25 research outputs found
Why is Argentina’s Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth
A long-standing concern in political economy is whether outcomes are efficient in political equilibrium. Recent contributions have examined the efficiency/inefficiency of policy choices from a theoretical point of view. The aim of this paper is to examine such issue empirically. Building on existing "economic" diagnoses that highlight the deficient incentives present in Argentina’s Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement the paper will attempt to understand the politics behind its adoption and persistence. We suggest an explanation based on the transaction costs of Argentina’s political market. Although potentially Pareto-improving policies could have been adopted, they were not introduced because of the uncertainty over the future status of today’s bargains, and given the lack of institutions to enforce bargains among the political actors. The paper concludes offering some preliminary ideas for institutional engineering: what governance structures could help reduce these transaction costs? The purpose is to create an institutional framework in which political actors could negotiate among themselves, ensuring the enforceability of agreements, in order to achieve more efficient outcomes.
¿Jugadores activos o apéndices del ejecutivo? Una evaluación del papel de los legisladores latinoamericanos en la toma de decisiones
Las legislaturas son instituciones cruciales para el funcionamiento efectivo de un sistema democrático y para el proceso de toma de decisiones. Se espera que representen las necesidades y los deseos de los ciudadanos, que identifiquen problemas y adopten estatutos para resolverlos, y que supervisen la aplicaciĂłn de las medidas. Sin embargo, el grado en que las legislaturas latinoamericanas asumen esas responsabilidades varĂa notablemente de un paĂs a otro. A pesar de la reciente proliferaciĂłn de la investigaciĂłn en torno a las relaciones entre el ejecutivo y el legislativo en AmĂ©rica Latina, el conocimiento comparativo de la manera en que funcionan las instituciones legislativas en los paĂses de la regiĂłn sigue siendo bastante limitado. En un esfuerzo por mejorar la comprensiĂłn de esta área he evaluaÂdo el alcance y la naturaleza del papel de dieciocho legislaturas latinoamericanas en lo referente a la elaboraciĂłn de las polĂticas que se pretenden seguir. EspecĂficamente, utilicĂ© tĂ©cnicas de escalamiento multidimensional para probar si, y cĂłmo, las dimensiones por las cuales se habĂan distinguido antes esas legislaturas correspondĂan a las semejanzas observadas entre ellas. El análisis revela que es posible identificar cuatro tipos de legislaturas. Los hallazgos confirman, además, que las legislaturas que cuentan con mayores capacidades son las que desempeñan un papel más activo en el proceso de generaciĂłn de polĂticas
La estructura radial del conflicto polĂtico: el juego imposible en Argentina (1955-1966)
In this article, we examine a two-dimensional, circular model of political conflict. We consider O’Donnell_s (1973) canonical interpretation of regime instability in Argentina between 1955 and 1966, the impossible game, and evaluate such characterization empirically through the analysis of roll call votes. Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis supports a two-dimensional radex representation composed of two intercorrelated facets: (1) ideological outlook (its elements being «liberal» versus «nationalistic»), and (2) attitudes toward Peronism. The radex structure, resembling a dart board, derives from the combination of a one-dimensional simplex (with radial lines capturing stands on Peronism) and a one-dimensional circumplex (with concentric circles corresponding to ideological outlook). These findings indicate that, because of the circular —and thus multidimensional— nature of political conflict during the 1955-1966 period, stable political outcomes failed to exist.Este artĂculo presenta una representaciĂłn radial del conflicto polĂtico para analizar el juego imposible, la clásica interpretaciĂłn de la inestabilidad del rĂ©gimen en Argentina entre 1955 y 1966 de O’Donnell (1973). Evaluamos esta caracterizaciĂłn utilizando las votaciones nominales de la Cámara de Diputados de dicho paĂs entre 1958 y 1966. Los resultados obtenidos a partir del uso de tĂ©cnicas de escalamiento multidimensional (MDS por sus iniciales en inglĂ©s) reflejan una representaciĂłn radial compuesta por dos facetas interconectadas: (1) la dimensiĂłn ideolĂłgica (siendo sus elementos «liberal» versus «nacionalista ») y (2) actitudes con respecto al peronismo. Estos hallazgos indican que, dada la naturaleza circular —y, por ende, multidimensional— del conflicto polĂtico en el perĂodo entre 1955 y 1966, no habĂa posibilidad de alcanzar acuerdos polĂticos estables. En tĂ©rminos substantivos, ello implica que la inestabilidad polĂtica no se debiĂł a la imposibilidad de encontrar una Ăşnica soluciĂłn al juego imposible, sino más bien por la existencia de mĂşltiples soluciones posibles
