27 research outputs found
Anti-Employer Blogging: Employee Breach of the Duty of Loyalty and the Procedure for Allowing Discovery of a Bloggerâs Identity Before Service of Process Is Effected
The rapid rise in anonymous anti-employer internet blogs by disgruntled employees has created a tension between the liberty interests of employees in free speech and privacy and employers\u27 rights to be free from defamation, disparagement and disclosure of confidential information by an employee. This iBrief argues that the anonymity of anti-employer bloggers should not shield employees from breach of the duty of loyalty claims under tort and contract law, and that Congress should enact rules to govern the disclosure of blogger identity
The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for Revisiting the Law of the Workplace
The IBM decision illustrates two major problems with current workplace regulation. First, there are two distinct but overlapping systems - the individual and the collective - which often collide. The result is, at best, an imperfect realization of rights under both systems, and perhaps more often, the sacrifice of rights under one to rights under the other. Second, the multitude of forums available for litigation results in multiple claims arising out of the same action, as well as tribunals deciding issues outside their expertise. After analyzing the IBM decision, I will consider the costs and benefits of the current regulatory system for employers and employees. Finally, I will make some broad suggestions for change, urging a revitalization of the collective system and creation of a system of labor courts to resolve workplace disputes
The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for Revisiting the Law of the Workplace
The IBM decision illustrates two major problems with current workplace regulation. First, there are two distinct but overlapping systems - the individual and the collective - which often collide. The result is, at best, an imperfect realization of rights under both systems, and perhaps more often, the sacrifice of rights under one to rights under the other. Second, the multitude of forums available for litigation results in multiple claims arising out of the same action, as well as tribunals deciding issues outside their expertise. After analyzing the IBM decision, I will consider the costs and benefits of the current regulatory system for employers and employees. Finally, I will make some broad suggestions for change, urging a revitalization of the collective system and creation of a system of labor courts to resolve workplace disputes
Solidarity, Self-Interest and the Unionization Differential Between Europe and North America
En Europe, le pourcentage des travailleurs syndiquĂ©s est plus grand qu'il ne l'est aux Ătats-Unis et au Canada. Cette situation intrigue Ă bien des titres. Les clauses de sĂ©curitĂ© syndicale sont beaucoup moins rĂ©pandues en Europe qu'elles ne le sont en AmĂ©rique du Nord. En Europe, la nĂ©gociation collective se fait surtout au niveau des branches industrielles et les conventions ne fixent que des conditions minimales qui s'appliquent aux travailleurs non-syndiquĂ©s comme aux travailleurs syndiquĂ©s. En outre, les syndicats europĂ©ens n'ont gĂ©nĂ©ralement pas Ă©tĂ© en mesure d'Ă©tablir des sections au niveau des usines comme on a pu y arriver en AmĂ©rique du Nord. Ce sont les comitĂ©s de travailleurs Ă©lus par l'ensemble des employĂ©s de l'entreprise qui constituent l'organisation syndicale principale Ă la base. Ătant donnĂ© ces caractĂ©ristiques du rĂ©gime des relations de travail en Europe, on pourrait s'attendre Ă un « parasitisme » exubĂ©rant et Ă un degrĂ© de syndicalisation trĂšs bas.L'explication connue de ce paradoxe, c'est que les travailleurs europĂ©ens feraient preuve d'un plus grand esprit de solidaritĂ© Ă l'Ă©gard de leurs syndicats. L'explication de ce phĂ©nomĂšne par l'esprit de solidaritĂ© s'efface devant la rĂ©alitĂ© omniprĂ©sente de l'intĂ©rĂȘt personnel. Donc, si l'on accepte l'explication que les travailleurs agissent poussĂ©s par des sentiments de solidaritĂ© envers leurs syndicats, force est de dire que les travailleurs europĂ©ens ont un comportement anormal.Des Ă©tudes rĂ©centes dĂ©montrent pourtant que les travailleurs europĂ©ens ne sont pas moins normaux que les camarades amĂ©ricains. En rĂ©alitĂ©, ils adhĂšrent aux syndicats dans l'espoir d'en retirer des avantages personnels, ce qui, pour eux, consiste avant tout Ă se protĂ©ger contre les dĂ©cisions patronales unilatĂ©rales qui peuvent ĂȘtre Ă leur dĂ©triment.On a dĂ©couvert deux facteurs qui seraient de nature Ă expliquer ces contradictions dans le comportement des syndiquĂ©s europĂ©ens et des syndiquĂ©s amĂ©ricains: les diffĂ©rences de structure des rĂ©gimes de relations du travail et la force de la pression sociale diffuse. En Europe, il n'est pas nĂ©cessaire que les syndicats obtiennent une majoritĂ© d'adhĂ©rents dans une unitĂ© de nĂ©gociation donnĂ©e pour que les