thus multiple measures of bar strength provide a means of studying the range of physical properties of galaxy bars in an objective statistical sense.Comment: LaTeX with Kluwer style file, 5 pages with 3 embedded figures. edited by Block, D.L., Freeman, K.C., Puerari, I., & Groess,

A SERVICE OR NOT A SERVICE—IS THAT THE QUESTION?: PLASMA DONATION CENTERS AND THE “OTHER SERVICE ESTABLISHMENT” CATCHALL UNDER SECTION 12181(7)(F) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

In 2013, Brent Levorsen was denied the opportunity to donate plasma at a Utah Octapharma Plasma. That same year, Mark Silguero was prevented from doing so at his Texas CSL Plasma. In 2016, George Matheis Jr. and Amy Wolfe faced the same fate at their respective plasma donation centers, a Texas CSL Plasma and a Pennsylvania CSL Plasma. Each individual had one thing in common; they were disabled. Each sued under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The resulting appellate cases created a federal circuit split over whether plasma donation centers are service establishments under Section 12181(7)(F) of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Each court analyzed the statute using various interpretative methods, including plain meaning, canons of construction, and legislative history. While the Tenth Circuit in Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc. and the Third Circuit in Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc. ultimately came to the right conclusion—that plasma donation centers are service establishments under the Americans with Disabilities Act—, the Fifth Circuit, in Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., did not. A better way to analyze the service establishment issue is to use a practical, or pragmatic, approach to statutory interpretation. Utilizing a pragmatic theory of statutory interpretation yields a result in accord with the Tenth and Third Circuits, but it also takes into account additional relevant information those courts left on the table

The Workers\u27 Constitution

This Article argues that the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Social Security Act of 1935, and Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 should be understood as a “workers’ constitution.” The Article tells the history of how a connected wave of social movements responded to the insecurity that wage earners faced after the Industrial Revolution and Great Depression by working with government officials to bring about federal collective bargaining rights, wage and hour legislation, and social security legislation. It argues that the statutes are tied together as a set of “small c” constitutional commitments in both their histories and theory. Each statute sought to redefine economic freedom for workers around security and sought to position worker security as essential to the constitutional accommodation of corporate capitalism. The Article also explores the interpretive implications of conceiving of a “workers’ constitution” in the current context