Teaching Employment Discrimination

In this Essay, I explore and discuss various methods for effectively teaching civil rights to this post-racial generation. Specifically, I examine the following four classroom challenges: (1) this generation\u27s general lack of understanding about the historical context in which many civil rights laws-for purposes of this Essay, Title VII-arose; (2) the general lack of real-life work experience among many law students; (3) a growing decline in the racial and ethnic diversity of law school classes; and (4) the increasing complexities of discrimination in the workplace, including forms of discrimination such as proxy discrimination and demands for covering. 11 I analyze these obstacles to teaching civil rights law-in particular, employment discrimination law-in four, short separate parts, each one dedicated to the challenges described above

Radical Method

Should traditional liberals and insurgent scholars who disdain the system nevertheless work together? They start at different points, build on clashing presumptions, and follow different methodologies. Nevertheless, they often come out the same way. Indeed, practitioners of the standard cases-and-policies approach sometimes end up instinctively applying radical techniques, such as the flip or shift of point of view, to great effect. After analyzing a number of examples, we conclude that progressive scholars should not reflexively reject lawyering that proceeds in the time- honored manner merely because it strikes them as quaint or square. By the same token, neither should they ignore those even further to the left than they, merely because those circles may contain a Marxist or two. We conclude by describing a second source of support for progressive agendas that is even easier to ignore, namely the far left. This examination shows that progressive scholars, including our fellow race-crits, would do well to heed the powerful insights of critical legal studies even if those insights strike them as deracinated or unrealistic

The ghetto sophisticates: Performing black masculinity, saving lost souls and serving as leaders of the new school.

The educational discourse chronicling the experiences of African American educators continues to be limited while the anthropological and sociological literature appears to be more inclusive. In reviewing the literature I have found the typical representation of African American educators to be negative. Educational literature in regards to African American educators since my birth year 1966 continues to focus on how African American educators maintain the status quo and how the dominant middle class values of society are reproduced through dominant pedagogy. This is the duality in which African. Americans must struggle. And because of the absence of the marginalized and silenced "other" within the literature, very few first-person narratives, which articulate the issues in which African American educators experience in educating today's youth is in existence. This has created a "state of uncertainty," (my emphasis) for myself and the practitioners studied, because of the works of other black educators, i.e., Mc Whorter (2000), Hale-Benson (1982), Delpit (1995), Ladson-Billings (1994), regarding what works for black children. This state of uncertainty is predicated upon the various conservative, liberal, and progressive politics that frame the writings of these academicians; as well as, the range of discourses. The discourses curricula, educational leadership, culture, teacher preparation and language are also informed by the researcher's position regarding the intersections of their race, class, and gender

Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms

Each stage of feminist legal theory-and each brand or strand of feminism- stays alive and is never completely replaced by newer approaches. When I first attempted to synthesize the field of Feminist Legal Theory for a treatise I was writing at the end of the twentieth century, I thought it would be useful to think chronologically and to analyze the major developments of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. I crudely divided feminist legal theory into three stages roughly corresponding to the preceding decades: the equality stage of the 1970s, the difference stage of the 1980s, and the diversity stage of the 1990s. It is much more difficult to describe feminist legal theory in this century. For this essay, I have borrowed from Rosalind Dixon\u27s terrific 2008 article in which she canvasses the last four decades and divides legal feminism into older femninisms and newer feminisms. The older feminisms-which I will call the Big Three -are liberal, dominance, and cultural feminism. The newer femninisms also come in threes: partial agency (or sex-positive) feminism, intersectional (or anti-essentialist) feminism, and postmodern/poststrucrural feminism. I will call them the New Three. The major difference between Dixon\u27s taxonomy and my three stages of feminist legal theory is Dixon\u27s astute positioning of the Big Three feminisms as foundational theories that have been taken up by mainstream scholars beyond feminist circles. Dixon also presents a more refined description of contemporary legal feminist thought, going beyond intersectional feminism to add two new strands of feminist theory, sex-positive feminism and postmodern feminism, that have come into their own in this century. I use Dixon\u27s taxonomy as a map to locate the scholarly contributions of todays panelists and to theorize a bit about the present state of feminist legal theory. At the end of this essay, I will briefly glimpse into the future of feminist legal theory and mention two promising lines of emerging scholarship, masculinities theories and social justice feminism, that demonstrate the capacity of feminist legal theory to generate new insights for a new generation

Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms

Each stage of feminist legal theory-and each brand or strand of feminism- stays alive and is never completely replaced by newer approaches. When I first attempted to synthesize the field of Feminist Legal Theory for a treatise I was writing at the end of the twentieth century, I thought it would be useful to think chronologically and to analyze the major developments of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. I crudely divided feminist legal theory into three stages roughly corresponding to the preceding decades: the equality stage of the 1970s, the difference stage of the 1980s, and the diversity stage of the 1990s. It is much more difficult to describe feminist legal theory in this century. For this essay, I have borrowed from Rosalind Dixon\u27s terrific 2008 article in which she canvasses the last four decades and divides legal feminism into older femninisms and newer feminisms. The older feminisms-which I will call the Big Three -are liberal, dominance, and cultural feminism. The newer femninisms also come in threes: partial agency (or sex-positive) feminism, intersectional (or anti-essentialist) feminism, and postmodern/poststrucrural feminism. I will call them the New Three. The major difference between Dixon\u27s taxonomy and my three stages of feminist legal theory is Dixon\u27s astute positioning of the Big Three feminisms as foundational theories that have been taken up by mainstream scholars beyond feminist circles. Dixon also presents a more refined description of contemporary legal feminist thought, going beyond intersectional feminism to add two new strands of feminist theory, sex-positive feminism and postmodern feminism, that have come into their own in this century. I use Dixon\u27s taxonomy as a map to locate the scholarly contributions of todays panelists and to theorize a bit about the present state of feminist legal theory. At the end of this essay, I will briefly glimpse into the future of feminist legal theory and mention two promising lines of emerging scholarship, masculinities theories and social justice feminism, that demonstrate the capacity of feminist legal theory to generate new insights for a new generation