Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game

We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulate the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources will be available for deliberation on the choice. Although much is known about how subjects make decisions under a cognitive load, little is known about how this affects behavior in strategic games. We run an experiment in which subjects play a repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects are placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other are placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). We find that the individual behavior of the subjects in the low load condition converges to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium prediction at a faster rate than those in the high load treatment. However, we do not find the corresponding relationship involving outcomes in the game. Specifically, there is no evidence of a significantly different convergence of game outcomes across treatments. As an explanation of these two results, we find evidence that low load subjects are better able to adjust their choice in response to outcomes in previous periods.cognitive resources; experimental economics; experimental game theory; public goods game

Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game

We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulate the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources will be available for deliberation on the choice. Although much is known about how subjects make decisions under a cognitive load, little is known about how this affects behavior in strategic games. We run an experiment in which subjects play a repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects are placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other are placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). We find that the behavior of the subjects in the low load condition converges to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium prediction at a faster rate than those in the high load treatment. However, we do not find the corresponding relationship involving outcomes in the game. Specifically, there is no evidence of a significantly different convergence of game outcomes across treatments. As an explanation of these two results, we find evidence that low load subjects are better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.cognitive resources; experimental economics; experimental game theory; public goods game

Omitted-variable bias and other matters in the defense of the category adjustment model: A reply to Crawford (2019)

The datasets from Duffy, Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Crawford (2010) [Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17(2), 224-230] were reanalyzed by Duffy and Smith (2018) [Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25(5), 1740-1750]. Duffy and Smith (2018) conclude that the datasets are not consistent with the category adjustment model (CAM). Crawford (2019) [Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 26(2), 693-698] offered a reply to Duffy and Smith (2018) that is based on three main points. Crawford proposes regressions that are, in part, based on a “deviation” analysis. Crawford offers a different simulation of data and claims that the techniques employed by Duffy and Smith (2018) are not sufficiently sensitive to detect a specific relationship that is claimed to be consistent with CAM. Crawford also appeals to a figure showing that the responses appear to be biased toward the overall running mean, and presumably not toward recently viewed lines. We show that Crawford’s analysis suffers from an omitted-variable bias. Once this bias is corrected, the evidence in support of CAM disappears. When we produce a simulated dataset that is consistent with the specification suggested by Crawford, the techniques of Duffy and Smith (2018) correctly detect the true relationship. Despite the assertion otherwise, the simulated dataset that was analyzed by Crawford is not publicly available. Since the analysis of Crawford (2019) is incorrect, it remains our view that the datasets from Duffy, Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Crawford (2010) do not appear to be consistent with CAM or any Bayesian model of judgment

Costly and discrete communication: An experimental investigation

Language is an imperfect and uneven means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental investigation of a setting in which the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. As is standard in the communication literature, the sender learns the state of the world then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and provides a best guess about the state. The incentives of the players are aligned in the sense that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the receiver's guess. As would be expected, we find that larger communication costs are associated with worse outcomes for both sender and receiver. Consistent with the communication literature, albeit in very different setting, we find that there is overcommunication. For the receiver, there is a positive relationship between the payoffs relative to the equilibrium predictions and communication costs. This relationship is negative for the senders. We also find that the response time of both the sender and receiver are positively related to their payoffs.communication; cheap talk; overcommunication

Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision-making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with 825 participants, using six different coordination games, where either individuals or teams interact with each other. We find that teams coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model.coordination games, individual decision-making, team decision-making, experience-weighted attraction learning, experiment

A Hedonic Analysis of the Value of Parks and Green Spaces in the Dublin Area [on housing market]. ESRI WP331. November 2009

We use a hedonic house price model to estimate the value of green spaces and parks to homeowners in the Dublin area. Using a dataset of house sales between 2001 and 2006 and combining it with available data on the location of green spaces in Dublin it is possible to assess the different values assigned to green areas by homeowners. We find that the value of green space depends first of all on how far from the property it is located. We also find a difference in the values assigned to open access parks and green spaces. For every 10% increase in the share of green space and park area near a house, its average price increases by 7% to 9%. We also attempted to identify different individual parks and rank them according to their value, however due to spatial multicollinearity the results were mixed

Skorokhod's M1 topology for distribution-valued processes

Skorokhod's M1 topology is defined for c\`adl\`ag paths taking values in the space of tempered distributions (more generally, in the dual of a countably Hilbertian nuclear space). Compactness and tightness characterisations are derived which allow us to study a collection of stochastic processes through their projections on the familiar space of real-valued c\`adl\`ag processes. It is shown how this topological space can be used in analysing the convergence of empirical process approximations to distribution-valued evolution equations with Dirichlet boundary conditions.Comment: 13 pages, 2 figure