travailleurs puissent bĂ©nĂ©ficier de leur protection. Au contraire, mĂȘme dans lesentreprises oĂč les syndicats ne comptent que peu de membres, ceux-lĂ peuvent intervenir au nom d'un membre qui s'estime traitĂ© injustment. Contrairement Ă ce qui se passe en AmĂ©rique du Nord, les valeurs sociales communĂ©ment acceptĂ©es outre-Atlantique empĂȘchent les employeurs de chercher Ă contrecarrer les tentatives de syndicalisation. D'autre part, Ă cause de la puissance politique dustanding social des syndicats, les employeurs ne sont pas enclins Ă prendre Ă la lĂ©gĂšre les dĂ©marches des syndicats en faveur de leurs membres. De plus, le concept de « grief » n'est pas trĂšs bien fixĂ© et les syndicats se trouvent ainsi en mesure d'intervenir en faveur de leurs membres sur un grand nombre de points, qu'il en soit traitĂ© ou non dans les conventions collectives. Les syndicats ne sont pas non plus obligĂ©s de dĂ©fendre les intĂ©rĂȘts des non-membres et, en consĂ©quence, seuls les membres des syndicats bĂ©nĂ©ficient de ce que Mark von de Vall a appelĂ© « une assurance contre la discorde ».MĂȘme si la lĂ©gislation du travail favorise certainement la nĂ©gociation collective en AmĂ©rique du Nord et, de façon indirecte, les syndicats qui la rendent possible, en rĂ©alitĂ© la lĂ©gislation nuit Ă leur dĂ©veloppement. MĂȘme si une minoritĂ© importante de salariĂ©s dans une entreprise donnĂ©e ou une « unitĂ© de nĂ©gociation appropriĂ©e » peut dĂ©sirer les services d'un syndicat, le syndicat ne peut pas faire beaucoup pour eux. En outre, la lĂ©gislation du travail en AmĂ©rique du Nord autorise le « droit » des employeurs de « combattre » la syndicalisation, ce qui est contraire aux valeurs et aux moeurs europĂ©ennes.Enfin, il y a certains indices qui dĂ©montrent que, en dĂ©pit de l'absence de retenue obligatoire des cotisations syndicales, dans beaucoup de pays d'Europe, la pression sociale ambiante qui s'exerce sur les travailleurs pour les inciter Ă adhĂ©rer aux syndicats est considĂ©rable.In this article, the« solidarity » argument is questionned on both theoretical and empirical grounds. It is argued instead that the unionization differential between the two continents may be more adequately explained in terms of differences on key dimensions of the existing industrial relations systems
Sigurjonsson v. Iceland: The European Court of Human Rights Expands the Negative Right of Association
Sigurjonsson v. Iceland: The European Court of Human Rights Expands the Negative Right of Association
Specialized Labor and Employment Law Institutions in New Zealand and the United States
Legal specialization takes several forms: decision-makers and advocates can specialize in particular types of cases, specialized rules can govern particular types of disputes, facts may be found by experts, appeals heard by special courts, or some or all of these combined. The American and New Zealand employment and labor law regimes make different use of specialized decision-makers, in part because of differences in their use of specialized legal rules for labor and employment law. These differences provide an opportunity to assess the appropriateness of specialization in legal decisionmaking.
Specialization in the legal system is simply one form of the more general phenomenon of specialization of goods and services. When we examine products provided in the marketplace, we see a wide range in degree of specialization. Medical services, for example, are provided through networks of generalists and specialists-we visit an internist for a routine physical, but a surgeon for an appendectomy. On a more basic level, in a visit to the grocery store in the United States or New Zealand, I can find many varieties of jam but at most one variety of Vegemite.
As these examples suggest, the degree of specialization in the market is a response to factors such as consumer demand or a desire to preempt competitors. In law, however, market forces play only a muted role around the edges. Getting the degree of legal specialization right is thus more important than getting the degree of specialization in toppings for bread right -in the latter case, a manufacturer that produced crunchy Vegemite may well go bankrupt; in the former, a government which opts for the wrong degree of specialization causes problems, but is unlikely to disappear.
The appropriateness of specialized legal institutions in a particular case rests on the balance between specialization\u27s benefits and its dangers. Evaluating that balance is trickier than it first appears. Without market measures of success, we must fall back on hypothetical counterfactuals. Nonetheless, a combination of theory and experience with specialist bodies in other areas provides some guidance. Part I of this Article describes the use of specialized legal institutions in New Zealand and the United States, while Part II assesses the appropriateness of both countries\u27 institutions in light of the theoretical literature on legal specialization