La estructura radial del conflicto polĂtico: el juego imposible en Argentina (1955-1966)
In this article, we examine a two-dimensional, circular model of political conflict. We consider O’Donnell_s (1973) canonical interpretation of regime instability in Argentina between 1955 and 1966, the impossible game, and evaluate such characterization empirically through the analysis of roll call votes. Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis supports a two-dimensional radex representation composed of two intercorrelated facets: (1) ideological outlook (its elements being «liberal» versus «nationalistic»), and (2) attitudes toward Peronism. The radex structure, resembling a dart board, derives from the combination of a one-dimensional simplex (with radial lines capturing stands on Peronism) and a one-dimensional circumplex (with concentric circles corresponding to ideological outlook). These findings indicate that, because of the circular —and thus multidimensional— nature of political conflict during the 1955-1966 period, stable political outcomes failed to exist.Este artĂculo presenta una representaciĂłn radial del conflicto polĂtico para analizar el juego imposible, la clásica interpretaciĂłn de la inestabilidad del rĂ©gimen en Argentina entre 1955 y 1966 de O’Donnell (1973). Evaluamos esta caracterizaciĂłn utilizando las votaciones nominales de la Cámara de Diputados de dicho paĂs entre 1958 y 1966. Los resultados obtenidos a partir del uso de tĂ©cnicas de escalamiento multidimensional (MDS por sus iniciales en inglĂ©s) reflejan una representaciĂłn radial compuesta por dos facetas interconectadas: (1) la dimensiĂłn ideolĂłgica (siendo sus elementos «liberal» versus «nacionalista ») y (2) actitudes con respecto al peronismo. Estos hallazgos indican que, dada la naturaleza circular —y, por ende, multidimensional— del conflicto polĂtico en el perĂodo entre 1955 y 1966, no habĂa posibilidad de alcanzar acuerdos polĂticos estables. En tĂ©rminos substantivos, ello implica que la inestabilidad polĂtica no se debiĂł a la imposibilidad de encontrar una Ăşnica soluciĂłn al juego imposible, sino más bien por la existencia de mĂşltiples soluciones posibles
Replication data for: Civil War Exposure and Violence
In recent years scholars have begun to focus on the consequences of individuals' exposure to civil war, including its severe health and psychological consequences. Our innovation is to move beyond the survey methodology that is widespread in this literature to analyze the actual behavior of individuals with varying degrees of exposure to civil war in a common institutional setting. We exploit the presence of thousands of international soccer (football) players with different exposures to civil conflict in the European professional leagues, and find a strong relationship between the extent of civil conflict in a player's home country and his propensity to behave violently on the soccer field, as measured by yellow and red cards. This link is robust to region fixed effects, country characteristics (e.g. rule of law, per capita income), player characteristics (e.g. age, field position, quality), outliers, and team fixed effects. Reinforcing our claim that we isolate the effect of civil war exposure rather than simple rule breaking or something else entirely, there is no meaningful correlation between our measure of exposure to civil war and soccer performance measures not closely related to violent conduct. The result is also robust to controlling for civil wars before a player's birth, suggesting that it is not driven by factors from the distant historical past
Supplementary Material, Saiegh_replication_files – Executive Constraint and Sovereign Debt: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Argentina During the Baring Crisis
<p>Supplementary Material, Saiegh_replication_files for Executive Constraint and Sovereign Debt: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Argentina During the Baring Crisis by Gary W. Cox and Sebastian M. Saiegh in Comparative Political Studies</p